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ICHAPTER I
Warehousing
I. Warehousing Prior to The Legislat ion of 1871. Warehousing is
the business of storing the surplus products of industry for future
demand. It is an important step in the marketing process of many
products* The business directly creates time utilities and indirect
ly assists in the creation of place utilities. The accumulation
of surplus products is a practice as old as civilization and it has
frequently been subject to state regulation? Its large scale oper-
ation has however always depended upon improved means of transpor-
tation and marketing conditions. Improved means of transportation,
concentration of population in large centers, geographical distri-
bution of labor, and warehousing go hand in hand.
The history of governmental regulation of warehousing
in the State of Illinois is almost coincident with the history of
public grain warehousing in the city of Chicago.This city, because
of its location on the Great Lakes, in the midst of the greatest
grain region of the country, early became one of the primary grain
2
markets in the United States.
The Constitution of 1848 contained no provisions direct-
ly relating to the business of public grain warehousing and the
statutory provisions, prior to the passage of the acts of 1871,
1. Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance, Oct. 1913, pp. I035ff
.
Ashley's English Economic History, II. pp.37ff. Herman's Unter-
suchungen p. 25.
2. "Elevators were built in Chicago in the 50's; possibly as ear-
ly as 1848 there was an elevator in Chicago. - - One of the most
important features of the handling of grain in Chicago is its stor-
age; and it being at the end of the railway lines and the begin-
ning of water navigation, it has become necessary to establish
large and numerous elevators here. 1* United States Industrial
Commission Report, Vol. 10, p. 295.
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failed to provide regulation at many points which are at present
considered in greatest need of State supervision.
The statutes, prior to 1867, provided that public ware-
houses might be kept at the places designated by county commission-
ers. These officials were also to appoint inspectors of beef, to-
bacco, hemp, and flour. Standard weights and measures were to be
kept and used there. The warehousing and inspection of tobacco
was more carefully provided for. An attempt was also made to
guard against the fraudulent issue of warehouse receipts. It was
made a criminal offense for any warehouseman, wharfinger or other
person to issue any receipt or other voucher for any goods, wares,
merchandise, or grain to any person claiming to be the owner there-
of, unless such goods of wares had been bona fide received into
store. Neither was any person to issue receipts on property not
2
his own.
These laws were highly inadequate and as no provision
3
was made for their enforcement they were generally disregarded.
In I860, over thirty millions bushels of grain were
received in the city of Chicago and over twenty-seven millions
4
of bushels were shipped out. The storage capacity of the city
elevators was at this time somewhat over five millions and four-
hundred thousand bushels. But the system of grain inspection
was very defective. There was no uniformity of inspection and
no responsibility was attached to the inspectors. Every inspector
was his own judge of the qualities and grades of grain inspected.
1. The provisions of this law cover over six pages in the statutes
of I860. Statutes of Illinois I860, pp.279ff.
2. Ibid.p420.
3. Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners * Report, 1872, p. 15
4. Chicago Board of Trade Reports, 1867
,
p. 7.
5. Ibid. p. 9.
6. Ibid. 1858, p. 10.
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In 1858, the Chicago Board of Trade, on the recommenda-
tion of its committee on grain inspection, appointed one chief
grain inspector with the power to appoint deputies. Regular in-
spection fees were agreed upon and free access to warehouses was pro-
vided for the inspectors* Only such grain as the receipts called
for was to be delivered from store? The proprietors of grain ele-
2
vators agreed to assist in the enforcement of these regulations?
By a special act of the legislature, the following year,
incorporating the Chicago Board of Trade, that board was granted
power to appoint, (as had been done by the board in the previous
year) one or more persons, as they might see fit, to examine,
weigh or inspect flour, grain or any other article of produce. The
certificate of such inspector was made binding upon the members
of the corporation and all others assenting to the employment of
such inspectors or weighers. But the law compelled no one outside
4
of board of trade members to employ such an appointee. Thus there
was no compulsory in- inspection or out-inspection of grain stored
1. Chicago Board of Trade Reports, 1858, pp«I2ff.
2. "Up to the fifteenth of May, I860, no rule had gone into effect
requiring grain received by canal to be inspected. Such a rule
now exists and is giving pretty general satisfaction. New grades
for grains have been adopted by the board." Ibid. 1859, pI3.
3. "Boards of Trade and Chambers of Commerce.
"Section I. That any number of persons not less than twenty, re-
siding in town or city, may associate themselves together as a
board of trade, and assembly -----and elect officers. --adopt a
name, constitution and by-laws , ----and shall thereupon become a
body corporate, " Illinois Session Laws, Feb. 8, 1861, p. 42;
Statutes of Illinois, I860, pp.275ff.
4. Act Incorporating the Chicago Board of Trade, Section, 10.

— ^ ^
r~
in public warehouses, no regulation on the mixing of grain, or on
the registration or cancellation of warehouse receipts.
To remedy the above mentioned defects, which had given
rise to gross abuses? a fairly comprehensive act was passed in
1867 for the purpose of regulating warehousemen and also for the
purpose of authorizing connections with railroads. It was provid-
ed that all persons who kept a warehouse in the State of Illinois,
for the storing of grain, in which warehouse the grain of each per-
son was kept in a separate bin, distinct from the grain of all
other persons, should be classed "private warehousemen" and all
persons who kept a warehouse for the storing of grain in bulk, and
in which the grain of different owners was, in any way mixed,
should be classed "public warehousemen". Both public and private
warehousemen, who received grain into store, should, on the demand
of the owner, issue receipts setting forth the quantity, kind,
and grade of grain received into store. Private warehousemen
were not to mix grain of different owners and upon the surrender
of the warehouse receipt they were to surrender the identical
grain received.
All public warehousemen, in all places where the storage
capacity of the city exceeded one million bushels, were to publish
at the beginning of the year the storage rates for that year. No
discrimination in rates was allowed.
In all places, where lawfully authorized inspectors of
grain were appointed, it was made their duty, on the application
of any public warehouseman to inspect and determine the grade of
any grain about to be delivered into or out of any public warehouse.
In all places where such inspectors had been appointed no grain
should be received into store until so inspected and graded.
I. Chicago Tribune
,"*
"March ~2
,"
"i87 ~p
T
~2
"c ~2
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All persons keeping public warehouses in Chicago were
to file with the board of trade of the city, each week, a statement
showing the amount of each kind of grain in store.
All receipts for grain issued by any warehouse were de-
clared negotiable, by indorsement, in the same manner and to the
same extent as bills of exchange and promissory notes*
No printed or written conditions inserted in any ware-
house receipt which in any manner limited the liability imposed
by law should have any force or effect.
All persons interested in any grain stored in any ware-
house should, at all times, have the right to visit such warehouse.
He might also have the scales inspected and tested.
Discrimination in rates between grain received over
different roads entering any city was made unlawful.
All contracts for the sale of grain for future delivery,
except in cases where the seller was the owner of such grain at
the time of making the contract and in actual possession thereof
were declared void and gambling contracts.
It was also made unlawful for any railroad to deliver
grain to any warehouse, other than that to which it was consigned?
The above act had little effect upon the warehousing
business in the city of Chicago. Compulsory weighing and regis-
tration of warehouse receipts were not provided for. The railroad
companies were not compelled to deliver grain by weight to the
elevators and no provision was made for compulsory out- inspection.
But the most serious defect in the law was that it made no provis-
ion for state officials charged with the enforcement of the law.
This left the warehousing business almost as completely as here-
I. Public Session Laws of Illinois, 1867, pp.I77ff.
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tofore in the control of the Chicago Board of Trade which organ-
ization had no authority to enforce the State law.
The sections of the act, making illegal dealings in fu-
tures, other than in cases where the seller was the owner and in
actual possession of the grain, were repealed by the next legisla-
I
ture.
The grain trade of the city of Chicago grew rapidly and
the storage capacity of Chicago elevators had increased to
2
11,580,000 bushels by 1870. The aggregate receipts in 1871 were
83,000,000 bushels of grain and the shipments aggregated 71 , 000, 000,
The importance of the warehousing business and the ap-
parent necessity for legislation on the subject is evidenced by
the newspaper editorials of the day, the Chicago Board of Trade
ReportB, the debates in the constitutional convention of 1870,
and particularly by the fact that an article consisting of seven
sections on warehousing became a part of the organic law of the
State. Making allowances for probably exaggerations in complaints
made by editors, Board of Trade members, and the delegates on the
convention floor there is no doubt that the grain producers of the
1. Public Session Laws of Illinois , 1869, p. 410.
2. Chicago Board of Trade Reports, 1870, p. 44.
Aggregate Annual Receipts Aggregate Annual ship-
of all grains in Chicago in ments of all grains from
Year millions of bushels: Chicago; millions bushels:
1860 37, 31,
1861 53, 50,
1862 57, 56,
1863 57, 54,
1864 49, 46,
1865 54, 52,
1866 68, 65,
1867 60, 55,
1868 69, 63,
1869 63, 56,
1870 60, 54,
1871 83, 71,
Ibid, for the Year 1871, pp. 36, 37.
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State of Illinois and of the entire Northwest had many causes
for complaint.
The complaints most common were over-issue of warehouse
receipts, short-weight by railroads in their delivery, monopolistic
control of the grain trade "by a few elevatormen and railroad com-
panies, fraudulent inspection, gambling by members of the Board
of Trade of Chicago, and the use of false weights by warehouse-
men.
The practice most derogatory to the grain business of
Chicago, to the country grain dealer, and to the grower of the
Northwest was the formation of rings and combinations on the part
of railroads and warehousemen. The result of such practice was
that no one could send his grain to an elevator not owned by the
warehousemen's union without paying a royalty to the railroads
in the form of higher freights rates*
Bitter complaints were made by growers and shippers of
grain in the Northwest and by members of the Chicago Board of Trade
but they were unable to cope with the situation, without the
assistance of the law.
I •"There are two classes of persons who stand as toll-gatherers
between the producers and consumers of the breadstuff s and other
articles essential to the lige and comfort of the whole people, ---
viz., the transportation companies and the warehousemen, ---who
take as toll about one-half of every bushel of grai/l/old on the
seaboard. To adjust upon some equitable basis the compensation
of these intermediary agents for moving the crops, is one of the
most important as it is, seemingly, the most difficult, problem
of the day. ----Certain railroads have resolved that they will
not take up a bushel of grain at any point where there is an ele-
vator unlesB the grain passes through that elevator and pays its
tolls; in other cases the railroads refuse to take grain from one
point to another unless warehouse tolls are paid to the elevators
in the towns through which the trains may pass; nor will these
railroads deliver grain to any consignee unless it first passes
through some warehouse of the combination."
The Chicago Tribune, March 2, 1870, p. 2c. 2.

The commercial interest of Chicago were alarmed over
the situation. It was feared that grain from the West would find
its way to the Eastern seaboard by other routes than the Chicago
routes. Grain from Minnesota could go by way of Milwaukee and
the grain from the States to the South of Minnesota could be
shipped down the Mississippi.
Fraudulent issue of warehouse receipts by the warehouse-
men and the failure to cancel the receipts when grain had been de-
livered on them was another practice derogatory to the commercial
2
interests of Chicago and the grain interests of the Nothwest. The
Chicago Board of Trade, although unable to entirely prevent the
fraud in warehouse receipts, was responsible for improvement in
the matter. The board required the registration of all receipts
for grain which were bought or sold on the floor of the exchange.
This however did not prevent the issue of receipts without regis-
tration. It only prevented such receipts from being legal tender
3
on the Exchange.
1. The Chicago Tribune, Feb. 16, 1870, p. 2, c.2; Ibid. July 4,
1871, p. 3, c.3$ Ibid. Aug. 18, p. 2, c.I;
"The farmers of the Northwest have been somewhat slow in reaching
the conclusion that they have been paying tribute to Chicago and
the railroads rings of the East. They are waking up now to a con-
sciousness of the fact that the grain they ship to the New York
market is taxed for the support of a chain of dealers, handlers,
and forwarders, until the pittance returned to them from sales
is not equal to a fair remuneration for their actual labor."
Cairo Evening Post, 1869, April 1, p. I, c.I.
2. "One reason why the warehousemen refused to register the amount
and number of their grain receipts outstanding was due to the fact
that they were in collusion with the railroads to the effect that
the railroads should deliver all grain shipped to Chicago to the
ring elevators. The elevator claimed that in order to receive all
the grain shipped to them they often had to sell a portion on
their own account which they could not do if ell receipts were
registeeed. " Chicago Tribune, Feb. 16, 1870, p. 2, c.3.
3. "The banks have now stepped in and made a proposition, with
which no respectable warehouseman can refuse to comply. They pro-
pose that the waeehouse registrar who stamps the receipts shall
also cancel the receipts when the grain is withdrawn, and prevent
its further circulation. ----This proposition has been accepted by
the warehousemen." Ibid. Aug. 23, 1872, p. 4, c.2.
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Excessive rates for storing grain were also detrimental
to the Chicago grain interests. A yearly rate equal to one- third
of the selling price of wheat was not uncommon}"
On the convention floor of 1870, many petitions were pre-
sented demanding that provisions for the regulation of railroads
and warehouses be placed in the organic law of the State. It was
urged that railroads and warehouses had "become great monopolies
2
to the detriment of the producer and the shipper of grain. The
regulation of these interests, it was urged, might "be left to the
legislature, but this body might be controlled in the future by
railroad and warehouse men as some previous legislatures had been.
Numerous instances of extortion were cited. A short
weight of fifty bushels to the carload was not considered as ex-
traordinary. Cases of fraudulent inspection making a difference
of as much as fifteen cents per bushel were given as authentic.
A Mr. Medall proposed in the convention of 1870, that fiv
things were wanted in regard to the grain question as follows:
"The first is, that the grain of the farmers and shippers
1. "The cost of storing wheat for one year is thirty-three and
one-third percent of its selling price today; and for oats nearly
seventy-four percent. It is no wonder that the farmers of the
section near the Mississippi have been casting about, for years
past, to find some other way by which their grain can reach its
market in the Eastern States ."Chicago Tribune, 1870, March, 17
,
p.
2
2. On the convention floor, a Mr. Eldridge presented a petition
signed by one hundred and five merchants and business men of Seneca
La Salle county, asking "--that a provision be made in the organic
law of the State for the protection of the public against frauds
and combination, and over issue of receipts by warehousemen, or
private corporations who receive goods,---; and also for the pro-
tection of shippers of produce, against the wrongs perpetrated up-
on them by transportation companies, and by sliort weights in their
delivery." Debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1870, p. 679
Another member stated on the convention floor: "Elevators
and warehouses have got to be great monopolies. The elevator men
control the whole grain trade of the Northwest— ." Ibid. p. 1622.
Heated discussions covering over twenty pages in the Debates tooi
place on the convention floor.
3. Ibid. 1622.

10
shall be delivered where consigned, and to the elevator to which
it is sent.
"The second is, that the weight or quantity of grain de-
livered shall be equal to that received by the railroad companies
from the owners.
"The third thing is, that the quantity of the grain in
store shall be known to the owners of the grain and to the public.
"The fourth proposition is, that a reasonable degree of
honesty must be secured in grading the grain into and out of the
warehouse.
"The fifth proposition is, that railroads shall be com-
pelled to permit connections with their tracis to competing ware-
houses in the vicinity of the tiacts." 1
The above proposals covered the most important points
relative to warehouse regulation and were embodied, among others,
either in the article in the constitution on warehousing or in
the law of 1871 or in both.
The report from the "committee on the whole" to the con-
stituent assembly contained the article practically as finally
2
adopted in the convention. The only changes of importance were
made in sections three and six.
Section three as reported by the committee reed: "The
board of trade of any city or town where a public warehouse is
located
,
may appoint committees whenever it may desire, who shall
have full power to inspect the books of any warehouse whenever
said board shall deem it necessary---." After considerable de-
bate this paragraph was stricken out. Although boards of trade,
as such, were considered honorable men, it was urged that some of
the members were gamblers and hence"leeches upon the commerce of
lYpeVa teV "in "(JonstTtu t ionVl 'CoVven t 1onTpTl 629 "2~.Tb idVp'.T693." "3"."p"l6 2 \

the community . "
Section six as reported reed: "The board of trp de or
other commercial organization of any town or city, to "be designat-
ed by law, shall have the power to make such rules in regard to the
inspection of grain as may be just and proper, for the protection
2
of producers, shippers, and receivers of grain."
ThiB clause was rejected for the same reason that section
three was rejected. Section two as reported by the committee did
not contain the clause "situated in any town or village of not less
than 100,000 inhabitants." This clause was inserted in the section
3before its final adoption.
Certain members were opposed to placing any articles in
the constitution regulating warehouses on the grounds that it was
deemed special legislation. It was urged that these matters should
be left to the legislature which could then change the laws from
4
time to time as the people might desire. It was also argued that
5
this regulation unnecessarily interferred with business. The
members, however, who advocated non-interference and the granting of
regulatory power to the boards of trade were in the minority and
the following article became a part of the organic law of the State:
"ARTICLE XIII, WAREHOUSES
"Section 1. All elevators or storehouses where grain or other pro-
perty is stored for a compensation, whether the property stored
be kept separate or not, are declared to be public warehouses.
"Section 2. The owner, lessee or manager of each and every public
warehouse situated in any town or city of not less than 100,000 in-
habitants shall make weekly statements, under oath, before some
officer to be designated by law, and keep the same posted in some
1. Debates in the Constitutional Convent ion
,
p. 1623. 2. Ibid. p. 1622
3. Ibid. p. 1697; 4. Ibid. p. 1628 ; 5. Ibid. p. 1700.
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conspicuous place in the office of such warehouse, and shall also
file a copy for public examination in such place as shall be desig-
nated by law, which statement shall correctly set forth the amount
and grade of each and every kind of grain in such warehouse, to-
gether with such other property as may be stored therein, and what
warehouse receipts have been issued and are at the time of making
such statement, outstanding therefor, and shall, on the copy posted
in the warehouse, note daily such changes as may be made in the
quantity and grade of grain in such warehouse; and the different
grades of grain shipped in separate lots shall not be mixed with
inferior or superior grades, without the consent of the owner or
consignee thereof.
"Section 3. The owner of property stored in any warehouse or hol-
der of a receipt for the same shell alweys be at liberty to examine
such property stored and all the books and records of the warehouse
in regard to such property*
"Section 4. All railroad companies and other common carriers on
railroads shall weigh or measure grain at points where it is ship-
ped, and receipt for the full amount, and shall be responsible for
the delivery of such amount to the owner or consignee thereof, at
the place of destination.
"Section 5. All railroad companies receiving and transporting
grain in bulk or otherwise shall deliver the same to any consignee
thereof,, or to any elevator or public warehouse to which it may
be consigned, provided such consignee or the elevator or the public
warehouse can be reached by any track owned, leased or used, or
which can be used by such railroad companies ; and all railroad
companies shall permit connections to be made with their tracks so
that any such consignee and any public warehouse, coal bank or coal
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coal yard, may be reached Toy the cars on said railroad.
"Section 6. It shall "be the duty of the General Assembly to pass
all necessary laws to prevent the issue of false and fraudulent re-
ceipts, and to give full effect to this article of the constitution,
which shall be liberally construed so as to protect producers and
shippers* And the enumeration of the remedies herein named shall
not be construed to deny to the General Assembly the power to pre-
scribe by law such other and further remedies as may be found ex-
pedient, or to deprive any person of existing common law remedies.
"Section 7. The General Assembly shall pass laws for the inspection
of grain, for the protection of producers, shippers, and receivers
of grain and produce."
The above article of seven sections as adopted by the
constituent assembly of 1870, and as ratified by the people, is the
present constitutional provision on public warehousing.
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2. Warehouse Legislation of 1871« The first legislature, meet-
ing under the new constitution, passed three acts regulating ware-
housing and the carrying and delivery of grain by railroads.
The first act provides for the appointment, "by the gov-
ernor of the State, of a commission of three persons, called the
"Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners.'' The persons so appointed
were not to be interested financially in any railroad or warehouse
nor were they to be in the employ of any railroad or warehouseman
in the State. This commission was charged with the execution of
the laws regulating the railroads and warehouse business. All recorc^
of such business were also to be open to their inspection. 1
Grades for grain were established by this act; but the next
legislature repealed this part of the act and authorised the com-
missioners to establish and change the grades for grain as conditions
2
demanded.
Under the subject of railroads, an act was passed for the
purpose of regulating the receiving, transportation, and delivery
of grain by the same. Every railroad company is bound under the act
to receive and carry all grain offered to it in bulk without dis-
crimination or favor between shippers. At the time such grain is
received it must be weighed* a bill of lading, stating the correct
weight must be given and the grain delivered to the warehouse to
which it is consigned.
At all places from which fifty* thousand bushels of grain
1. Laws of Illinois, 1871, pp. 618ff.
2. Ibid. 1873, p. 189.
2. It is difficult to explain why the legislature did not leave
the fixing of grades for grain in the hands of the Railroad and
Warehouse Commissinoers from the first. It would seem to show the
legislature's ignorance relative to the grain business. They must
have been ignorant of the fact that grades cannot be established
for all time but that they must be flexible in order to be workable.
It would furtheE indicate extreme distrust toward the Chicago Board.
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were carried "by the road during the previous year, the railroad
corporation wa6 to erect and use correct scales. Every railroad
must also permit connections to be made with its tracks and public
warehouses and must receive from other carriers, at their crossings
and junctions any grain shipped.*
The third act deals directly with the warehouse business
and was passed to give effect to the articles on warehousing as
found in the constitution of the State.
According to this act public warehouses are divided into
three classes designated as A, B, and C. Class A embraces all
elevators located in cities of 100,000 population or more, in which
elevators grain js stored in bulk and in which grain of different
owners is mixed. Public elevators of class E embrace all other
warehouses in which grain is stored in bulk and mixed. Class C
include all other warehouses where property of any kind is stored
for a compensation*
Proprietors of public elevators of class A are required
to procure from the circuit court of the county licenses permitting
them to transact business as public warehousemen.
Every public warehouseman must receive for storage any
grain tendered him provided he has room for the same. All grain
so received must be duly inspected and graded and upon delivery
must be out-inspected. No grain of different grades may be mixed.
Upon the application of the owner of grain stored, the
warehouseman of class A, must issue a receipt stating the quantity
and inspected grade of the grain. Upon the return of the receipt
the grain must be delivered and the receipt canceled.
Clauses limiting or modifying the warehouseman *s liabili-
ty may not be inserted in the receipt. False receipts may not be
1 . Laws" of' 111".", 187 1" "op". " 536". f
f
~.
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issued and no grain may be delivered except upon the return of a
genuine receipt.
Public warehousemen of class A, must issue weekly state-
ments giving the amount and kinds of grain in store. A daily
statement of the amount of grain received on the previous day
must be presented to the registrar.
The appointment by the governor of a chief inspector of
grain in every city in which there is located a public elevator of
class A, is provided for. Such inspector may not be a member of
the board of trade nor interested in any warehouse in the State.
Assistant inspectors may be appointed by the railroad and ware-
house commissioners. A registrar of warehouse receipts is also to
be appointed by the commission.
A table or schedule of rates for the storage of grain
during the ensuing year must be published during the first week
in January of each year by all warehousemen of class A. These
rates may not exceed the rates fixed by statute. 1
All persons having property in store in public warehouses
may examine the same at all reasonable hours and any duly author-
ized inspector and sealer of weights may test the scales of the
warehouse.
In all places where there are duly appointed inspectors
1. "The maximum charge for storage and handling of grain, ---
shall be, for the first thirty days, or part thereof, two cents
per bushel, and for each fifteen days, or part thereof, after the
first thirty, one-half of one cent per bushel:--- grain damp or
liable to early damage, ----may be subject to two cents per bushel
storage for the first ten days, and for each additional five days,
-----not exceeding one-half of one cent per bushel."
Laws of Illinois, 187.1, pp.762ff.
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of grain no proprietor of a public warehouse of class B is per-
mitted to receive any grain and mix the same with the grain of
others until the same shall have been duly inspected and graded.
No railroad company may enter into any agreement with
any public warehouseman to deliver the property of any person to
any warehouse other than the one to which it is consigned.'"
The above laws have undergone comparatively few impor-
tant changes and remain up to the present time the fundamental
2
laws on public warehousing m this State.
The most important feature in which the act of 1871,
differs from the previous acts is in the provision made for the
appointment of officials who are charged with the enforcement of
the laws. The Railroad and Warehouse Commission were given gen-
eral supervisory powers, the chief inspector has charge of the in-
spection of all grain going into and out of public storage, and the
chief registrar has charge of the department of registration which
places its official stamp on all receipts representing grain in
3
store.
The most serious defects in the law are its failure to
provide for the regulation of public warehouses of class B and C
4
and for State supervision of weighing. Other defects in the grain
1. Laws of Illinois, 1871, pp. 762ff.
2. If the last section was passed to prevent "rings" and "corners"
it failed to accomplish its purpose. A law forbidding railroads
and warehousemen to enter into any agreement whatsoever among
themselves relative to the delivery and storage of grain might
have been more effective. The act of 1871, also provides that the
department of registration register for "cancellation" all receipts
before they are presented for the delivery of grain. This law
soon became a dead letter but was reenacted in the year 1901.
Ibid. 1901, p. 320; also vide Ibid. 1907, p. 489.
3. For the changes made in the supervision of public warehouses
by the Publec Utilities Act, see infra p. 48.
4. Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners Reports 1871-70, p. 17.
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storage business were not due to ommissions in the law "but to the
failure on the part of the railroads and warehousemen to live up
to the law.
The history of the regulation of public warehousing,
from 1871 to the present time ,is not a history of new legislation
on the subject although a few important changes have been made*
It is rather a history of a stricter enforcement of the laws by
the Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners and the Chicago Board of
Trade usually after considerable litigation in the courts. A great-
er cooperation between the Commission and the Board of Trade are
largely responsible for the improvement.
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3. Litigation Establishing Constitutionality of State Rates, The
Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners met in July 1871, in the city
of Chicago, for the purpose of organizing the inspection and reg-
istration departments provided for by law.* Chicago was at this
time the only city containing warehouses of class A. The inspection
of grain and the registration of warehouse receipts having been
heretofore in charge of the Board of Trade of Chicago, the Commiss-
ioners, in the main, adopted the rules which the Board had found
2
practicable. The Commissioners also embodied in their rules the
schedule of grades of grain fixed by law. But the Commissioners
soon discovered that the rules for grading grain should be flexible,
that is, the grades should not be fixed by statute. The authority
to establish grades as conditions demanded was given the Commission-
3
ers by the next legislature.
The State inspection system was commenced under great
disadvantages; the warehousemen and the railroads refused to abide
by the law and the Board of Trade was from the first unfriendly
toward the Inspection System and later developed an almost hostile
attitude.
The warehousemen continued, as before the act of 1871,
to issue fraudulent receipts and also allowed grain to be removed
4from store without taking up the receipts. They persistently
refused to adopt a system of registration and cancellation on the
5pretence that it unduly interfered with their private business.
1. Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners' Reports, 1870-71, p. 15.
2. Ibid. p. 15.
3. Illinois Session Laws, 1873-74, p. 141; also vide infra p. 14.
4«Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners' Reports, 1872, p. 15;
also Chicago Tribune, 1872, Aug. 23, p. 4, c. 2.
5.Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners' Reports, 1872, p# 40.
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But the most flagrant disregard of the law was the warehousemen^
failure to take out licenses, give "bonds, and abide by the storage
rates as established by law. Such open violation of the law gave
rise to the first important case, Munn v. Illinois, ^to test the
constitutionality of the act of 1871. This is a leading case in
establishing the relation between the State as a regulatory power
on the one hand and public utilities as subjects for State reg-
ulation on the other.
The case was first filed in the criminal court of Cook
county, Illinois, against Munn and Scott, public warehousemen of
Chicago, lessees and managers of the North Western Elevator. It
was alleged that these warehousemene were carrying on the regular
business of a public warehouse but had secured no license, given
2
no bond, and were charging higher rates than prescribed by law.
The case was decided against the defendants in the court
of Cook county. Munn and Scott then sued out a writ alleging that
sections 3, 4, 5, and 15 of the statute were unconstitutional and
void. and carried the case to the Supreme court of the State. The
Supreme court decided that the act of 1871, to regulate public
warehouses , was not in contravention of the fourteenth amendment of
the constitution of the United States. The court stated further:
"The constitutional provision prohibiting the deprivation of pro-
perty is not infringed by a proper law regulating a business which
may render property used to carry on the business less valuable.
"If the business is still allowed to be carried on, and the propery;y
used is allowed to exist, and its possession is not disturbed, the
owner cannot be said to be deprived of his property.
"The regulation of warehouses and elevators is a legimate and pro-
1. 69 111. 80.
2. Defendants hed been in the warehouse business since 1862.
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per exercise of legislative power. All regulation of trade with
a view to the public interest, may more or less impair the value
of property, but it does not come within the constitutional in-
hibition, unless they virtually take away and destroy those rights
in which property consists, 1,1
The Supreme court of the State of Illinois affirmed the
judgnent of the Criminal court of Cook county.
Munn and Scott again sued out the writ, stating that sec-
tions 3, 4, 5, and 15, of the Statute of 1871, were repugnant to
the third clause of section eight, of article one, and the sixth
clause of section nine, of article one, of the constitution of
the United States and to the fifth and fourteenth amendment.
The case was decided by the Supreme court of the United
2
States in 1876. T&e opinion of the court is best stated as summed
up in the syllabus which reads as follows: w l. Under the powers
inherent in every sovereignty, a government may regulate the con-
duct of its citizens toward each other, and , when necessary for
the public good, the manner in which each shall use his own pro-
perty.
"2. It has in the exercise of these powers been custom-
ary in England from time immaemorial and in this countryfrom its
first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers,
etc., and
,
in so doing, to fix a maximum of charge to be made
for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold.
n 3. Down to the time of the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment of the constitution of the United States, it was not
supposed that statutes regulating the use, or even the price of
the use, of private property necessarily deprived an owner of
1. 69 111. 80, Decided in the Sept. term, 1873.
2. 94 U.S. 113.
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his property without due process of law. Under some circumstances
they may, not under all. The amendment does not change the law in
thi6 particular: it simply prevents the States from doing that
which will operate as such privation.
"4. When the owner of a property devoted it to a use in
which the public has an interest, he in effect grants to the public
an interest in such use, and must to the extent of that interest,
submit to be controlled by the public, for the common good, as
long as he maintaines the use. He may withdraw his grant by dis-
continuing the use»
w 5. Right of property, and to a reasonable compensation
for its use, created by the common law, cannot be taken away with-
out due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may,
unless constitutional limitations forbid, be changed at the will
of the legislature. The great office of statutes is to remedy de-
fects in the commonn law as they are developed, and to adapt it
to the changes of time and circumstances.
"6. The limitations by legislative enactment of the rate
of charge for services rendered in a public employment, or for the
use of property in which the public has an interest, establishes
no new principles in the law, but only gives a new effect to an
old one.
"7. Where warehouses are situated and their business is
carried on exclusively within a State, she may, as a matter of
domestic concern, prescribe regulations for them, notwith standing
they are used as instruments by those engaged in interstate, as
well as in State, commerce; and, until Congress acts in reference
to their interstate relations, such regulations can be enforced,
enen though they may indirectly operate upon commerce beyond her
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immediate jurisdiction.
"8. The court does not hold that a case may not arise
in which it may "be found that a State has , under the form of regu-
lating her own affairs, encroached upon the exclusive domain of
Congress in respect to interstate commerce.
"9. The ninth section of the first article of the constitu-
tion of the United States operates only as a limitation of the pow-
ers of Congress, and in no respect affects the States in the reg-
ulation of their domestic affairs.
"10. The act of the General Assembly of Illinois, entitled,
'An act to regulate public warehouses and to give effect to article
thirteen, of the constitution of this State, • approved April 25,
1871, is not repugnant to the constitution of the United States."
The justice, delivering the opinion of the court, thus
clearly stated that a body politic does have the power to enact
laws requiring each citizen so to use his own property as not to
injure another, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." "This is
the source of the police power. When private property is affected
with a public interest, it ceases to be JURIS PRIVATI only" The
justice further stated that when one devotes his property to a use
in which the public has an interest, he, ineffect, grants to the
public an interest in that use. It was definitely maintained that
the principle of State regulation was no new principle but had
been laid down over two centuries ago.
The above principles are now definitely established, hav-
ing been twice reaffirmed by the Supreme court of the United States.
The legislature of New York, in the year 1888, passed a
law providing for maximum charges for elevating, receiving, weigh-
ing, and discharging grain. In a case brought to the Supreme court
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of the United States under this act, the court held that the act
was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State over a
business affected with a public interest, and did not violate the
1
constitution of the United States and was valid.
The State of North Dakota, in 1891, passed an act regu-
lating grain warehouses and the weighing and handling of grain and
2
establishing maximum rates for storage. In a case coming up un-
der this act the United States Supreme court reaffirmed its former
position, declaring the law not in conflict with the constitution,
of the United States, but a legitimate exercise of the police power
of the State.
The decision in Munn v. Illinois settled the question
relative to the State's authority to fix rates in the State of
Illinois and there was no further open violation of the law in
this respect in the State of Illinois.
1. The Laws of New York, of 1888, Chapter 581.
Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517.
2. North Dakota Laws, 1891, C. i26.
3. Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391.

25
4. Under!) il ling and "Rings" and "Corners". For some time after
the passage of the warehouse act of 1871, the railroads continued
to under-bill grain, a practice very derogatory to "both the grain
interests of Chicago and the shippers of grain. The roads failed
to weigh the grain at country points and hence were unable to give
bills of lading calling for the correct amounts of grain. In many
cases grain was billed as "shippers' weight" and bills of lading
were given reading "more or less". 1
Underbilling was usually done for the purpose of discrim-
inating in favor of certain shippers, thus relieving them from pay-
ing freight on the whole amount shipped. The shipper discriminated
against or the shipper too honest to take advantage of the discrim-
inatory rate was thus placed at a disadvantage. The average under-
billing ranged from two thousand to two thousand and four hundred
pounds per car. Transportation companies also inserted in their
bills of lading "conditions, and stipulations exempting themselves
as much as possible from their just and reasonable liabilities im-
2posed upon them by statute as common carriers".
Complaints of grain, arriving by railroad, falling short
in weight, as compared with shippers' weight continued for many
3
years. But the law was adequate on the subject and only needed
1. Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners Reports, 1872, p. 116, 124
2. Chicago Board of Trade Reports, 1885, p. XLIV.
The practice of underbilling was not confined to the
Chicago district. The Boston Commercial Exchange is quoted as
stating that it was their opinion that on all grain shipped from
interior points in the West to interior points in the East, an
average of ten per cent escaped freight charges. Over-billing and
underbilling was also common at Dayton, Piqua, Peoria, and Pitts-
burg. Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners ' Reports, 1872, p. 131
and 138.
3. "A good deal of surprise was expressed on Change today at the
fact that the copiously worded report of the Board of Railroad and
Warehouse Commissioners' has omitted all reference to the right of
the grain owner to receive as much grain as he delivers to the car-
rier. Between the railroads and the warehouses there is often a
very heavy shortage, and the owner of the grain finds it impossible
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enforcing. This lew requires railroads to weigh the grain received
for transportation and to deliver the quantity received. 1
A law providing for the weighing of grain in transit at
2
transfer and junction points was passed in 1887. Thereafter little
complaint of under-billing or short- weight appears in the reports
of either the Chicago Board of Trade or the Railroad and Warehouse
Commissioners.
A condition, justly complained of by the members of the
Board of Trade and the country shippers, was the existence of
"cornerB" and "rings". Such monopolies had existed for many years
but they became especially numerous and hence objectionable at this
3
time.
A group of men constituting the "corner" would at times
control the grain market almost completely by buying all the grain
or the grain of a certain kind in storage and holding it. No
storage room would then be available for country shippers. Nearly
all grain received in the city at this time had to pass through
public storgge and much remained in storage throughout the winter
as a result of the closing of water transportation. According to
to obtain his rights. Whether by leaky cars, or by the abomination
of unrighteous balances, he now loses a considerable proportion of
his property, which he ought not to lose; and he should be protect-
ed if the State Commission ia any thing better than a farce. As
it is now, he is ground between the upper and the nether millstone,
and the miller looks on doing nothing." Chicago Tribune, 1874,
Jan* 8, p. 6, e. 2.
1. Chicago Board of Trade Reports, 1874. p. 23.
2. Laws of Illinois, 1887, pp. 253.
3. Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners * Reports, 1872, pp. 32ff.
" The Warehousemens • Embargo.
"The arbitrary character of the monopoly under which the
warehousing of grain in Chicago is conducted was never more appar-
ent than in the present "corner" in oats or rather, it is a corner
in warehousemen *s receipts for oats. It is the rule of the trade
here, that contracts for the delivery of grain must be filled by
the delivery of the paper of any one of certain "regular" ware-
house firms acknowledging the receipt of the grain to be delivered
on demand. No "regular" contract for grain made "on Change" can
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the early practice of the Chicago Board of Trade, all deliveries
upon grain contracts had to be made by tender of regular warehouse
receipts, registered by an officer duly appointed for that purpose?"
A practice of the railroads was to enter into agreements with pub-
lic warehouses to deliver all the grain which they carried to cer-
2
tain elevators. These conditions make it apparent that any group
of men who could get control of the grain in storage and thus lock
up the storage room of any one or more warehouses could indirectly
prevent the shipment of grain into the city by those road6 whose
storage room was thus controlled.
The effect of these conditions upon the grain trade of
the city was demoralizing. The country shippers sought other mark-
ets and other routes.
There is considerable conflict of opinion as to who con-
3
stituted these "corners" and "rings". Undoubtedly in a number of
be filled in any other way. There might be millions of bushels of
any kind of grain standing in cars on the railroad tracks, or in
other warehouses than those belonging to the ring, and yet not a
bushel of it be available for delivery on a contract until the ware-
house monopoly have given their permission by the issue of their
receipt for it. - - -It may even have been inspected by the official
inspector, - - - and yet it is not grain deliverable on a regular
contract until the warehousemen issue their receipt for it.
Under these rules, the warehousemen have complete control
of the supply of merchantable grain in the market and can "corner"
any particular kind at any time they plesse- - -" Chicago Tribune,
June 6, 1872, p. 4, c. 3.
The "corner" or "oat clique" above refered to, failed
within two weeks after the above article was written. Ibid. June,
19, 1872, p. 3, c. 1.
1. Chicago Board of Trade, Reports, 1877, p. XLVI; also Railroad
and Warehouse Commissioners * Reports, 1878, p. XXIV.
2. Chicago Tribune, 1872, June 8, p. 4, c. 4.
3. Testimony of John Hill Jr. before the subcommission on agricul-
ture in Chicago, Aug. 12, 1899: "As the Western roads brought grain
to Chicago and as the grain business increased they all, or nearly
all, built railway elevators, or built elevators as terminal depots
for their grain - - . During the period from 1871 until 1887, there
was very little if any difficulty in the manner in which the grain
was handled in these elevators. The public used them entirely.
They were handled by disinterested parties engaged solely in the
warehouse business, and the independent shippers and receivers of
(
28
cases the public warehousemen themselves purchased and held the
grain stored in their houses, although it was not until about 1885,
that warehousemen made a common practice of storing their own grain.
The Chicago Board of Trade took an important step in de-
stroying the power of these grain monopolies by placing a larger
number of houses, accessible to owners of grain, upon the same foot-
ing as other regular elevators. This move brought relief to hundreds
of country shippers who desired to ship their grain to the Chicago
2
market. The grain business of the city was thus benefited. Fur-
ther relief came through the increase in the storage capacity of
the public elevators, the increase of inspect ion-upon-arrival , and
the through shipment of grain without such grain going into storage.
The effective monopolization of the grain market through the cor-
nering of the storage room, therefore, soon came to an end.
grain in Chicago and at outside points owned and controlled the
grain that was stored in these houses - - -
United States Industrial Commission Report, Vol. 10, pp. 298ff
.
The above quoted testimony hardly agrees with the reports
made by the members of the Chicago Board of Trade and the Railroad
and warehouse Commissioners.
1. Vide Infra p. 41.
2. Chicago Tribune, 1872, June 8, p. 4, c. 4.
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5. State Inspection System and The Chicago Board of Trade. The
grain "business of the city of Chicago grew rapidly as is evidenced
"by the following table, compiled from the Railroad and Warehouse
Commissioners' Reports and the Chicago Board of Trade Reports.
Table representing the grain business of the city of
Chicago; 000,000 omitted:
Total Total Inspection OUT
Year
:
Rec e ipt s ; Shipmen t
;
on Arrival InsTiec ion *
1870
1871 71
1872 88 83 69 69
1873 98 91 69 66
1874 95 84 66 66
1875 81 72 54 51
1876 97 87 61 53
1877 94 90 71 64
1878 134 118 107 77
1879 137 125 115 77
1880 165 154 138 104
1881 146 140 124 85
1882 126 114 99 64
1883 164 141 137 73
1884 159 138 128 58
1885 156 135 131 45
1886 151 129 131 61
1887 163 151 130 75
1888 182 156 147 72
1889 183 179 173 103
1890 227 204 204 85
It will be noticed that the sums given under in-inspec-
tion approximate the sums given under total receipts, whereas the
sums given under out- inspection decrease rapidly in proportion to
total shipments for the respective years. This decrease in the
amounts under out-inspection relative to the shipments is due to
the fact that an increasingly large amount of grain did not enter
1. Total Receipts and Shipments ' figures are taken from the Chicago
Board of Trade Reports: 1871, pp. 36-37; 1891, pp. 18-19;
Inspection figures are taken from the Railroad and Warehouse
Commissioners * Reports: 1879, p. 280; 1883, p. 476; 1890, p. 34.
There are slight discrepancies between the figures given in the
reportB for the current years and the figures given in the conden-
sed tables covering longer periods of time.
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8 tore, hence was inspected only once, that is, inspected on arrival.
The percentage of grain transferred on track grew from thirteen per
cent in 1876, to twenty percent in 1880, and to fifty-seven per cent
in 1885.
1
The work of the inspection department increased with the
growth in the grain trade of the city of Chicago. The storage
capacity of the Chicago public elevators increased from 10,200,000
bushels in 1872, to 36,550,000 "bushels in 1897; and all grain enter-
ing store was both in- inspected and out- inspected. Also most of
the grain not going into store, but sold on track, was inspected
2by the State department.
There is no agreement in the opinions of the Chicago
Board of Trade and the Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners on the
merits of the State system of grain inspection. In the majority
of the Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners' Reports the system is
highly praised. The Commission, for example, claims that the cer-
tificates of the Chicago inspection department are "good the world
3
over." The criticisms of the members of the Chicago Board of Trade
on the merits of the system are at times favorable and at times un-
favorable. In 1884, the State inspection system is highly praised
4in their official reports. The management of the inspection de-
partment is declared a guarantee of safety and accuracy. In the
Boards' reports for the year 1896, is found the following state-
ment: "When the inspection of grain was surrendered by this board
to the State- - - - we had reason to expect faithful and uniform
administration of the service. For many years we had no ground for
1. Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners' Reports* 1886, p. 553.
2. Ibid., 1872, p. 36; and Ibid., 1898, p. 203.
3. Ibid., 1892, p. 18.
4. Chicago Board of Trade Reports, 1884, p. XI; Ibid., 1896,
p. LXXXVI.
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Berious complaint, but it has gradually "become a useful part of
machine politics, and ward heelers are crowded upon the pay rolls-
--. The inspection department should "be placed under the merit sys-
tem."
1
Again in their report of 1899, is found the following criti-
cism: "Our cash grain trade----has suffered through abuse of the
practice of mixing grades of wheat and through the incompetence of
our State Inspection. This seems to be true of many American mar-
kets, but especially of Chicago. Within a twelve month, public
meetings of grain merchants in England have been held to devise new
methods of handling American grain, owing to the unreliable charac-
ter of American grades and certificates, and bitter complaints
have come to private individuals and to the officials of our board.
As recently as last Wednesday press cables from Marselles stated
that owing to dishonest grading at American Gulf ports that market
would handle no more American wheat except on sample. Times were
when under the Chicago Board of Trade inspection our certificates
passed current as money in any market of the world. It is high
time that the system receive an overhauling Should we not
seek the means for restoring Chicago Board of Trade inspection in
p
this market to replace the political machine?"
The changes in the attitude of the Chicago Board of Trade
are undoubtedly due to several reasons. The attitude of the Board
during the early years of the State inspection system was unfriend-
ly owing to the fact that the inspection of grain was taken out of
their hands and to changes in grades of grain which were often sud-
den and abrupt. But soon the committee of appeals was established
and members of the Chicago Board of Trade constituted the committee.
1. Chicago Board of Trade Reports, 1896, p. LXXXVI.
2. Ibid., 1899, p. 81.
< <
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Thus their decision in disputed cases was final.
As late as 1884, the State inspection system is highly-
praised. But in the following year a law was passed prohibiting
the appointment of Chicago Board of Trade members on the committee
of appeals. The apparent reason for the enactment of this law was
the increase in appeal cases. In 1874, 150,303 cars and canal
boats of grain were inspected and only 74 appeals were taken from
the State inspectors to the committee of appeals. In 27, out of
the 74, cases the grades were raised.*" In 1876, there were 153
2
appeals taken; in 54 cases the grades were raised. w Three years
3later 1,140 appeals were taken. The decision of the appeals* com-
mittee was final, therefore, to the extent that the appeals increas-
ed, the Board of Trade of Chicago became the inspector of grain
4
and the State system came into disrepute or was discredited.
This change in membership of the appeals * committee took
the inspection of grain, going into store, and also that inspected
"on track" by the State, completely out of the control of the Board
of Trade and was conducive to making the Board's attitude unfriend-
ly. But it is not to be supposed that the Board was without other
grievances. The inspection was often defective in many respects.
A committee on railroads appointed by the State Senate
to investigate certain charges made against the inspection system
reported that the following charges had been confirmed: Neglect on
the part of the Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners to enforce the
1. Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners 1 Reports, 1874, p. 31.
2. Ibid., 1876, p. 35.
3. Ibid., 1879, p. XXX.
4. It is impossible to ascertain whBther the committee on appeals
was justified in making the changes in the grades of grain in the
appeal cases. If the changes made were justifiable, the discred-
iting of the State inspection system effected thereby ought to
have served to improve the system and not to eliminate the Chicago
Board of Trade members.
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law against collection of charges for "track service," "switch-
ing" and "demurrage" in direct violation of the law of 1871; chief
inspector relieved of his official duties by assistants to the de-
triment of the service; compromising the standing of the inspection
department by retaining on the service an inspector against whom
there had been pending charges of disreputable and corrupt official
conduct.
*
Political favoritism rather than efficiency as determin-
2^
ing the appointment of inspectors is frequently charged. A gener-
al inflexibility in the grading system due to inefficiency or ignor-
ance on the part of the Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners is a
3
common cause of complaint.
At various times appeals were made to the General Assem-
bly by the Chicago Board of Trade to change from the State back to
4the Board of Trade inspection.
These complaints, though probably exaggerated, cannot be
entirely discredited. That the Board of Trade had cause for com-
1. An inspector referred to had been exposed as grading more than
one thousand cars of grain dates and numbers of cars given
without in a single instance having passed into the doors of the
cars thus graded. Senate Journal, 1881, March 24, pp. 464ff.
2. Editorial in substance; Chief grain inspector, Harper, used
State funds to the amount of $17,000 and speculated in grain. The
Commission investigated and reported the matter to the Governor.
It is said that the report was returned to them by the Governor
for amendment. It was amended and again presented. In the mean-
time the Commission refused to make the report public. Chicago
Tribune, Feb. 27, 1874, p. 4, cc.6 and 7.
"Illinois Grain Inspection Laws.
"No grain reaching Chicago can be inspected except by a
politician who supports some particular person for United States
Senator. That the State inspection of grain has never been intrust-
ed to an expe and even if the inspector were an expert, he has
no discretion but must rate grain according to certain rules made
by a board of Commissioners profoundly ignorant of all things per-
taining to the subject. The inspection laws of this State were
invented and framed to injure and divert business from this city."
Chicago Tribune, July 30, 1875, p. 4, c. 2.
3. Ibid.
4. Report in substance by the Board of Trade to the Legislature:
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plaint is apparent from the fact that in 1904, the Board establish-
ed a grain sampling and seed inspection department for the resamp-
ling of grain consigned to and shipped from the Chicago market.
This department v/as established in response to a general demand
from the grain merchants of the East and the West as well as those
of the Chicago exchange. 1 This department works in harmony with the
2State grain inspection department.
By a ruling of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commission the railroads are com-
pelled to allow the necessary time for the resampling of inspected
grain. This saves demurrage charges on grain which requires a re-
sampl ing.3
The methods of inspecting grain were improved from time
to time. The old method was to inspect the grain from the cars
in the elevator yards. Later for lack of room it was done in in-
4
spection yards remote from the elevators. By 1885, in- inspect ion
stations were established on ten of the railroads and on one canal.
There were at this time out- inspect ions at each of the twenty-six
elevators. Early in the morning the daily reports from all of
these stations were gathered and "brought to the inspection office. 5
"1. Lp.w of 1871, is only local in its application
"2. The Law deprives owners of their natural rights to classify
their property into grades "before offering it for sale.
"3. The Law places the State of Illinois in the apparent position
of levying a tax upon the commerce of other States
M 4. The Law imposes an unnecessary tax upon the grain producing in-
terests of this and other States.
"5. The Law makes it the duty of the State to do that which citizens
can do much better--
"6. Appointees are often unfit for the business--
"7. Experience of other States has proven that State inspection is
oppressive. Chicago Tribune, March 6, 1877, p. 3, c. 1.
1. Chicago Board of Trade Reports, 1904, p. (51) LI.
2. Ibid. ,1905, p. XLIV, and 1909, p. XLIV.
3. Ibid., 1910, p. XXXV.
4. Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners' Report, 1886, p. 551.
5. "Under the old system of 'track' inspections, in use when I
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In 1908, a system was established whereby all grains are
inspected from sample taken from the car in the inspection office.
The system was found to be a great improvement over the older meth-
ods as grain could be more carefully inspected. 1 In the following
year provision was also made for inspecting in the office all grain
2inspected "out".
A law providing for the consolidation of all the branches
of the State grain inspection department into one department and
under one chief inspector of grain was passed by the legislature in
1907. This change tends to establish a unifornity in the grades of
grain inspected and graded in the various places having State super-
3
vision of inspection. The Chicago inspector was made the head of
the department. The same act, which is a revision of the act of
1871, provides that "no grain shall be received into any private
elevator located in cities having a population of 100,000 inhabi-
tants or more until such grain shall have been inspected by a duly
authorized inspector."
began my administration, much complaint arose because of unsatis-
factory gradings. Now we have office inspection. In track in-
spections, the gradings of grain were determined by a single inspec
tor whose work was sone at the cars on railroad tracks. In office
inspections, the grades are determined by a corps of inspectors at
the central office of the Grain Inspection Department. Under the
new system
,
much greater accuracy and uniformity of inspections
is possible.
"One day for example 1,800 cars of grain were inspected from
sample. Only 42 re- inspections were called for; of these 15 only
were changed." Governor's Message in Journal of The Senate 1913
,
pp. 67ff.
The conflict between the Chicago Board of Trade and the Rail-
road and Warehouse Commissioners, whether the later was at fault
to the degree reported, or not, was necessarily responsible for im-
provement in the inspection of grain.
1. Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners 1 Reports, 1908, p. 557.
2. Ibid., 1909, p. 500. Laws of 111., 1907, p. 492.
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6. Warehouses of Classes "B" and W C". Under the warehouse act of
1871, warehouses of classes B and C escaped all State regulation
for meny years. Some general provisions of the lew relative to re-
ceipts, handling of grain, and the nixing of grain epply to ware-
houses of these classes hut no officers were provided by the law to
enforce them.
In 1878, the Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners request-
ed all the owners and managers of public warehouses of classes B
and C to make reports on their "business in accordance with the re-
quirements of the law. Blanks were sent to 1,180 public warehouse-
men but only 65 replies were received. 1 In the following year a
law was passed providing that in cities or counties in which are
located warehouses of class B an inspector of grain should be ap-
pointed by the governor upon the application and petition of two or
more warehousemen doing a separate business. If there were a legal-
ly organized Board of Trade in such city or county such Board must
2
ratify the petition.
This law cannot have been passed with any serious inten-
tion on the part of the legislature for the reason that it must
have known well th8t boards of trade were not anxious to turn the
inspection of grain over to State control. Irrespective of the num-
ber of warehousemen desiring the appointment of Stste inspectors of
grain, the Board of Trade of such place could thwart their efforts.1"
1. Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners' Reports, 1878, p. XXI.
2. Laws of Illinois, 1879, p. 227.
3. No data were available to the writer showing cases
,
provided
there were such cases, in which two or more warehouses petitioned
the governor of the State for State supervision of grain inspection
The faet that no State inspection was instituted in any city or
county under the law of 1879, makes it apparent that every such
petition from cities or counties, containing a legally organized
Board of Trade, failed to receive the ratification by such Board.

37
The Board of Trade of the city of East St. Louis appoint-
ed inspectors of grain. Under its charter it had such power to ap-
point inspectors whose decisions were binding upon the members of
the Board and upon all others assenting thereto. But such inspect-
ors had no power to act in any other case according to the State
law. The East St. Louis Board however made its inspections binding
and obligatory upon all warehousemen, collecting regular fees for
their services. In a case, carried to the Supreme State Court,
involving an action against the East St. Louis Board, the court stat-
ed that the Board had no authority, either by virtue of its charter
or by virtue of the law of 1871, to exact fees and compel the in-
spection of grain of warehousemen other than members of their own
2
organization. The court further maintained that in all places
where there were no legally appointed inspectors, the warehousemen
might continue to carry on their business without inspection if
3
they so preferred.
State inspection of grain continued to be confined to
Chicago for many years. In 1897, however, the legislature acting
upon the recommendation of the Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners
passed a new law providing that the appointment of grain inspectors
of public warehouses of class B should be made updn the recommend-
ation of the above Commissioners. The Commissioners were to act up-
on the request of the county commissioners or board of supervisors
4
of the county where the waretoouses were situated.
1. The charter of the East St. Louis Board of Trade is similar to
charter grainted to the Chicago Board of Trade.
2. Eor a number of years the grain dealers of Chicago refused to
pay inspection fees under the law of 1871. Ey order of the Rail-
road and Warehouse Commissioners thirty suits were started and
judgment obtained in each case. Railroad and Warehouse Commission-
ers' Reports, 1874, pp. 30ff. et 91 111. 357.
3. 105 111. 382. (1883)
4. Laws of Illinois, 1897, p. 300.
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The first county board to file a petition under this law
was that of St. Clair county. An inspector was at once appointed and
the Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners took possession of the in-
spection at East St. Louis on the first of August , 1897 • ^ For many
years the inspection had been in the hands of the Merchants' Ex-
change of St. Louis, Missouri. Five years later there was establish-
ed in connection with the inspection department at East St. Louis,
a weighing department over which the Railroad and Warehouse Com-
mission had supervision.
By 1907, there were five cities in addition to Chicago
3
with State supervision of grain inspection. Warehousing in other
cities throughout the State remained without State supervision un-
til the passage of the State Utilities act in 1913.
1. Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners' Reports, 1897, p. XI.
2. Ibid., 1902, p. 371.
By 1906, there were inspected in end out of regular ware-
houses at East St. Louis 24,293 cars; from private elevators 3,973
cars. Ibid., 1906, p. 485.
3. East St. Louis, Decatur, Kankakee, Joliet, and Springfield.
State inspection at the last four mentioned cities was
maintained for a period of five years and then abandoned; apparent-
ly because of the small amount of grain received. Ibid., 1907-1911.
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7. State Regulati on of Weighing. One serious defect in the laws
relative to the supervision of public grain elevators was the lack
of provisions for State control of the weighing of grain going in-
to and out of these elevators. 1
Warehouses early made a practice of accumulating surplus-
es of grain which they called accidental; and there was no way to
2prove the contrary.
In 1883, a law was passed providing for the appointment
by the Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners of a State weighmaster
and necessary assistants in all cities having State grain inspection.
Such weighmaster and assistants were not to be members of any board
of trade or association. The rules for the weighing of grain were
3
to be made by the Commissioners.
The law contained one serious defect; the funds for the
maintenance of the State weighing system were to be secured from
fees collected from buyers and sellers, which means from receivers
and shippers of grain who are usually members of the Board of Trade.
It was at the request of the Chicago Board of Trade that
the lew was passed. The Eastern roads had refused the Board's
weighmaster access to their scales for some time and they were un-
able to compel them to submit to their inspection. But the Board of
Trade wanted the authority to appoint the weighmaster and when that
power was denied them they failed to co-operate with the weighmaster.
1. Whole trains were pulled upon and over the scales and weighed
while in motion and without uncoupling. Cars when full were
weighed, left in the rain when empty and then re-weighed. Railroad
and Warehouse Commissioners' Report, 1883, p. 493.
2. One elevator accumulated during one year 9,029 bushels of corn
and 1,479 bushels of oats. Ibid., 1874, p. 42.
3. Laws of Illinois, 1883, p. 172.

The city weighmaster also refused to co-operate with the State
department. Trouble arose, funds were lacking, and the State
weighmaster resigned.
The weighing at the Chicago elevators was again left
to the Chicago Board of Trade. 1 Later the Eoard also extended
2
its supervision over scales at country points.
1. Chicago Board of Trade Reports, 1904, p. L, and LI.
2. "In 1915, the Board inspected 51 scales at interior points,
37 of which were found to weigh incorrectly, and 483 scales
were tested in the Chicago district of which 143 were found de-
fective." Chicago Board of Trade Reports, 1915, p. XXXV.
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8 . Central Elevator Cases: Public Warehousemen Enjoined from
Mixing Their Own Grain with Tha t of Their Patrons. Prior to the
year 1887, Chicago elevators were mainly owned by warehousemen and
railroads who had no direct interest in the grain stored therein,
only as occasional "corners" were formed by the socalled elevator
"rings". 1 But within a few years after the passage of the Inter-
state Commerce Act of 1887, the elevator interests became important
dealers in grain and hence became directly interested in the grain
o
stored in their warehouses.*" The principal reason for this change
was the prohibition of the granting of rebates by the Interstate
Commerce Act. For a number of years the granting of rebates to
shippers of grain had been a common practice. It was one of the
most effective means of meeting the competition of the roads carry-
ing grain by other routes to the Eastern markets. After the passage
of the Interstate Commerce Act it became necessary for the railroads
to grant these rebates more secretly. This was most effectively
accomplished by entering into agreements with a few large dealers
in grain. In many instances the railroads leased to these grain
dealers their own terminal elevators at nominal rates, in other in-
stances the owners of warehouses became directly interested in the
buying and selling of grain. The owners were also frequently large
3
stockholders in railroad corporations. The competition of other
1. United States Industrial Commission Reports, Vol.X, pp. XLIX.
2. Ibid.
,
p. L.
3. Records to show that the railroads were to a greater of less
extent, either directly or through their officers interested in the
elevators: "The following is a copy of the list of stockholders of
the Central Elevator Company, the terminal elevators of the Illinois
Central Railroad Company. This list of stockholders contains the
name of almost every officer of that road, including the party who
was president and one who has since been president:
(Central Elevator Company, Record No. 21, p. 323. Incorporated
in Illinois, Dec. 13, 1886, for 99 years. Capital Stock, $100,000--
1,000 shares, $100 each.)
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roads could now be met by granting secret rebates to these grain
merchants. The Minneapolis grain interests had been drawing upon
the grain of Iowa and Nebraska, shipping the same via Duluth and
the Great lakes' route and the St. Louis interests had been attract-
ing grain from other territory tributary to Chicago, shipping it by
way of the Mississippi River to the Eastern markets and abroad.
^
Another important reason for the change in the system of
handling grain in Chicago was the practice of selling grain upon
"track" by "sample". Heretofore most of the grain going through
Chicago had entered storage, sale being made by delivery of ware-
house receipts. The practice of through-billing was also instrument-
al. The effect of these practices was to greatly reduce the amount
2
of grain that went into store in Chicago. The warehousemen soon
realized that they must buy the grain in order to maintain the stor-
age business and the railroads who were frequently the owners of the
3
warehouses gladly co-operated with them.
It is difficult to determine what the effects of the
system were upon the prices of grain, hence upon the producers.
From the conflicting evidence presented in the city of Chicago be-
fore a sub-committee of the United States Industrial Commission, it
would appear that the grain merchants of Chicago who did not receive
"Original Stockholders;
Name, Shares, Value,
J.C.Clarke, 150 15,000
John Dunn, 100 10,000
A.G.Hackstaff , 100 16,000
S.Fish, 150 15,000
E.T.Jeffrey, 150 15,000
J. C.Welling, 150 15,000
Henry De Wolf, 100 10,000
C.A .Beck, 100 10.000
Total 1,000 $100,000 ".
United States Industrial Commission Report, Vol. X, p. 296.
1. Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 383. 2. Ibid., Vol. X, p. 299.
3. Rules regarding grain consigned to Chicago by railroads:
"Illinois Central Railroad Company,
Chicago, Illinois, May 3,1895.
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rebates were most seriously effected. These were placed in a posit-
ion where they could not compete with the more favored grain mer-
chants.
Bitter complaints against this system of handling grain
first came from the Chicago Board of Trade. 1, The president of the
Board, Wm. T« Baker, characterized the system as immoral and derog-
atory to the grain "business of Chicago. In the following year,
1895, the "board of directors gave as their opinion that it was
against sound public policy for public custodians of grain, upon
whom the State had conferred special privileges for the single pur-
pose of sensing the people upon equal terms, to be dealers in grain."
On March 8, 1895, written complaints were presented to the
Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners by the warehouse committee of
the Chicago Board of Trade asking that the licenses of thirteen pub-
lic elevators be revoked upon the grounds that they were violating
the law in mixing their own grain with that of their depositors.
The Commissioners decided that the practice was contrary to law and
3
revoked the licenses of nine elevators. The warehousemen however
refused to abide by the decision of the Railroad and Warehouse Com-
HTo agents, shippers, and receivers of grain:
This company having ample storage room for grain in elevators
on its own tracks in Chicago, will not on and after this date, re-
ceive grain consigned to elevators off its lines in Chicago --
—
without extra charge." U.S. Industrial Commission Report, Vol. 10, p.
304.
1. Chicago Board of Trade Reports, 1894, p. LXVI.
2. Ibid., 1895, p. LXII.
3. The Central Elevator Company; George A. Seaverns; South Chicago
Elevator Company; Armour Elevator Company; Charles Counselman;
Chicago Railway Terminal Elevator Company; Nebraska City Packing
Company; Chicago Elevator Company; Alexander C. Davis. 174 111. 203.
The Warehouse Commissioners, however, had no jurisdiction to re-
voke Class A licenses. Section three of the act of 1871, confers
upon the local circuit court exclusive jurisdiction to issue and
revoke licenses to Class A warehouses. 64 111. App. 273 affirmed;
168 111. 165.
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missioners and continued their former practices. The attorney
general "brought the cases "before the circuit court of Cook county.
This court enjoined the defendants from mixing their own grain
with that of their depositors to the detriment of the other grain
merchants. 1 The defendants immediately appealed to the Supreme
court of the State. All cases appealing on the same grounds and
charged with the same violation of the law were argued as one case.
It was argued "by the appellants in substance as follows:
"The warehouse act of 1871, does not make it unlawful for the ware-
housemen to store their own grain in their warehouses.
"The long practical construction given to the act, as to the right
of warehousemen to receive and store their own grain with the grain
of others, should he conclusive of the question of construction.
"The relief in equity, prayed for by the informations, is barred
"by continuous acquiesence in the well known practice and methods
of the business of warehouse proprietors in storing their own grain
during the period of twenty- three years.
"The decrees in the cases against the Central Elevator Company,
and others, are erroneous in enjoining the stockholders, and the
companies themselves, from storing the grain of the stockholders."
It was also argued that elevators prior to the passage
of the act of 1871, stored their own grain and mixed it with that
of their depositors, and that the Supreme court had recognized
2
such practice.
The opinion rendered by the State Supreme court in this
case is in substance as follows:
"A warehouseman may be enjoined from using his license so as to sup-
press competition in trade in the articles stored in his warehouse.
1. Vide 174 111. 203.
2. Low v. Martin, 18 111. 286.
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"A public warehouseman will not be permitted to deal in grain and
store such grain in his own licensed warehouse. Stockholders of
such a corporation are likewise prohibited from storing their grain
in their warehouses.
"Failure on the part of warehouse commissioners to stop such prac-
tice or to question its legality does not amount to a practical con-
struction of the statute providing for licensing warehouses so as to
show that it authorizes such conduct."
The attorney general stated in behalf of the appellee
that there was no evidence that the practice complained of existed
before 1885, and that the older view, that is before 1860, held
that the deposit passed the title in the grain to the warehouseman
placing the transaction on the same basis as the deposit of money
in a bank. But that this view had occassioned much injustice to
the depositors of grain, and that now generally, either by statute
or judicial determination, it had become the law that a deposit of
grain in an elevator is a mere bailment and does not pass the title
to the grain. In Illinois this change hes been effected by statute 1
The court further charged the appellants with being monop-
olists of the Chicago grain market, being the owners of three-fourth^
of all the grain received in the public warehouses of the city*
These charges were not denied by the defendants who were large
dealers in futures on the Chicago Board of Trade .
According to the court as well as according to the Chicago
Board of Trade Reports and the evidence presented before the sub-
committee of the United States Industrial Commission the warehouse-
mens 1 position gave them a very peculiar advantage. Their chief ad-
vantages were said to be: "First,he pays no storage on the grain,
1. Vide, 55 111. 44.
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or pays storage to himself, so that the possession of the elevator
operates as a rebate; Second, he is able to select the "best grain
of a given grade and keep it for himself as merchant, giving the
public the 'line' grade, or grain juBt good enough to pass inspec-
tion."
1
The court charged that the warehouse proprietors often
overbade ether dealers as much as a quarter of a cent a bushel,
and immediately resold the same to a private buyer at a quarter of
a cent less than they paid and then exacted storage charges and re-
couped themselves.
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the circuit
court of Cook county. But before the Supreme court had rendered
its decision the legislature at Springfield had passed an act on
warehousing which contained a clause that specifically conferred
upon the proprietors, lessees, or managers of public warehouses
the authority to store in any warehouse owned by them, grain of
their own and mix it with the grain of others of like grade stored
therein. They were also authorized to purchase warehouse receipts
2
representing grain on store in such warehouse.
After this act was adopted and after the decree of the
circuit court of Cook county was affirmed by the State Supreme
court, J.S.Hannah, manager of the Central Elevator Company , continue!
to store the grain of the elevator company in the warehouse of the
company, claiming that the act of 1897 granted him such authority.
J.S.Hannah was tried in the circuit court of Cook county, adjudged
guilty of contempt of court and fined one hundred dollars. The
case was again appealed to the State Supreme court. The act of
1897 was declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it was out
of harmony with the constitution of the State. The court maintair-
1. Report of the United States Industrial Commission, Vol.X, p.L.
2. Illinois Session Laws, 1897, p. 302.

ed that a party cannot "be a qualified trustee if he has interests
which run counter to the interests of those for whom he acts as
trustee. The court stated that a public warehouseman was not pro-
hibited from storing his own grain in vacant places in his own ware-
house where the space so vacant was not needed for the storage of
grain of customers of the warehouse.''' The judgment of the circuit
2
court was affirmed.
A result of the decisions in the Central Elevator case
and the J.S.Hannah case was the change of a number of public ware-
housemen to private warehousemen. The Railroad and Warehouse Com-
missioners report in 1898, a decrease of 5,500,000 bushels in the
3public elevator capacity during the preceding year. Central Ele-
vator "A M ( 1,000, 000 capacity.) and Santa Fe "A" ( 1, 500, 000 capacity.)
voluntarily surrendered their licenses and became private warehouses
During the following year another decrease is reported. The capac-
ity of public elevators decreased from 31,050,000 bushels to
25,400,000 bushels. 4
This reduction in capacity of public warehouses made their
storage room less than the storage room of private elevators by
57,000,000 bushels. During the following year a number of private
warehouses took out licenses increasing the storage capacity again
to 31,900,000 bushels. For a number of years thereafter there was
very little change in the capacity of public warehouses.
1. 198 111. 77.
2. The same principle was set forth by the court in Lichtstern v.
Rosenbaum Grain Company, 176 111. App. 250,(1913)
3. Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners' Reports, 1898, p. 203.
4. The Rock Island MB'\ Peavy "B M
,
and the St. Paul and Fulton
Annex became private warehouses. Ibid., 1899, p. 94.
5. Ibid. 1899, p. 94.
6. The Iowa was made a private elevator but the Calumet WB" and "C M
Armour "C M
,
Peavy "B" , St. Paul and Fulton Annex, and the Galena
were made warehouses of class "A". Ibid., 1900, p. 89.
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9. The Publ ic Utilities' Act and Warehousing. The act of 1913,
"An act to provide for the regulation of public utilities", has ef-
fected a number of important changes in State supervision of public
warehouses. Section 10, of article I, of the act defines the term
"public utility" to mean: "Every corporation, company, association,
joint stock company, or association, firm, partnership or individual
(except, however, such public utilities as are or may be owned
or operated by any municipality), that now or hereafter: (A) may
own, control, operate or manage within the State, directly or in-
directly, for public use, any plant, equipment or property, used or
to be used---for the storing or warehousing of goods."
The Illinois Public Utilities Commission, created by the
act and succeeding to the powers and duties of the Railroad and
Warehouse Commissioners, maintains in its reports that it has wide
jurisdiction which covers every class of storage business that may
be done for compensation. The Commission states that it is compen-
sation, and not the particular nature of the business that deter-
2
mines its legal status. According to the Commission's reports
the law has placed under its regulation many forms of business
which heretofore have not been subject to State supervision, such
as cold storage houses, general storage, transfer and forwerding
warehouses, all classes of grain elevators, and other storage bus-
'siness conducted for a compensation. The Commission embodied the
4
above principle in Conference Ruling No. 12. It thereupon ordered
that every proprietor, lessee or manager of a public warehouse of
classes A, E, and C, as above defined, should immediately file with
the Commission, and should keep open to public inspection schedules
1. Laws of Illinois, 1913, p. 459 ff.
2. Illinois Public Utilities' Commission Report, 1914, Vol.1, pp. 15.
3. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
4. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
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showing all rates and charges. It was also ms.de obligatory for
such warehousemen to secure a certificate of "public convenience
and necessity", in order to conduct such business.
1
Many country elevators were conducting a storage business.
There consequently came under the control and supervision of the
Commission. But most of the elevators doing such storage business
for compensation either ceased charging storage rates or ceased the
storage business entirely. Out of a total of 2,441 elevators do-
ing business in the State, only 58 reported as doing a public
2
storage business in 1914.
The jurisdiction of the Commission over the cold storage
business was at first questioned. But in 1915, it was definitely
established by the Supreme court of the State that such business is
subject to the jurisdiction and control of the State Public Utili-
ties Commission. The defendants in the case, The monarch Refrig-
erator Company, argued that the Public Utilities act defined the
term warehouse as including all grain elevators and storehouses
where grain is stored for compensation, and that therefore cold
storage warehouses were not subject to the control of the Commiss-
ion. The court maintained that the spirit of the act as a whole
had to be considered and that the maxim "expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius" did not apply.
According to the Civil Administrative Code of 1917, dis-
tributing the administrative functions of the State governmemt
among nine departments, the regulation of cold storage warehousing
iB placed under the control of the department of agriculture. 4 The
1. 111. Public Utilities Commission Reports, 1914, Vol. I,t>.73.
2. Ibid., p. 15.
3. 267 111. 528. The Monarch Refrigerator Company, defendants in
this case, have plants covering several acres having a storage
capacity for about 4500 carloads of goods.
4. The following is in substance the Cold Storage Act passed in
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regulation of other kinds of warehousing, together with the in-
spection of grain is placed under the department of Trade and Com-
merce. The Public Utilities Commission, created by the Act of
1913, and which took over the functions of the Railroad and Ware-
house Commissioners, exercises its powers and duties under the di-
rection of the department of Trade and Commerce.
in the year 1917. "The Uniform Cold Storage Act"
"Section 1. For the purpose of this act 'cold Storage' shall mean
the storage --- of articles of food at or below a temperature above
zero of 45 degrees Fahrenheit in a cold storage warehouse; 'cold
storege warehouse' shall mean any place artificially cooled to or
below a temperature above zero of 45 degrees Fahrenheit, in which
articles of food are placed and held for thirty days or more; 'arti-
cles of food' shall mean fresh meat and fresh meat products and all
fish, game
,
poultry
,
eggs and butter.
"Section 2. No person, firm or corporation shall maintain or operate
a cold storage warehouse without a license so to do---- The licesse
shall be issued upon payment -of a license fee of $25.00 per
annum----
.
"Section 3. In case any cold storage warehouse --shall --be
deemed b„, the department of Agriculture to be in an unsanitary con-
dition, he shall notify the licensee ---and upon failure of the
licensee to put such cold storage warehouse in a sanitary condition
----he shall revoke the license.
"Section 4. Every such licensee shall keep accurate records of the
articles of food received in and of the articles of food drawn
from his ----warehouse.
"Section 6. No article of food intended for human use shall be plac-
ed , ---received or kept in any cold storage warehouse, if diseased
,
tainted, --or in such condition that it will not keep whole-
some for human consumption. •-
"Section 7. No person, firm or corporation shall place, receive or
keep in any cold storage warehouse --- articles of food unless the
same shall be plainly marked, with the date when placed there-
im and no person----shall remove --such articles fo food from any
cold storage warehouse unless the same shall be plainly marked, ---
with the date of such removal,---.
"Section 8. No person, ----shall hereafter keep ----in any cold
storage warehouse any article of food which has been held in cold
storage ---for a longer aggregate period than twelve months, ex-
cept upon the approval of the Director of the department of Agri.
—
"Section 9. It shall be unlawful to sell, ---any article of food
which has been held for a period of thirty days or more in cold
storage without notifying persons purchasing, the same, that
it has been so held, by the display of a placard plainly ---marked,
•Cold Storage Goods', .
"Section 10. It shall be unlawful to return to any cold storage
warehouse any article of food which has been once released from
storage for the purpose of placing it on the market for sale.---."
Laws of Illinois, 1917, pp. 648ff.
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10. Liability of Warehousemen. Warehousemen are obligated to ex-
ercise only ordinary care in the preservation of grain which is
stored with them. This principle has several times "been laid down
by the Supreme court of the State. 1
In case a warehouseman agrees to keep grain separate in
a particular bin, such grain must not be removed to another bin
without the owner's consent. In case of grain so removed, the grain
is in any way injured or destroyed, the warehouseman is liable for
2the full amount. The warehouseman, in the absence of any injury
to the grain, is nevertheless guilty of a breach of contract.
In all cases what constitutes ordinary care and diligence
depends upon the circumstances, on the nature of the company's
agreements with his depositors, on the confidence which he invites,
4
and on the value and nature of the deposit.
A warehouseman is also presumed to know the ordinary
character or nature of the articles of daily use which are stored
in his warehouse.^
1. 31 111. 353, (I863)j 102 111. App. 406} 200 111. 354, (1902).
2. 51 111. 520, (1869);
3. 126 111. App. 349, (1906).
4. 117 111. App. 652.
5. 200 111. 354, (1902).
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11. Negotiab il ity o f Warehouse Receipts. Prior to the Act of 1907,
warehouse receipts of all kinds have "been declared non-negotiable
instruments "by the courts of the State of Illinois. 1 In Burton v.
Curyea it was held that "warehouse receipts, not "being negotiable
instruments in a technical sense, merely stand in the place of the
property itself, and a delivery of such receipt transfers the title
to the property in the same manner as would the delivery of the prop-
2
erty itself."
In the following year, 1867, an act was passed which de-
clared all receipts for grain, issued by any warehouse, negotiable
by indorsement in blank or by special indorsement, in the same man-
ner and to the same extent as bills of exchange and promissory
3
notes. No cases of importance seem to he.ve arisen under the Act
while it was in force.
In the Act of 1871, there is found a section which reads
in part as follows: "Warehouse receipts for property stored in any
class of public warehouses , -----shall be transferable by the in-
dorsement of the party to whose order such receipt may be issued,
and such indorsement shall be deemed a valid transfer of the prop-
erty represented by such receipt, and may be made either in blank
or to the order of another . " 4 This act of 1871 repealed the
warehouse Act of 1867 and with it the section declaring warehouse
receipts negotiable.
The first important case to arise under the act of 1871,
relative to the negotiability of warehouse receipts, was The Canadi-
an Bank of Commerce v. Samuel H.McCrea, filed at Ottawa 1882. The
1. Laws of Illinois, 1907, pp. 477ff.
2. 40 111. 320, (1866).
3. Illinois Public Session Laws, 1867, pp. 177ff.
4. Laws of Illinois, 1871, pp. 762ff.
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State Supreme Court at this time declared that the warehouse re-
ceipts were not made negotiable by the Act of 1871 and further the
court was not of the opinion that the act of 1867 was intended to
change the decision rendered in Burton v. Curyea, 40 111. 320, 1866.
The court also stated that the negotiable instruments act did not
embrace warehouse receipts or bills of lading, and instruments of
that class. 1 The Act reads: "Promissory notes, bonds, due bills,
and other instruments in writing, made or to be made by any person,
body politic or corporate, whereby such person promises or agrees
to pay eny sum of money or articles of personal property, ---or ac-
knowledges any sum of money or article of personal property to be
2due to any other person are negotiable."
In 1907, a very comprehensive law was passed relative to
the negotiability of warehouse receipts and the liability of ware-
housemen who issue such receipts. This Act provides that any
warehouseman may issue warehouse receipts; such receipts to state
the location of the warehouse, date of issue, description of goods,
storage rate, and whether the goods received shall be delivered to
the bearer, specified person or his order. A receipt stating that
the goods are to be delivered to the depositor or any specified
person is declared non-negotiable. One stating that the goods are
deliverable to bearer or order is declared a negotiable receipt.
A warehouseman who delivers goods to one not lawfully en-
titled to them or who fails to take up a negotiable receipt on de-
livery of the goods is liable.
It would appear from the above quoted act as though ware-
house receipts, stating that the goods are deliverable to bearer or
1. 106 111. 281, (1882).
2. Hurd's Statutes, 1881, Chap. 114, Sec. 142.
3. Laws of Illinois, 1907, pp. 477ff.
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order, are negotiable instruments. But the courts have not so in-
terpreted the law. In Manufacturer^ Mercantile Co. v. Monarch Re-
frigerating Co., the court held: "Warehouse receipts are not nego-
tiable in a legal sense so as to enable the person holding them to
transfer a greater right or title to the property mentioned in them
than he himself had."*
This decision apparently put warehouse receipts back into
the non-negotiable class of commercial paper.
3L« 266 111. 584; 169 111. App. 562.
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12. Concluding Remarks. The effects of the State's supervision
of the inspection and storage of grain upon the grain trade of the
city of Chicago are difficult to determine "because of the many
other factors affecting the business. The warehouse legislation,
as has been shown, was passed for the most part previous to 1872
when the interests of the people were predominantly agricultural. 1
The farmers were considered and called the "producing class" as
gdistinct from the railroad and mercantile interests." The critical,
if not hostile, attitude of the farmers toward the railroads and
warehousemen during this early period was part of the Granger Move-
3
ment which pervaded the entire Northwest. The erroneous conception
that the farmers are in a very peculiar sense the sole producing
class was still strong. The other more defensible conception was
that the "producers" needed protection. The same ideas are found
in the early pure food legislation. The oleomargarine laws, for ex-
ample, were passed, not to protect the consumer but the producer,
the dairyman of northern Illinois.
These conditions would at once discount to some degree
the criticisms made relative to the early practices of the railroads
and warehousemen. The practices of giving short weights, issuing
fraudulent receipts, dishonest grading, and forming "corners" and
"rings" undoubtedly existed prior to 1871 and for some time after
1. The following resolution offered in the constitutional conven-
tion of 1870 would indicate the scarcity of manufactures in the
State: "Resolved, That for the encouragement of the establishment
of manufactures in this State, there ought to be a clause in the
new constitution exempting all manufacturing companies from taxation
by all laws of this State, for the term of five years after the
adoption of said constitution ." Debates of Constitutional Con-
vention, 1870, p. 100.
2. "The great evil under which the 'producing class 1 of this State
labor, is the want of competition in the business of warehousing
the produce of the State." Ibid., p. 1629.
3. "The present system of grain inspection was the outgrowth of
an incomprehensible antagonism developed some years ago among the
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that date. But to what extent these practices affected the grain
trade of the city of Chicago or to what extent the elimination of
such practices has been due to State regulation or the efforts of
the Chicago Board of Trade is impossible to determine. Undoubtedly
both agencies are responsible for improvement in the conditions.
The grain business of the city of Chicago ha3 increased
during the last sixty years both absolutely and relative to the
total production of grain in the territory tributary to the city.
The following table^shows the growth in the total grain receipts in
the city from 1862 to 1914 and also the increase in the total pro-
duction of wheat, corn, and oats, the three most inportant cereals
of the States of Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and
North and South Dakota, States tributary to Chicago: (in millions Bu.
Year, Total Pro- Total Receipts Year, Total Pro- Total Receip
duction, in Chicago, duction, in Chicago,
1868 493 69 1894 838 187
1870 623 60 1896 1382 253
1872 641 88 1898 1335 320
1874 555 95 1900 1402 349
1876 705 97 1902 1774 218
1878 897 134 1904 1633 265
1880 1013 165 1906 1897 280
1882 934 126 1908 1570 272
1884 1130 159 1910 1943 294
1886 1083 151 1912 2404 322
1888 1265 182 1914 1953 416
1890 987 227
1892 1046 255
The increase in production is from 493 millions bushels
in 1868 to 1953 millions in 1914. The total receipts of grain in
the city of Chicago were in 1854, 15 millions bushels, in 1868,
69 millions bushels and in 1914, 416 millions bushels. This shows
a six-fold increase in total receipts since 1868, and also a slight
Grangers as to Chicago business. w Chicago Tribune, 1877, March 7.
1. Table compiled from the Annual Reports of the Secretary of
Agriculture and from the Year Books of the Department of Agricul-
ture. The amount, 838, under total production for 1894, includes
oat crop of 1895 instead of 1894 as the figures for the latter are
not available.
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increase in Chicago receipts relative to the total production of
the three most important cereals in the seven States named.*
The growth of grain business in the city of Chicago can
be attributed in only a very small degree, if at all, to the merits
of the State inspection system. The most important factors apparent-
ly responsible for such increase are the location of the city in the
greatest grain belt of the world and the city's accessibility to
both water and rail transportation.*
The amount of grain stored in warehouses, both public and
private, during this period shows no such increase. The total
amount so stored in Chicago in 1872, was 69 millions bushels and
p
and the amount so stored in 1914, was 162 millions bushels. This
decrease relative to total receipts is due to the fact that an in-
creasingly large amount was transferred "on track" and "billed-
through" to the Eastern markets. The graph representing the amount
of grain going into public store shows a slightly upward curve for
the years 1870 to 1896. After 1896, the curve is decidedly down-
ward for a period of ten years when there is again a slight rise.
Unlicensed elevators, which do not become important until
1890, rapidly increase their holdings of grain in the years 1897,
1898, and 1899.
The decrease in the amount of grain going into public
1. Average rates in cents per bushel of corn and wheat, Chicago to
New York; Year Book of the Department of Agriculture, 1902, p. 851.
Year Corn Wheat
All Rail, By Lake By Lake All Rail, Lake and Lake
and Canal, and Rail, Canal
,
Rail,
1875 19.5 ""8.75 11.34 20.89 9.82 12.09
1880 17.48 13.41 14.43 19.8 13.13 15.8
1885 12.32 6.3 8.01 13.2 6.54 9.02
1890 11.36 5.93 7.32 14.3 6.76 8.52
1895 10.29 4.54 6.4 11.89 4. 86 6.96
1900 9.19 4.07 4.72 9.96 4.49 5.1
W, Vide Statistical Table following Page, 58.
3. Vide Graph opposite Page, 56, Graph III.
4. Vide Statistigal Table following Page, 58.

(*» ufe do do Oo OoK^tfefcloO^o^O^-^

58
storage and the increased importance of private warehouses cannot
be attributed to defects in the State Inspection System since both
public and private elevators, in order to be "regular" on Exchange,
have for over fifty years been subjected to the Chicago Board of
Trade regulations which in every particular have been as exacting
as the State '8 regulations and in addition have controlled many
phases of the business not supervised by the State. 1
One of the apparent reasons for the increased importance
of private over public warehouses is the decision made in the Cen-
tral Elevator cases enjoining the owners of public warehouses from
mixing their own grain with that of their patrons. A considerable
number of licenses were voluntarily surrendered and many grain deal-
ers have also become private warehousemen.
Whatever the merits or defects of the State System of
grain inspection and supervision over public elevators, a minimum
standard was set. The law has not enjoined the Chicago Board of
Trade from subjecting warehousemen to more exacting requirements
relative to inspection and weighing of grain than the requirements
laid down by law or imposed by the Railroad and Warehouse Commis-
sioners prior to 1914. The law likewise does not compel the Board
of Trade to accept the receipts issued by the public warehousemen
and stamped by the State registrar. If the Staters standard is not
sufficiently high, the Board has it within its power to raise it
for all warehousemen whose receipts are passed on the Exchange floor
These conditions, however, do not necessarily mean ade-
quate protection for the shipper and producer of grain nor for the
1. These regulations are printed in detail in every report of the
Chicago Board of Trade.
2. In Minneapolis, where there is State inspection, grain is sold
as graded by the Board of Trade inspectors and graders of grain.
Since 1904, the Chicago Board of Trade has conducted a resampling
department. Vide, Supra p. 34.

The Grain Bus iness of Chicago in Millions of Bushels
for Alternate Years •
Year, 1 A
1
B. 1 c.
1
D « 1 F. | G.
1
H.
„ , 1 11-
1854 15 13
1856 24 21
1858 23 20
1860X WV w 37 31
1862 57 56
1864 49 46
68 65
1868 69 63
1870 60 54
1872 88 83 69 69
1 87 4 95 84 65 66 66
1876 97 87 56 S3WW 61 53 8
1878 134 118 80 77 1 07 77 70
1880 165 154 107 104 1 ^8 104 34
1882 126 114 57 64 09 64 35
1884 159Jm %J %y 138 57 ICO 58 70
1886Xw lw» V 151X w X 129 62 61U X 1 **1X <J X 61 70
1888X Ww w 182 156 78 73 1 47X *± ' 72 75
1890 227 204 86 o o 204 85 119
1892 216 109 Q9 9 Afi 107 8 139
1894X W w7 "I 187 148 73 AftDO 1 ATX ox 71 3 110
1896 253 219 100 Q? 9 6A 120 28 144
1898 320 287 86 99 299 166 67 133
1900 349 265 72 69 991 170 101 121
1902 218 166 35 41*x X 1 72 115 74 57
1904 265 180 27 22 x J7 121 99 22
1906 280 214 34 33 257 150 117 107
1908 272 222 32 37 229 139 102 90
1910 294 214 35 29 254 134 105 120
1912 322 244 32 40 255 145 105 110
1914 416 316 49 53 259 162 109 97
1915 371 299 52 53 348 243 190 105
A. Represents Total Chicago Receipts of all Grain.
B. " H "" " " " Shipments of all Grain.
C. " " Grain Received into Public Store.
D. " " Grain Shipped from Public Store.
E. " " Grain Inspected on Arrival.
P. " " Grain from Store, Public and Private, Inspected.
G. " " Grain from unlicensed Elevators, Inspected.
H. " N Grain Inspected on "Track".
Columns A, and B, are compiled from the Chicago Boerd of
Trade Reports, 1871, pp. 36-37; 1891, pp. 18,19; 1915, pp. 18, 19.
Columns C, and D, are taken from the Annual Reports of
the Illinois State Grain Inspection Department, 1914-15, r>p. 265ff
.
Columns E, and P, are compiled from the Railroad and
Warehouse Commissioners 1 Reports , through the year 1907, and from
the Reports of the Illinois Grain Inspection Department through
1915, Reports 1914-15;
Column G, is obtained by subtracting column D from F.Column H, is obtained bv subtracting column V from E.
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distant purchaser, who buys the grain, not "by sample, but by grade.
The failure of the State to make adequate provision for the weigh-
ing of grain, going into store, leaves the shipper dependant upon
the warehouseman or board of trade in this important particular.
Further if the inspection system is faulty, the shipper has no legal
guarantee that his grain will be honestly graded nor can the distant
purchaser be certain that a reported grade will be up to the stand-
ard. Dishonesty or ignorance in the grading of grain will partic-
ularly injure the foreign market for grain and hence unfavorably
affect the price of the same.
If the history of mercantile regulation by law proves one
thing it proves that the law in most instances is no stronger than
the special agencies created to look after its enforcement. With-
out such agencies the law is soon a dead letter even if temporarily
obeyed and with faulty agencies or agencies burdened with too many
duties the law is not effectually enforced. In the regulation of
many mercantile businesses and in the warehousing business in par-
ticular, another conclusion may be drawn and that is that the State
agency must co-operate with the mercantile interests, in this case
the boards of trade.
The Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners have undoubtedly
been burdened with too many functions to leave them time to estab-
lish a more perfect system of inspecting and grading grain. During
its early history it failed to co-operate with the Chicago Board of
Trade in establishing grades of grain and at times inspectors have
been appointed because of political affiliations and not because
of their qualifications as grain judging experts.
It is a question whether Section 6. of the article on
warehousing, as reported by the "committee on the whole" to the
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constituent assembly, in 1870, ought not to have been retained.
It provided: "The board of trade or other commercial organization
of any town or city, to be designated by law, shall have the power
to make such rules in regard to the inspection of grain as may be
just and proper, for the protection of producers, shippers, and
receivers of grain. w ^ /
1. Debates in the Constitutional Convention, 1S70, p. 1682, Supra, 11

CHAPTER II
Pure Pood and Drug Legislation.
1. Practice of Adulteration in The Past * The manufacture and sale
of impure and adulterated foods and drugs is not peculiar to the
present age. The practice was carried on by the Greeks and Romans
and became common during the middle ages and the early period of
modern times. 1 Even "in primitive society knavish tricks, ignorant
bartering, substitutions of bed for good, end falseness end mean-
2
ness of all kinds,--" were practices of the day.
During the middle ages in Europe the bakers, brewers,
"pepperers" and vintners were the most common offenders. The pro-
duction of imitation butter was common at a very early period;Paris
passing an ordinance in 1396, forbidding "the coloring of butter
with 'saucy flowers, 1 other flowers, herbs, or drugs." 4 Old butter
likewise was not to be mixed with new, but the sele was to be sep-
arate, under penalty of confiscation and fine. In very early times
a "police des Commissaires" was established in France that had gen-
eral supervision of provisions, as to purity and quality. Various
5
statutes were also enacted from time to time.
The histories of England and Germany likewise record
practices of adulteration of foods and drinks.
The punishments meted out to these offenders, if caught,
were of a charecter consistent with the customs of the times.
1. Quoting from the Elack-letter Tract--"And you, maister brewer,
that growe to be worth forty thousand pounds by selling of soden
water, what subtil ty have you in making your beere to spare the
malt, and put in the more of the hoppe, to make your drinke, be
barley never so cheape, not a whit the stronger, and yet never sell
a whit the more measure for money--" Blyth, Foods; Their Composi-
tion and Analysis, p. 7.
2. Ibid., p. 3.
3. Pure Products, 1905, pp. 54ff. (Magizine)
4. Blyth, Foods: Their Composition and Analysis, p. 11.
5. American Food Journal, 1915, p. 572.
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Offenders were taken about the town in the cart in which the re-
fuse of the place had been collected, and to thi8 degradation was
often added corporal punishment. The pillory end other forms of
cruel treatment were also resorted to."*"
Not only the manufacturer or producer of the corrupt arti-
p
cle but also the retailer was early held responsible.
1« Elyth, Foods: Their Composition and Analysis, p. 7.
2. "Last to you, Tom Tapster, that take your small cannes of
beere, if you see your guests begin to be drunke, halfe smal
and halfe stronge Ibid.
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2. Causes of Increase in Adulteration * Although there v/as much
adulteration in early periods, its large scale practice was depend-
ent upon the development of commerce and modern inventions in the
manufacture, preservation, and storage of foodstuffs. As long as
the bulk of vegetables and fruits came from the family garden and
orchard, the dairy products from the family cow, and the meats from
the stock raised and slaughtered by the consumer, the adulteration
of foodstuffs could not assume important proportions. Hence the
first condition requisite for the large-scale manufacture and sale
of adulterated and impure foods is the concentration of a large
population into centers where such population is largely dependent
upon the market for their food supplies. This condition alone, how-
ever, does not necessarily lead to the adulteration of foods. Large
cities have existed from the earliest times of which we have histor-
ic records.
The other conditions requisite for the large scale prac-
tice of food adulteration were the inventions of new kinds of foods,
new methods of preserving and canning foods, and the discovery of
substitutes for and imitations of old kinds of foods. These condi-
tions, together with the improved means of transportation, result-
ing in the territorial distribution of labor, concentration of pop-
ulation into large cities, and a relative increase in the prices of
foodstuffs have been conducive to the manufacture and sale of impure
and adulterated foods on a scale unimagined half a century ago!
The salmon canned on the Pacific coast, the oysters from
the Atlantic, the fruit canned in the State of Calfornia or dried
in the hot sun and arid atmosphere of New Mexico and Arizona are
sold to the consumer in every city and hamlet of the United States
1. Probably no one factor is more responsible for adulteration on
the large scale than the relative high cost of foodstuffs.
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end in many other parts of the world. These products are sold in
such a form that there can be no inspection as to purity or quality
from the time that they leave the packer in these distant lands un-
til the packages are broken by the consumer in his home. The seme
conditions prevail in the manufacture and sale of preserved meats
and dairy products.
The discovery and use of new kinds of preservatives of
doubtful purity and wholesomeness is one of the most potent causes
for the existence of impure foods. * The science of bacteriology
has contributed the germ theory and the science of chemistry has
discovered these new preservatives. Manufacturers of perishable
foodstuffs ere utilizing these two sciences, in too many cases ig-
norant of the effects of the chemicals they use upon the health
of the consumer, or in utter disregard of the consumer they change
perishable foodstuffs into well-nigh non-perishable products.
With the progress of the sciences, imitations of old
kinds of foods and substitutes for the same, which are difficult to
detect, have been placed upon the market. Many of these products
have been proven to be of lower food value than the genuine and in
many case6 to be postively injurious to the human system. Chicory
is sold for coffee, oleomargarine for butter, and glucose products
for maple syrups.
The pure food problem is thus a two-fold problem: what are
impure foods end how can the manufacture and sale of the same be
prevented. The former is a problem for the chemist, the latter for
the legislatures and courts.
1. Folin, Preservatives in Foods, p. 14.
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3. Pure Food Legislation and The Police Power. The power of the
State to regulate the manufacture and sale of foods and drugs is a
valid exercise of its police power. The maxim, "Salus populi supre-
ma lex H has come down to us from the Romans. In Beer Co. v. Mass.,
the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the following
opinion: "Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the ex-
tent and boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it
may be to render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems to be
no doubt that it does extend to the protection of the lives, health,
and property of the citizens, and to preservation of good order and
the public morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest
itself of the power to provide for these objects. They belong
emphatically to that class of objects which demand the application
of the maxim, 'Salus populi suprema lex 1 ."^" In an opinion of the
Illinois Supreme Court is found the following: "The police power
of the State is that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,
2
and welfare of society---." In another case the court held that
"the police power endeavors to prevent evil by checking the tenden-
cy toward it, and it seeks to place a margin of safety between that
which is permitted and that which is sure to lead to injury or loss.'
It is apparent from these opinions that the police power is suffi-
ciently broad to admit of food and drug regulation.
This power may be exercised by the State even though it
interferes with the liberty and property rights of individuals or
corporations. In Mugler v. Kansas the United States Supreme Court
held that the constitutional limitations which declare that no per-
son shall be deprived of his property of liberty without due proc-
1. 97 U.S. 25.
2. 70 111. 191.
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ess of law are not incompatible with the principles equally vital
because essential to the peace and safety, that all property in
this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's
use of it shall not be injurious to the community.^"
The Illinois Supreme Court in Hawthorn v. People, held:
"Where a law is necessary for the safety, security, and welfare of
society, the fact that it regulates trade or any business, or to
some degree operates as a restraint thereon, does not render it un-
constitutional. " 2
The police power, although very broad, is not without its
limitations. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated its
boundaries as follows: "Neither the legislature nor a municipality
can, under the guise of police regulation, arbitrarily invade per-
sonal or property rights; and when such regulations are called in
question the test should be whether they have some relation to the
public health or public safety, and whether such is in fact the end
3
sought to be attained. If not, they should be declared invalid— .
"
The police power of the State must also be exercised at
4
all times in subordination to the Federal Constitution. The
Illinois Supreme Court held: "Under pretense of making police reg-
ulations, the legislature cannot enact laws unnecessary to the pres-
ervation of the health and safety of the community, or which prohib-
it that which is harmless in itself, or command that to be done
which does not tend to promote the health, safety, and welfare of
society.
"
Until a few decades ago the police power as exercised in
the regulation of the manufacture and sale of foods and drugs was
1. 123 U.S. 623. 2. 109 111. 302.
3. 199 U.S. 306. (1903).
4. 173 U.S. 684.
5. 67 111. 37, (1873).
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a matter of common law, the guiding principles being found in
the decisions of courts. During the last few decades, however,
many States have through their legislatures enacted the common law
rules into statutes. Unwholesomeness was a necessary element of
the offense at common law, and it has been held a necessary element
of the offense forbidden by statute.
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4* Pure Food Regulation in Illinois Prior to 1899 > Although
adulterated and poisonous foods and drinks have been produced end
sold since the earliest historic times, the pure food problem as
we have it today, dates back only a little over half a century.
With the growth of cities, the relative increase in the prices of
foodstuffs, and the advancement in chemical science adulteration
have increased. But at the same time that the science of chemis-
try cane to the aid of the manufacturer of these impure products
chemistry and bacteriology both came to the aid of the consumer.
Food products were analyzed and their nutritive values determined.
The effects of poisons and preservatives of various kinds upon the
human system were also studied. Hygiene began to be taught in the
public schools and newspapers, magazines, and lecturers aided in
directing the attention of the people to the subject of pure foods.
Another important factor, if not the most important, active in se-
curing the suppression of the manufacture and sale of adulterated
products and cheap imitations has been the honest producer of the
genuine product. The most striking example of this factor in the
State of Illinois has for many years been the producer of dairy
products.
Prior to 1899, the State of Illinois had very few laws
effectively regulating foods and drugs. The laws that were on the
statute books in regard to food regulation were vague and unweildy.
The legislature had made no provision for their enforcement and
"what was everybody's business was nobody's business . "^ System-
atic inspection and enforcement of law prevailed in only a f ew
fields, primarily in the production and sale of dairy products and
their substitutes. The principle of "caveat emptor" remained in
1. Illinois Food Commissioner's Report, 1899, p. 13.
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force long after it had become practically impossible for either
the middlemen to inspect much of the food that they were handling
or for the consumer to inspect the food which he purchased until it
was placed on his table.
The statutes of 1860, contain a law prohibiting a person
from knowingly selling any flesh of any diseased animal, or other
unwholesome provisions, or any pernicious or adulterated drink or
liquor.^" The weakness of such a statute is apparent and it is a
question whether it strengthened the common law or weakemed it.
Two laws, more specific in their application, were enacted
a few years later. One forbade the manufacture and sale of poison-
ous candies and the other had for its object the regulation of milk
2
supplied to cheese factories. According to the latter law it was
made a punishable offense for any one knowingly to supply or bring
to be manufactured to any cheese factory in the State any tainted
or adulterated milk or milk from which cream had been taken.
The Supreme Court of the State, five years later, constru-
ed this act as not applying to a person engaged in making butter or
cheese on his own account but only to such factories as were con-
3ducted upon a joint or co-operative plan. The Court stated that
the words "supply to be manufactured" or "bring to be manufac tured','
as used in the act, could not be construed to mean a sale. The
1. Illinois Statutes, 1860, p. 397. Opposition to sumptuary leg-
islation was more openly manifested fifty years ago than at present.
The following resolution was made by the committee on the bill of
rights to the constitutional convention: "The maintenance inviolate
of the right of every person in this State to select and enjoy
whatever, of food or drink, he may deem most conducive to his
health and comfort, is essential to the full and just enjoyment by
every citizen of his natural birthright of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness; and the same shall never be denied or abridg-
ed in this State by law." Debates in Constitutional Convention,
1870, p. 260.
2. Public Session Laws, 1869, p. 113; Ibid., pp. 163ff.
3. Phillips v. Meade, 75 111. 334.
<
71
Court further stated: "Where various persons are interested in the
factory, and each furnishing a quantity of milk to he manufactured,
and to share in the products in proportion to the milk furnished,
---there is manifest justice in the provision which prevents one
from imposing on the others "by furnishing or supplying to be manu-
factured a diluted article.
"While the necessity for a law for this purpose is appar-
ent, it is difficult to perceive any nee=d for legislation to secure
a party, who might "be manufacturing on his own account, against
imposition." The last statement is significant. The Court could
see no necessity for legislation to protect the manufacturer pro-
ducing on his own account. The principle "caveat emptor" must pre-
vail. Further the Court did not take into consideration the con-
sumer who might purchase the inferior article produced from the di-
luted or tainted milk.
The adulteration of milk and the manufacture of skimmed
cheese were subjects early discussed by the dairy interests of the
State. Both practices were considered detrimental to the dairy
business. Skimmed cheese was said to be sold for full cream
cheese and consequently was destroying the market for the Illinois
products. It was also contended that good butter and good cheese
2
could not be made from unclean milk. Adulterations of butter and
cheese by the substitution of lard and tallow, were alleged to be
common practices. It was thought high time that every dairyman
throughout the great Northwest should join hands in supressing
these great frauds which were certain to sap the foundations of
every dairyman's industry. Petitions were at various times sent
to the legislature, requesting the passage of laws that would re-
1. Proceedings of The Illinois Dairymen's Association, 1875,
p. 33: 1876. p. 11; 1877. p. 34: 1878, p. 45.
2. Ibid., 187$, p.*53; 188Q-" p. 8.
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quire all manufacturers to "brand all cheese made, so as to indicate
whether skimmed, partly skimmed, or full cream. The existing laws
were not effective.
As a result of continued agitation, the legislature in 1879,
passed two laws for the benefit of the dairy interests and the con-
sumers of dairy products. The one was for the purpose of regulat-
ing the sale of milk and the other for the prevention of fraud in
the manufacture and sale of butter and cheese. The act, regulating
the sale of milk and providing penalities for the adulteration of
the same, was a fairly comprehensive act and if proper provisions
had been made for its enforcement it would undoubtedly have been
adequate for thet time. 1 The adulteration of milk and the sale of
the same, either directly to the consumer or to any cheese or milk
factory, were made punishable acts. Any milk from a diseased cow
or milk diluted with water or any other foreign substance or milk
from which cream had been taken were declared adulterated. Milk
from cows fed on distillery waste was also declared impure.
The act for the prevention of fraud in the manufacture
and sale of butter and cheese was in part as follows: "That who-
ever manufactures or sells any substance purporting to be
butter or cheese, or having the semblance of butter or cheese,
which substance is not made wholly from pure cream or pure milk,
unless the same be manufactured under its appropriate name, and un-
less each package, roll or parcel of such subs tance, ------having
distinctly----^ marked thereon the true --- name of such substance,
----shall be punished as provided in this act."
The above law was not adequate as it did not forbid the
manufacture and sale of products made in imitation of dairy products
provided that such products were properly labeled substitutes.
1. Public Session Laws of Illinois, 1879. pp. lllff.

73
This defect, which was apparently soon discovered, was remedied by
the following legislature. A law was passed which mede illegal the
manufacture and sale of products in imitation of butter and cheese
irrespective of whether such products were so labeled or not. 1
Another act was passed by the same legislature for the
purpose of preventing the adulteration of other articles of food,
drink, or medicine and the sale of the same when adulterated. Ac-
cording to this act the mixing, coloring, staining or powdering of
any article of food with any ingredient rendering the article in-
jurious to health or depreciating its value was prohibited. The
sale of such articles was likewise prohibited. The manufacture and
sale of articles of food colored, stained or powdered whether in-
jurious to health or not was also -prohibited unless such products
were properly labeled, or the purchasers were fully informed by the
seller of the true name and ingredients of such article."'
This act contained several weaknesses. Section Three per-
mitted the manufacture and sale of adulterated foods and drugs not
injurious to health provided such articles were properly labeled,
and Section Six excused the maker and seller of the adulterated pro-
duct provided that he could prove to the satisfaction of the court
that he was ignorant of violating the provisions cf the act and
1. "Section l.--That whoever manufactures out of any oleaginous
substances, or any compound of the same other than that produced
from unadulterated milk, or cream from the same, any article design-
ed to take the place cf butter or cheese produced from pure, unadul-
terated milk, or cream of the same, and shall sell, or offer for
sale, the same as butter or cheese, or give to any person the same
as an article of food, as butter or cheese, shall, on conviction
thereof, be fined not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than
two-hundred dollar.s." Laws of Illinois, 1881, pp. 74ff.
In 1877, the coloring of grain by means of fumigation or any
other chemical or coloring process, whereby defects in the grain
might be concealed or its quality effected v/as prohibited.
2. Laws of Illinois, 1881, pp. 75ff. According to this act it
was permitted to use harmless coloring substances jn butter and
cheese without so labeling it.
( <
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that he could not, with reasonable diligence, have obtained such
knowledge. There were at this time no standards of purity and
quality for food articles; much less was it known what adulterants
made foods injurious to health. Hence in order to convict an of-
fender it was necessary to establish that the adulterated article
in question was injurious to health and that the offender was aware
that he was violating the law.
Such an act could at best but remedy the most flagrant
abuses. It was not a revision of the former acts and did not re-
peal them except by implication.*
In spite of all the preceding laws the adulteration of
foods and drugs continued to increase. One reason was the coming
upon the market of canned goods and another reason the discovery of
new adulterations. It was cla.imed that flour was adulterated with
alum, carbonate of soda, hydrated sulphate of lime, bone dust, terra
alba, and chalk. Glucose was scld for sugar products and chicory
for coffee.*'
The State Board of Health complaines of the food condi-
tions of the State. "Tainted end disease-marked meats, immature
or decayed vegatables, pernicious or adulterated groceries and con-
diments, and bad things made worse by bad cooking, are spread upon
our tables----. Cupidity, fearing loss, conceals as best it can
the damaged and tainted character of the meats and fruits it offers
1. An article which has been much adulterated for many years is
cider vinegar. The adulteration and the sale of the impure article
was made illegal by an act of 1883. "Section 1. --- That every per-
son who shell manufacture for sale, or shall offer for sale, as
cider vinegar, any vinegar not the legitimate product of pure
apple juice, known as apple cider, and not made exclusively of said
apple cider, shall, for each offense, be punished------.
"Section 2. Every person who shall manufacture for sale, or
who shall offer or expose for sale, any vinegar found upon test to
contain any preparation of lead, copper, sulphuric acid, or other
ingredients shall be punished ." Laws of Illinois, 1883, p. 176
2. Proceedings of 111. State Dairymen's Asso. 1885, pp. 38ff.
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for sale, or tempts the poor, by a cheaper price, to "buy and use
it 8 unwholesome viands.
"Adulteration comes to add its deceits and dangers, and
the poor denizens of the city homes are beset with dangers in al-
most every dish which appears upon our tatoles."^"
The above is undoubtedly an exaggerated statement of food
condi t ions ;but according to reports from various sources, the distri-
pbuticn of adulterated and tainted foodstuffs was a common practice.
The rapid increase in the manufacture and sale of canned
and preserved vegetables, fruits, and meat and fish products celled
for legislation regulating the industries producing such products.
The following table shows the rapid increase in the production of
canned and preserved products during the last forty years:
"Combined data for 'canning and preserving, fruits and
vegetables,' and 'pickles and sauces' for the censuses from 1869 to
1909? Table No. 20, Thirteenth Census of the U.S. 1910, Vol.8, p. 382
Year, Cost of Material: Value of Product: Value added
In Millions Dollars. by M'F'G.
1869, - -- 3- -- - e - - - 2
1879, - -- 13 --- - 20 -- - 6
1889, - -- 23 --- - 39-- - 15
1899, - -- 51 --- - 79 -- - 28
1904, - - - 68 - - - - 107 - - - 39
1909, - - - 84 - - - 128 - - - 44
Value of Canned and Preserved Fish and Oyster Products: Ibid., p. 378
1889 - -- 6- -- - 10 -- - 3
1899 - -- 12 --- - 19 -- - 7
1904 - -- 14 --- - 22 -- - 7
1909 - -- 17 --- - 28 -- - 10
The following Table gives in a general was the development of the
meat packing industries: Ibid., p. 380.
1869, - -- 61 --- - 75 -- - 14
1879, - - - 267 - - - - 303 - 35
1889, - - - 482 - - - - 564 - - - 81
1899, - - - 685 - - - - 788 - - - 103
1904, - 811 - 922 - - - 110
1909, - - -1202 - - - - 1370 - - - 167.
1. State Board of Health, 4th Annual Report, 1882, p. Intro. 12.
2. Illinois State Food Commissioner's Report, 1899-00, p. 80.
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The demand for legisle. tion protecting the consumer of
these canned and preserved products increased with the growth in
output of these products. Unscrupulous manufacturers used raw mate-
rial unfit for human food, artificially colored and flavored it and
then distributed it in hermetically seeled cans. No one but an ex-
pert analyst could detect the impurities contained therein.
In 1885, an act was passed which had for its object the
protection of the consumer from fraud end deception in relation to
canned and preserved foodstuffs. The act was carefully drawn up
and went one step farther than the preceding pure-food laws had
gone. It charged any board of health in the State cognizant of any
violations of the act to prosecute the offender.^ It was however
not to be expected that the boards of health could prosecute except
in case of the most flagrant violations for the legislature had a-
gain failed to provide food-standards and the plaintiff, as hereto-
fore, had the burden of proving that the food involved in each
particular case was detrimental to health or dangerous to life.
The oleomargarine law of the State remained a dead letter
1. "An act to protect the public from imposition in relation to
canned and preserved food.
"Section 1. That it shal] hereafter be unlawful in this State
for any packer or dealer in preserved or canned fruits or vegetables
or other articles of food to offer such canned articles for sele
—
, with the exception of goods brought from foreign countries,
or packed prior to the passage of this act, unless such articles
bear a mark to indicate the grade or quality together with the
name and address of such firm, person, or corporation that pack the
same or dealer who sells the same, .
"Section 2. That all soaked goods put up from products dried be-
fore canning, shall be plainly marked on the face of the label,
with the word "Soaked."
"Section 3. Any person or corporation, who shall falsely stamp or
label such cans----or knowingly permit such false stamping or la-
beling, ----shall be---punished , --and it shall be the duty of
any board of health in this State cognizant of any violations of
this act to prosecute any person,-—-or corporation, which it has
reason to believe has violated any of the provisions of this act,-"
Laws of Illinois, 1885, pp. 207ff.
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and the manufacture and sale of "butter substitutes continued to be
of great concern to the dairying interests of the State. The inef-
fectiveness of the Illinois law was primarily due to the fact that
the legislature had again failed to provide special agencies charged
with its enforcement. But conditions in any one State could not be
remedied by the laws of that State alone however carefully enforced.
Butter has a country-wide if not world market and therefore the
sale of butter substitutes as genuine butter in any one or more of
the States of the Union affected the price of butter unfavorably
throughout the entire country. The States likewise had no control
over interstate traffic in the product. A national law was neces-
sary.
At various times the State Boards of Agriculture petitia*
ed Congress for such a law. Government inspectors were also asked
for.^ Congress finally passed a law in 1886, placing a special
tax upon the manufacturer and also upon the dealer in butter sub-
stitutes. A tax was also placed upon the oleomargarine produced
2in this country or imported from foreign countries.
This act was hailed with much enthusiasm by the dairying
interests of the State. It was reported in the annual convention
of the Illinois Dairymen's Association in 1887, that the price of
butter as effected by the National Oleomargarine Law had been rais-
ed from nine to twenty-one cents per pound and that the production
of oleomargarine had been decreased by seventy-five per cent. Data
on the production of oleomargarine prior to the year 1887 are not
available therefore it is impossible to determine the decrease in
its production if there was a decrease; but according to prices
quoted by the Elgin and New York markets there was no perceptable
1. Annual Report of 111. State Dairymen's Association, 1886, p. 95.
2. The following is in substance the National Oleomargarine Law
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chenge in prices of butter resulting from the enactment of the
National law."1 The National law did one thing, it assisted the
States in their efforts to have "butter substitutes sold under their
true name.
The manufacture and sale of oleomargarine on which reve-
p
nue was paid rapidly increased. In 1888, revenue was paid on 32
of 1886.
Section 3. Special taxes are imposed as follows: Manufacturers
shall pay $600. Whole dealers in oleomargar ine shall pay $480.
Every person who sells or offers for sale oleomargarine in the
original manufacturers* packages is deemed a wholesale dealer. A
manufacturer who has paid the $600 tax may sell his own product in
original packages to which the tax paid stamps are affixed without
paying the $480. Retail dealers in oleomargarine shall pay $48.
Every person who sells oleomargarine in less quantities than ten
pounds at one time shall be regarded as a retail dealer in oleomar-
garine.
Section 8. Manufacturers shall pay a tax of two cents per pound
upon oleomargarine which he manufactures and sells.
Section 10. All oleomargarine imported from foreign conntries,
shall in addition to any import duty imposed on the same, pay an
internal revenue tax of fifteen cents per pound.
Section 16. Oleomargarine may be expected without paying the tax
thereon. United States Statutes 1886, Chapter 840, pp. 209ff.
1. The following table gives the Elgin and New York butter prices
for the years 1882-1915. (fractions ommitted)
Year, Elgin N.Y. Year
,
Elgin N.Y. Year, Elgin N.Y.
Prices
,
Prices, Prices
,
Prices Prices
,
Prices
1882, 34 33 1894, 22 23 1906 24 25
1883, 30 26 1895, 21 21 1907 28 28
1884, 28 26 1896, 18 18 1908 27 27
1885, 26 23 1897, 18 19 1909 29 29
1886, 26 24 1898, 19 20 1910 30 30
1887, 26 24 1899, 21 21 1911 27 27
1888, 26 24 1900, 22 22 1912 30 31
1889, 23 24 1901, 21 22 1913 31 32
1890, 23 23 1902, 24 25 1914 29 30
1891, 25 26 1903, 23 23 1915 28 30
1892, 25 26 1904, 22 22
1893, 26 27 1905, 24 25
Elgin prices are compiled from the Elgin Dairy Reports.
New York prices are taken from "The Milk Reporter" Oct. 1917, p. 16
2. Oleomargarine: Production on which Internal-Revenue Tax was
paid: ( in millions of pounds)
Year, 111. U.S. Year, 111. U.S. Year, 111. U.S.
1887, 10 21 1891, 30 43 1895, 31 53
1888, 17 32 1892, 30 47 1896, 28 47
1889, 17 33 1893, 39 65 1897, 24 42
1890, 20 30 1894, 40 66 1898, 20 55
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millions pounds, 17 millions of which was produced in the State of
Illinois. In 1894, 66 millions pounds paid revenue, 40 millions
of which was produced in the State of .Illinois. During the follow-
ing three years the amount on which revenue was paid decreased
greatly. The lowest point was reached in 1897, when revenue v/as
paid on only 42 millions pounds. The decrease was apparently due
to the exceedingly low price of butter. In 1916, revenue was paid
on 15o millions pounds, 101 millions of which was produced in the
State of Illinois.
The dairymen of the State made no open objection to the
manufacture and sale of butter substitutes when sold under their
true names but complaints continued to be made that substitutes
were still sold under the name of butter. 1 Data on the illicit
trade in the product are of course not available but that the quan-
tity so sold was considerable is beyond question.
To more completely overcome the fraudulent sale of these
substitutes a law was passed in 1897, regulating the manufacture
and sale of every conceivable substitute for butter. Every
article, substitute or compound, other than that which is made
from pure milk or cream, made in the semblance of butter is declar-
ed an imitation butter. Coating, powdering or coloring, with any
coloring matter whatever, any substance designed as a substitute
Table of Oleomargarine Production continued:
Year, 111. U.S. Year, 111. U.S. Year, 111. U.S.
1899, 38 80 1905, 31 49 1911, 75 117
1900, 46 104 1906, 36 53 1912, 77 126
1901, 41 101 1907, 48 68 1913, 87 143
1902, 49 123 1908, 51 79 1914, 89 141
1903, 30 71 1909, 56 90 1915, 100 143
1904, 20 48 1910, 90 139 1916, 101 150
Compiled from the Statistical Abstr acts of the U. S., 1895, p
1900, p. 36; 1906, p. 110; 1910, p. 218; 1914, p. 168;
1916, p. 212.
1. In 1885, the 111. State Board of Agriculture received butterine
for exhibition at the fat stock and dairy show. A flood of criticisi
followed. Annual Rept. of 111. State Dairymen's Asso. 1887, p. 90.
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for butter is prohibited. The mixing of any animal fat or vegetable
oil with butter or in any way combining fats so as to give them a
yellow color in resemblance of butter is also prohibited. Imitation
butter lawfully manufactured and sold, must be branded "Butter ine",
"substitute for Butter" or "Imitation Butter". Contracts made in
violation of the act are declared null and void.^
This act, though carefully worded and comprehensive, like
most of the other food and drug acts of the State made little im-
provement since the legislature again failed to make any provisions
for its enforcement. The anti-color clause was also considered un-
constitutional on the grounds that it was special legislation.
o
Justices of Chicago dismissed cases brought up under the act.~
1. Laws of Illinois, 1897, pp. 3ff.
2. Illinois State Food Commissioner's Report, 1901, p. 2. The
Act specifically permitted the coloring of butter made from milk
or cream.
A standard of analysis for milk was fixed by the legislature
of 1897: "The standard of analysis for milk as to ingredients:
"Water 88 per cent; milk solids 12 per cent; and such milk
solids shall contain not less than 3 per cent of butter fat. When
contracts are made for milk purchased within this State, for de-
livery within or without this State, no other standard shall be
used except by special contract in writing." Laws of Illinois,
1897, p. 268.
In 1887, a law was passed prohibiting the killing of an im-
mature calf less than four weeks old, for the purpose of sale.
The sale of veal of such calf was also prohibited. Laws of Illinois
1887, p. 307.
The sale of lard substitutes, unless distinctly marked "Com-
pound Lard" or "Lard Compound" was prohibited by an act passed
by the legislature in 1889. Laws of Illinois, 1889, p. ill.

— — —
1
81
5. Regulation under The State Food Commissioner* In the absence
of a National pure food law prohibiting the interstate traffic in
impure and adulterated products together with effective pure food
laws in several surrounding States, it was contended that Illinois
furnished the dumping ground for the food refuse of a dozen States,
particularly since the State with her greet cities and large for-
eign population afforded an almost unlimited market for cheap foods?"
The pure food laws of Illinois would have been adequate
if they could have been enforced, but as there were no special
agencies charged with their enforcement, they were generally disre-
garded. Consumers and honest producers continued to agitate for
effective legislation. The enlightened consumer wanted an opportu-
nity to secure pure and wholesome food and the honest producer long-
ed to see unfair methods of competition suppressed.
Such legislation was finally enacted in the year 1899,
for which no interests in the State probably deserve more credit
p
than the producers of dairy products. * This law not only prohibits
the manufacture and sale of impure and adulterated foods and drugs
but also provides for special officers charged with the enforcement
of the law. Its main provisions are in substance as follows: The
governor by and with the advise of the Senate shall appoint a State
Food Commissioner. Such commissioner shall appoint two assistants,
one of whom shall be an expert in dairy products and the other
shall be a practical and analytical chemist. The commissioner shall
also appoint six inspectors. It shall be the duty of the commission'
er to enforce all laws that now exist or are hereafter passed rela-
tive to the production, manufacture or sale of food products.
1. Illinois State Food Commissioner's Report, 1899-00, p. 80.
2. American Food Journal, May, 1907, p. 16j Illinois Dairymen's
Association, 1890, p. 126.

It shall be the duty of the commissioner to inquire into
the quality of dairy and other food products. He may lawfully se-
cure samples and have them analyzed "by the State chemist and shall
furnish the prosecuting attorney with evidence against violators
of the food laws. The commissioner or any of his assistants may
enter any factory or store where foods are made, stored or sold
and secure samples. He shall also examine and report on samples
furnished by the State Board of Health. Annual reports shall be
made to the governor.
No person shall, within this State, manufacture for sale
or sell any article of food which is adulterated within the meaning
of this act."*"
1. The following are in substance some of the more important pro-
visions of the act of 1899:
The term "food" as used in this act shall include all articles
used for food by man or animal.
An article shall be deemed adulterated within the meaning of
this act:
First: If its quality, strength or purity has been affected as
a result of mixing with any substances.
Second: If affected by substitution.
Third: If affected by substraction.
Fourth: If it is any imitation falsely sold.
Fifth: If inferiority is concealed by mixing, coloring, etz.
Sixth: If it contains any added substances or ingredients
which are poisonous or injurious to health.
Seventh: If it is wholly or partly decomposed, putrid, or
is part of diseased animal.
Compounds and mixtures and imitations not injurious to health
may be sold if properly and honestly labeled.
Section 20. Packed and canned goods must be free from sub-
stances deleterious to health. Such articles must bear a mark,
Btamp, brand or label bearing name and address of firm, person, or
corporation that packs them, or of the dealer that sells the same.
Bleached and soaked goods shall be branded "Bleached" or "Soaked".
Section 21. All imitation jams, fruits, and jellies shall be
labeled "Imitation".
Section 22. Extracts of more than one principle must be so
labeled.
Section 25. Any one manufacturing or selling food products
shall furnish samples to the State analyst if so required but shall
receive pay therefore.
Section 26. All acts inconsistent with this act are hereby re-
pealed.
Laws of Illinois, 1899, pp. 372ff.

83
This law differs from all the preceding pure food laws
of this State in that it provides for the office of State Food Com-
missioner charged with the enforcement of the food laws. The regu-
lation by statute of the manufacture and sale of foods in Illinois
may be said to commence with the enactment of this law.
In the absence of the law making provisions for the loca-
tion of offices and laboratory, the commissioner located them in
Chicago. ^ Six inspectors were appointed for the purpose of secur-
ing samples of food for analysis. A State analyst and an assistant
2
commissioner were also appointed.
The commissioner from the very beginning of his term,
addressed various meetings of wholesale and retail grocers for the
purpose of acquainting them with the law and securing their co-op-
eration. The Retail Grocers' Association of Illinois, at their
annual meeting at Rock Island in 1900, declared that they believed
in the law and agreed to stand by it and uphold it. Wholesale as-
2
sociations likewise declared themselves in sympathy with the law.
As a result of these various meetings, the manufacturers
and dealers in food products submitted their labels and stamps for
their food products for inspection and the commissioner's office
changed and corrected over five hundred of them so as to conform to
3
the laws and rulings of the department.
Inspection was extensively carried on from the beginning
and good results were obtained. In 1902, 924 samples were taken
by the inspectors of which 527 were found pure and 397 or 43 per
cent were found adulterated and blended. A number of these samples
1. Offices and laboratory were located on the sixteenth floor of
the Manhattan Building. Illinois State Food Commissioner's Report,
1899-00, pp 2ff.
2. Ibid., pp. 4ff.
3. Ibid., p. 5; Ibid., 1902, p. 2.

were condemned under the old laws. In the following year 1,446
samples were collected and analyzed by the State analyst. Of these
2Cc were found pure and 450, or 31 per cent, not in conformity with
2
the lew. The Food Department at this time estimated that eighty
per cent of the manufactureEs in the State were making and putting
on the market their food products in conformity with the State food
laws. The other twenty per cent of the manufacturers were consid-
ered as opposing the laws; 4,595 inspections were made during the
year. In 1904, 1,718 samples were analyzed of which 1,152 were
found pure and 56C, or 32 per cent, adulterated. In 1905, 2,402
samples were collected; 1,609 were found pure and 793, or 33per
4
cent, not in conformity with the laws.
These percentages of food samples not in conformity with
the law and rulings of the Food Department would indicate no im-
provement in food conditions in the State. It is however to "be
questioned whether they can "be taken as a criterion of existing con-
ditions. Increased experience undoubtedly enabled the commissioner
and his assistants to more readily detect the violator of the law
and hence the samples gathered would not be a fair representation
of the foods manufactured and sold in the State.
The anti-color clause of the law of 1897, which had caus-
ed the department much trouble because Circuit Judges of Cook county
had declared the clause special legislation, was to a large degree
remedied by the passage of the National lew of 1902, which placed
a tax of ten cents per pound upon colored oleomargarine and edulter-
1. "The old law provided for c penalty that might be recovered be-
fore a justice of the peace; suits were accordingly brought before
a justice of the peace in the county where the offence was committed
Under the statutes of 1899 the case has to be brought by indictment
and prosecution has to be in the Circuit or criminal court."
Illinois State Food Commissioner's Report, 1902, p. 2.
2. Ibid., 1903, p. 58.
3. Ibid., 1904, p. 58.
4. Ibid., 1905, p. 86.
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ated "butter and one-fourth of one cent per pound upon uncolored
oleomargarine. This law also requires that these products "be stamp-
ed and every package properly labeled. It also provides that if
hotel men and boarding house keepers tint the oleomargarine, they
too must pay the tax.
In the preceding year the Illinois legislature had passed
an act "to prevent fraud in the branding and sale of process and
renovated butter". It was ma.de a misdemeaner to manufacture, sell
or expose for sr.le any process butter or renovated butter unless
2
the same was branded or marked as such.
The dairy interests were now well protected in their in-
3dustry and likewise the consumer in the use of dairy products.
Great improvement in the conditions of the food market in general
4is also reported at this time by the commissioner.
There remained however many defects in the lews which had
to be remedied in order to make them easy to enforce. One defect
resulted from the fact that Section 6, of the act, "to prevent and
punish the adulteration of articles of food, drink, and medicine
and the sale thereof when adulterated" passed in 1881 and reading,
"No person shall be convicted under any of the foregoing sections
of this act if he shows to the satisfaction of the court or jury
that he did not know that he was violating any of the provisions of
this act and that he could not with reasonable diligence have ob-
tained the knowledge," had not been repealed by the act cf 1899.
Bills were presented to mend this defect but they met cold recep-
1. United States Statutes, 1902, Part I, pp. 193 ff.
2. Laws of Illinois, 1901, pp. 315ff.
3. This does not mean that butter substitutes were no longer sold
es genuine butter. Court records abundantly prove that that the
illicit trade in the products continued. But the illicit trade
was unquestionably reduced to such proportions that neither
the dairy interests nor the consumer were perceptably menaced.
4. State Food Commissioner's Rept. 1902, p. 3.
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tions. This clause of the act of 1881 made it necessary for the
government to prove that the defendant knowingly violated the act.
This was generally difficult to do.
Another serious defect in the lew was its failure to es-
tablish standards for foods or to provide a commission authorized to
establish such standards. Consequently violators of the law set
up the defense that "inasmuch as no standards were fixed by statute
therefore they could not be held to any definite composition in
their preparation of any article of food and that they might sell
as pure any food not injurious to the public health, no matter how
low in percentage its food constituent might be."^" This defect was
however remedied to some degree, as early as 1905, by the adoption,
on the part of the State Food Department, of the food standards as
fixed by the food chemists of the National Association of State
Dairy and Food Departments. These standards were at this time
recognized by the State Food Departments of the different States
as authority and the National Association of Official Agricultural
Chemists, of which Dr. H. W« Wiley, chief of the Bureau of Chemistry
of Washington, D.C., was at this time chairman, had also substanti-
2
ally adopted these standards.
Retail dealers claimed that there was another serious
defect in the law of 1899. Under this law the retail dealers were
held responsible for the foodstuffs which they sold. They claimed
that it was unjust to prosecute them if they bought the goods in
good faith, guaranteed to be according to law. The food commission-
er, on the other hand, maintained that if the dealers were not held
responsible in the first instance the result would be that their
competitors would buy adulterated foodstuffs with a purity certifi-
1. State Food Commissioner's Report, 1903, p. 60.
2. Ibid., 1905, p. 95.
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cate from irresponsible wholesalers and manufacturers in other
States and the Illinois commissioner would then he helpless in pro-
tecting the honest retailers. 1 If this was a weakness in the law
it could not be remedied by a change in the State laws alone as it
involved interstate traffic.
It was early contended that uniformity in State food laws
was necessary. Under existing conditions, prior to the enactment
of the National law of 3 906, the manufacturers of foodstuffs in
Illinois, for example, had to prepare labels for their foods sold
in Illinois that would probably not meet the requirements of the
laws in other States . Special labels had to be prepared for each
State in which their foods were sold, whereas if a uniform law end
uniform rulings prevailed throughout the Nation then one form of
label would answer for all the States, and the same would be true
in the case of goods that were to be stamped, branded or placarded.
The lack in uniformity of food laws, probable injustice
of holding retailers responsible in first instance, and interstate
traffic in impure and adulterated foods and drugs were problems
that could not be solved by the State legislatures alone.
The need of a National law regulating the sale and manu-
facture of foods and drugs in the territories and the traffic in
n.
the same in interstate commerce became greater annually. Finally
1. 111. State Food Commissioner's Report, 1899-00, p. 36.
2. In 1903, Congress had made an appropriation to the Department
of Agriculture for the purpose of enabling the Secretary of Agri-
culture in collaboration with the Association of Official Agri.
Chemists to establish food standards and to determine upon adulter-
ations. American Food Journal, June, 1906, p. 26.
3. Senator Hepburn is quoted as follows: "The necessity of a Fed-
eral pure food bill is almost obvious. Every State, save perhaps
one, in the union, has adopted more or less efficient legislation
of this character, and the prevention of the manufacture and sale
of mis-branded or adulterated drugs, foods and liquors would be
complete were it not for the 'unbroken package 1 decisions of the
supreme court, under which one State is practically powerless
against the importations of this class of goods from another State.

as a result of almost twenty years of agitation, analyses of foods
and drugs "by State and National chemists, and publication of such
analyses, Congress, in 1906, passed the much needed and now well
known Pure *ood and Drug Act. This act unconditionally forbids the
manufacture of impure foods in the territories and the District of
Columbia and the interstate traffic and foreign commerce in the
same.*" The Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce
and Labor are constituted a board to make uniform rules and regula-
tions for carrying out the provisions of the act. The Bureau of
Chemistry of the Department of Agriculture is charged with the ex-
aminations of specimens collected.
Under the Act drugs are deemed adulterated if they differ
from the standard of strength, quality or purity of drugs recognized
in the United States formulary unless such deviation from the stand-
ard is plainly stated on the package.
Confectionery must be free from poisonous or deleterious
substances. Adulterated foods are also carefully described and
2defined.
"The fact that the various State legislatures have adopted pure
food bills demonstrates that the people are alive to the necessity
of such legislation, and the one link necessary to perfect the
chain is a Federal bill which will cover interstate commerce, over
which the Stetes can exercise no jurisdiction ." American
Food Journal, Jan., 1906, p. 11.
1. 34 United States Statutes at Large 771;
Food products, not meeting the requirements of the National
Act, may be exported if they are put up according to the specifi-
cations of the foreign purchaser. Section 2, of National Act.
2. Foods ere deemed adulterated as follows:
First: If any substance has been mixed or packed with it so as
to reduce or lower or injuriously affect its quality or strength.
Second: If any substance has been substituted wholly or in part.
Third: If any valuable constituent has been withdrawn.
Fourth: If it be mixed, colored, etc., in a manner whereby
damage or inferiority is concealed.
Fifth: If it contain any added poisonous ingredient.
Sixth: If it consists in whole or in part of a filthy, decom-
posed, or putrid animal or vegetable substance, or part of diseased
animal, or one that has died other wise than by slaughter.
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Both foods and drugs are considered misbranded if the
label on the same bears any statement or design which shall be false
or misleading. If food is in package form, and the contents are
stated in terms of weight or measure, they must be stated correctly.
Deceptive labels or designs are prohibited.
Articles of food not containing any added poisonous or
deleterious ingredients may be sold under their ov/n distinctive
names provided such name is accompanied with a statement of the piece
of manufacture. Trade formulas of proprietary foods need not be ex-
posed.
Section nine provides that no dealer shall be prosecuted
under the act when he can establish a guarantee signed by the whole-
saler, jobber, manufacturer or other party in the United States
from whom he purchased the articles, to the effect that the same
2is not adulterated or misbranded.
In the following year, 1907, Congress passed the "Meat
Inspection Act." This act forbids the interstate traffic in "any
carcasses or parts thereof, meat, or meat-food products thereof,
which nave not been inspected, examined and marked as "Inspected
and Passed". Meats entering interstate traffic must contain no
preservatives of any kind injurious to health and all establishments
1. In the case of drugs, every package must contain a statement on
the label of the quantity or proportion of any alcohol, morphine,
opium, cocaine, heroin, alpha or beta eucaine, chloroform, cannabis,
indica, chloral hydrate or asecetanilide or any derivatives of such
substances. In the case of foods, containing any of the above
mentioned drugs, alcohol excepted, the label must contain a state-
ment of such fact.
2. "The National food authorities located their offices and labora-
tory for the middle West on theNorth half of the sixteenth floor
of the Manhattan building, at Chicago, Illinois. The Illinois
food department occupies the South half of the sixteenth of the
seme building. Now when adulterated foods are discovered that
have come across the border line of our State the same is handed
over to the National food authorities to prosecute and when
it is discovered as adulterated , --contrary to the provisions of

90
where such meat products are prepared are subject at all times to
Federal inspection.
The National Act of 1906 greatly assisted the States in
protecting the consumer from fraud by keeping impure foods out of
the channels of interstate commerce. It also served es e model for
State legislatures and thus tended to establish greater uniformity
in the State laws. The rules and regulations for the enforcement
of the National Act were considered, from the first, practicable. 1
In 1907, Illinois amended its pure food laws in many im-
portant particulars. A "Food Standard Commission" is provided for.
This commission is charged with the duty of determining upon and
adopting standards of quality, purity, or strength for food products
2
for the State.
The condition, so much complained of under the old law,
of holding the dealer responsible in the first instance for the
character of the foods which he sold, has been remedied by both the
National and the State laws. The State law provides that the dealer
may produce in his defense a written guarantee from the wholesaler
or manufacturer whose goods he handles, stating that such goods meet
the requirements of the law. Such a statement will relieve the
dealer from prosecution under the law. The National law contains a
similar provision which until May 1, 1915, was carried out by means
of the "serial number" method. The manufacturer or dealer in foods
or drugs could file a guarantee with the Secretary of Agriculture
our State food laws, it is handed over to our State food authorities
to prosecute as provided in our State food laws."
Illinois State Food Commissioner's Report, 1908, p. 4.
1. American Food Journal, Nov. 1906, p. 16.
2. "The 'Food Standard Commission' shall consist of three members,
one of whom shall be the State Food Commissioner or his representa-
tive; one of whom shall be a representative of the Illinois food
manufacturing industries and one of whom shall be an expert food
chemist." Laws of Illinois, 1907, p. 544.
Under the old law, "Each case had to be proven by expert
I
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and receive a serial number which was then placed on every package
of the goods sold under the guarantee with the words , "Guaranteed
under The Food and Drug Act of June 30, 1906." Thus no special
guarantee had to be sent with every shipment of goods. But this
serial number method caused too much misunderstanding and abuse.
The consumers were made to believe that the government guaranteed
the food products whereas the serial number represented the guaran-
tee by the manufacturer that the goods complied with the National
Food and Drug Act. 1
Under the new rule, the manufacturer, who desires to guar-
antee his goods may do so by incorporating such guarantee in the
invoice, bill of lading, or bill of sale.
The new Illinois food law contains all the provisions of
the National food law relative to misbranding and mislabeling and
requires in addition that every manufactured article of food sold
in package form shall be distinctly labeled, marked or branded with
the true name of the article and with either the name and address
of the manufacturer or the name and address of the packer or dealer
who sells the same.
The act also contains all the provisions of the National
act relative to adulteration.
Section forty of the act authorizes the food department
to grant preliminary hearings to the accused violators of the law.
It provides that the commissioner may cause notice of the violation
to be given the accused, with a copy of the findings, and a hearing
had on the seme. After the hearing the commissioner shall, in his
testimony, as if no other case had ever been tried. The uncertain-
ty of conditions due to this weakness made it hard to convict and
encouraged violators of the law to continue their transgressions."
Illinois State Food Commissioner's Report, 1907, p. 12.
1. American Food Journal, Oct. 1907, p. 4. Ibid., 1915, p. 238.
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discretion, either prosecute the accused or discharge him.
Confiscation of adulterated and raisbranded foods is also
authorized and the possession of such articles is prima facia evi-
dence of guilt.
The law of 1907, as changed in minor details "by amendments12 3 4
and revisions in 1909, 1911, 1915, and 1917 is the pure food
law of the State at the present time.
An act having for its object the regulation of the sale
5
of concentrated feedstuffs was passed by the legislature in 1905.
According to this law every lot of concentrated feedstuffs sold
shall have affixed thereto a plainly printed statement, certifying
the name or brand under which it is sold, name and address of man-
ufacturer or dealer, the net weight of the package and a description
of the contents.
It The amendment of 1909 to the act of 1907 eliminates condensed
milk and evaporated cream from the list of articles for which a
standard of purity and strength had been set. Laws of 111., 1909,
p. 423.
2. A new section provides that a license must be secured by every-
one before operating a milk or cream testing apparatus to determine
the percentage of butter fat in milk or cream for the purpose of
purchasing the same either for himself or for another. Ibid., 1911,
pp. 519 ff.
3. The most important clause in this amendment provides that all
foods in package form must contain on the outside of the package in
plain and conspicuous markings the quantity of the contents in terms
of weight, measure, or numerical count. The sale and shipment of
other than fresh eggs is also regulated in detail. Ibid., 1915,
pp. 70 ff.
4. Several amendments were mede during the 1917 session. On act
provides for the testing of milk by the Department of Agriculture.
Another act provides for the registration by the Secretary of State
of marks and brands to be used upon cans, bottles, or other contain-
ers of dairy products. A third act is an amendment to the act of
1915, regulating the sale and shipment of other than fresh eggs.
According to this act, eggs unfit for human food must be broken and
denatured before shipment. "Breaking Stock" eggs must be shipped
only in packages sealed with proper identifying strips approved by
the Department of Agriculture. Illinois Laws, 1915, r>p. 700 ff.
Ibid. , 1917
, pp. 768 ff
.
Under the subject "State Food Commissioner" there was also
passed, in 1917, an act regulating the sale of paints and oils and
fixing a standard of strength and purity for these products.
Ibid., 1917, p. 769. 5. Ibid., 1905, pp. 393 ff;. 1911, p. 527.
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The duties of the State food commissioner and his assist-
ants increased annually. The number of samples collected "by the in-
spectors also increased. In the year 1909, 7,606 samples were taken
and analyzed. Of these 4,841 were found in conformity with the law
and 2,765, or 36 per cent, not so conforming.^ In the following
year, 1,222 samples of stock food were analyzed; 776 were found up
o
to the standard and 446 not in conformity with the law.~ The re-
sults of the stock food law were reported as good.
In 1911, the "Sanitary Food Law" was passed for the pur-
pose of "preventing the ^reparation
,
manufacture, packing, storing,
or distribution of food intended for sale--- under unsanitary
or unclean conditions " This act provides that every building
used as a place for the manufacture, storage, distribution or sale
of foods tuff s , as well as hotels and restaurants, must be kept in a
wholesome sanitary condition and be properly drained, lighted, and
ventilated.
The State food commissioner is charged with the adminis-
tration and enforcement of this act which greatly aids the Food
Department in enforcing the pure food laws of the State and in se-
curing pure foods for the consumer. It is, however, impossible
for the Food Department to inspect all the establishment handling
foodstuffs annually. In the year 1914, for example, 13,485 estab-
lishments were inspected and there were also 5,256 re- inspect ions
.
4
As a result of this work the inspectors destroyed 39,402 r>ounds of
decomposed meat, fish, and poultry, 10,218 cans of spoiled canned
goods, 11,331 pounds of contaminated dried fruits, 7,088 pounds of
dirty candy and confectionery, and 18,027 pounds of miscellaneous
1. Illinois State Food Commissioner's Report, 1909, p. 4.
2. Ibid., 1910, p. 240.
3. Laws of Illinois, 1911, p. 528 ff.
4. Illinois State Food Commissioner's Report, 1914, p. 12.
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foodstuffs. They also condemned 45, 595 pounds of flour and 286
cases of eggs.
In the year 1911, 3,622 samples of food were taken, 2,432
of which met the requirements of the law and 1,190, or 32 per cent,
of which did not so qualify. 1 During the following year 6,523
samples were taken, 4,432 of which were up to the standard and
2
2,091, or 32 per cent, did not so conform.*"
The State food commissioner reports that "the per cent
of illegal samples cannot "be taken as a basis for judging actual
trade conditions of the entire State On the other hand, the
per cent together with the actual number of illegal samples are
significant of the fact that violations of the law are still com-
mon, especially in certain food products." The worst offenders
are those handling milk and eggs.
By the Civil Administrative Act of 1917, the offices of
State food Commissioner, Fcod Standard Commission, and the State
Game and Fish Commission are placed under the direction of the
4Department of Agriculture created by that act.
1. Illinois State Food Commissioner's Report, 1911, p. 22.
2. Ibid., 1912, p. 10.
3. Ibid., 1914, p. 17.
4. Laws of Illinois, 1917, pp. 2 ff.
The enforcement of an act to prevent fraud in the manufacture
and sale of commercial fertilizers is also placed under the super-
vision of the Department of Agriculture.
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6. Regulation of The Sale of Drugs. The power to regulate the
manufacture and sale of drugs and medicines is as clearly within
the police power of the State es is its authority to regulate the
manufacture and sale of foods and drinks. On account of the proba-
ble serious results attendant upon the use of faultily compounded
drugs, no less than upon the use of adulterated drugs, much of the
regulation has for its object the elimination of the unskilled dis-
penser by requiring all pharmacists to register after meeting cer-
tain exacting qualifications.
Such qualifications were first required in the State of
Illinois by a comprehensive act passed in 1881.^" This law provides
for the appointment of five persons, of ten or more years experi-
ence in the dispensing of physicians' prescriptions who shall consti-
tute the State Board of Pharmacy. This board is charged with the
duty of examining applicants for registration, prosecuting violators
of the provisions of the act, and making annual reports to the gov-
ernor and to the Illinois Pharmaceutical Association upon the con-
ditions of pharmacy in the State.
A person, in order to be registered within the meaning
of the act, either had to be a graduate in pharmacy, a graduate in
medicine, or he had to be engaged in the business of a dispensing
pharmacist on his own account in the State at the time the act took
2
effect or he had to be a licentiate in pharmacy. The requisite
qualifications for pharmacists, as fixed by this act, have been
raised from time to time.
1. Laws of Illinois, 1881, pp. 120 ff.
2. Graduates in pharmacy were described as such persons who had
had four years of practical experience in drug stores and had ob-
tained a satisfactory diploma from a regularly incorporated
school of pharmacy.
Licentiates in pharmacy were described to be such persons as
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The adulteration of drugs and medicines was also prohib-
ited by the act of 1881. The adding to or the removing from any
drug or medicine any ingredient or material for the purpose of adul-
teration or substitution is prohibited. A criminal law, passed by
the same legislature, forbids the mixing, coloring, or staining of
any drug or medicine provided such coloring or staining injuriously
affects the quality of such drug or medicine.^"
Proprietary medicines may be sold by any person in this
State. An attempt was made in 1895 to limit the sale of such
medicines to druggists. The legislature granted to the Board of
I %
Pharmacy the discretionary power of issuing permits to persons or
o
companies empowering them to sell proprietary medicines.'- This pro-
vision, of an act of 1895, was however declared unconstitutional by
. the State Supreme Court on the ground that it delegated legislative
power to the board. 1 It was further urged that as the vendor of
proprietary medicines did not examine into its contents, no purpose
was served by limiting the sale of such medicines to druggists or
4
any other class or classes of vendors.
had had two years of practical experience in drug stores and h8d
passed a. satisfactory examination before the State Board, of Phar-
macy.
For more exacting requirements ma.de by later laws see: Laws of
Illinois, 1887, n. 250; 1889, pp. 219 ff.; 1895, pp. 245, ff
.
;
1901, pp. 238 ff.; 1907, pp. 379, ff.
According to the amendment, ma.de in 1889, a licentiate in phar-
macy and one who has had five years of practical experience in a
drug store is entitled to be registered. The Board of Pharmacy,
upon satisfactory proof that an applicant is registered in another
State, may grant a certificate of registration.
Section 14, of the amendment of 1895, provides that every peck-
age containing drugs or medicines shall contain a label, bearing
the name of the article and the name and place of business of the
registered pharmacist.
The act of 1907 makes good moral character and temperate habits
a prerequisite to becoming a registered pharmacist.
1. Laws of Illinois, 1881, mp. 75 ff. All poisons must be so labele .
2. Ibid., 1895, pp. 245 ff. 3. Noel v. People, 187 111, 587.
4. Section 12, of en act of 1901, provides that proprietary medi-
cines, when sold in original packages, reed not contain a label
bearing the name of the contents. Laws of Illinois, 1901, pp. 238.
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The sale of cocaine and salts and compounds of cocaine
have, for apparent reasons, "been carefully regulated, particularly
during the lest, twenty yesrs. An act of 1897 forbids the sale of
such drugs except upon the written prescription of a licensed phy-
sician or dentist."1" Later acts forbid the sale of the same to
2habitual users under any conditions whatsoever.
The State pharmacy laws are inadequate in one important
particular; no proper inspection force is provided. An attempt
to overcome this defect is seen in the law requiring all druggists
end pharmacists to keep on file, for a period of not less than two
3years, the original of every prescription filled.
The State food commissioner has advocated that the ad-
ministration of the drug laws, as well as that of the food laws,
be left to the inspection department created by the State food
4laws. The State legislature has not followed this recommendation,
but, in the Civil Administrative Code of 1917, it has delegated
1. Laws of Illinois, 1897, p. 138. An amendment made to this act
in 19 03 requires that the name of the patient be written upon the
package. Ibid., 1903, p. 248.
In 1914, Congress passed an act to the effect: "Th8t on and
after the first day of March, 1915, every person who produces, im-
ports, manufactures, deals in, sells, or gives away opium
or coca leaves or any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or
preparation thereof, shall register with the collector of internal
revenue of the district his name , place of business, ; Pro-
vided, — at the time of registry and annually thereafter,
every such person shall pay to the said collector a special
tax at the rate of one dollar ner annum." United States Statutes;
1914-1915, pp. 785 ff
.
The Illinois legislature, in 1915, amended the pharmacy act to
the effect that only thoBe registered according to the act of Con-
gress may deal in any opium or coca leaves or their products.
Preparations or remedies containing less than 2 grains of opi-
um, 1/4 grain of morphine, 1/8 grain of heroin, or 1 grain of codine
or any salt or derivative of any of them in one fluid ounce are not
subject to the act of Congress. Act of Congress, Dec. 17, 1914.
2. Laws of Illinois, 1908, pp. 88 ff.
3. Ibid., ]915, pp. 500 ff. The law of 1911 required such pre-
scriptions to be kept for a period of five years.
4. Illinois State Food Commissioner's Report, 1912, p. 23.
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all the rights, powers, and duties vested by law in the State
Eoard of Pharmacy to the department of Registration and Education.
This department is also authorized to make rules for the establish-
ment of a uniform and reasonable standard of educational require-
ments to be observed by colleges of pharmacy.*
1. Laws of Illinois, 1917, pp. 2 ff., and pp. 592 ff.
Nearly every legislature, since 1881, has amended or revised
the existing pharmacy laws or has passed new laws on the subject.
An act of 1901 empowers the Board of Pharmacy to employ an
analyst who shall examine into the so claimed adulterations and
substitutions. Laws of Illinois, 1901, pp. 238 ff.
An act of 1907, made the standard of the United States Phar-
macopoeia or National Formulary the standard of strength, quality,
and purity for the Illinois druggists and pharmacists.
Py an act of 1907, it is made unlawful for any person or com-
pany to manufacture, give away, or sell embalming fluids which
contain arsenic or strychnine without having the words "arsenic
contained herein" or "strychnine contained herein" (as the case
may be) written or printed upon the label. No undertaker or other
person shall embalm with, inject into or place upon, any dead
human body any fluid containing arsenic or strychnine.
The seme legislature passed an act to regulate the sale of
Peris green. Every lot or parcel of Paris green, sold shall have
affixed thereto a printed label bearing the words, "High Grade,
for insecticide Purposes" or the words, "Not for insecticide pur-
poses."
All "High Grade" Paris green shall have affixed to the contain-
er the name and place of manufacture, net weight and percentage
of the various contents. A standard of strength is fixed by the
act. Laws of Illinois, 1907, pp. 267 ff.
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7. Power of Cities to Regulate The Sale of Food* "Express author-
ity to pass ordinances regulating the sale of foods is conferred
ordinarily upon municipal corporations.""'" Ordinances passed under
such delegated authority must however not be in conflict with the
laws of the State, and the laws of the State will continue to oper-
2
ate in the city unless its charter clearly provides otherwise.
Under the statutes of I860, of this State, the president
and trustees of any incorporated town were authorized to make and
execute such ordinances, not inconsistent with the laws or consti-
tution of the State, as they deemed necessary to regulate and es-
3tablish markets. Incorporated towns were also granted exclusive
4privileges of granting licenses to keep groceries.
The first legislature which met after the adoption of the
constitution of 1870 passed a very comprehensive act providing for
5the incorporation of cities and villages. The powers of the city
councils are set forth in minute detail. The city councils and
boards of trustees of towns and villages are granted jurisdiction
to regulate the sale of liquor, meats, dairy products, vegetables,
and all other provisions and to provide for the place and manner
of selling the same. City authorities may also provide for and
regulate the inspection of all foodstuffs sold within their limits.
1. Ruling Case Lew, p. 1100.
2. "Police regulations enacted by a city under a genera.l grant
of power may differ from those of the State upon the same subject,
provided they are not inconsistent therewith." Chicago v. Union
Ice Cream Company. 252 111. 311.
3. Statutes of Illinois, I860, p. 196; Revised Statutes of 1845,
Chapter 25.
4. Groceries are places where liquors are sold in small amounts.
Ey an act of 1869, the mayor and aldermen of cities are authorized
to appoint inspectors of mineral oils used for illuminating purpos-
es. Public Session Laws, 1869, p. 259.
5. Prior to 1870, powers to regulate the sale of foods was dele-
gated to cities and villages in the special charters conferred.
6. Laws of Illinois, 1871, pp. 224 ff.
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The act of 1871, as amended and revised in minor points,
is the present law delegating jurisdiction to the cities and vil-
lages of the State to regulate the sale of foods and drinks.
The powers of cities and villages to regulate the sale
of foods is not affected by the Stete pure food act of 1907. In
Chicago v. Union Ice Cream Manufacturing Company, the Supreme Court
of the State held: "The passage of the pure food law of 1907 did
not deprive cities and villages of the power given by the provisions
of Article V. of the cities' and villages' act to regulate the sale
of impure and adulterated food by ordinances not inconsistent with
such statute."
The courts have always been liberal in construing powers
delegated to cities and villages. No food regulatory nowers have
at any time been held as unconstitutionally delegated, and their
exercise by the municipalities has been upheld by the State courts
provided they were reasonably exercised.*
An act giving cities power to provide for the regulation
and inspection of meats has been held to confer power to establish
a public slaughter house for the purpose of securing proper in-
2
spection of fresh meats.
An ordinance requiring that the weight of bread sold be
3labeled thereon in pounds has been upheld. An ordinance making
it unlawful to cover fruit with colored netting has been held un-
reasonable.
*
In City of Chicago v. Bowman Dairy Company, it was held:
"--the Revised Municipal Code of Chicago which requires dealers
selling cream and milk in bottles or glass jars to have the capac-
1. Koy v. City of Chicago, 263 111. 122.
2. Huesing v. City of Rock Island, 25 111. App. 6C0; Reversed
128 111. 465.
3. 174 111. App. 64. 4. Frost v. City of Chicago, 178 111. 250.
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ity of the bottles or jars permanently indicated on them, end pre-
scribes a penalty for having in their possession bottles or glass
jars of a capacity of less than that indicated on the outside, or
which do not indicate their capacity, is valid as being within the
police power of the city." ^
In Koy v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court held that
the legislatures and city councils in the exercise of police power,
may prohibit all things hurtful to the health and safety of society,
even though the prohibition invades the right of liberty or property
2
of an individual.
A statute empowering a municipality "to direct and regu-
late the weight and quality of bread, the size of the loaf, and
the inspecting thereof" has been held valid.
In July of 1908, the city of Chicago passed several ordi-
nances wherein it was required that no milk, cream, buttermilk,
ice-cream, butter or cheese should be sold or offered for sale in
the city unless such products were made from the milk or cream ob-
tained from cows that had given a satisfactory tuberculin test with-
in one year: provided however that from Jan. 1, 1909, for a period
of five years, such products made of milk obtained from cows not
tuberculin tested or not free from tuberculosis may be sold in the
city of Chicago if the milk or cream from which such products are
made has been pasteurized according to the rules and regulations
of the department of health in the city of Chicago.
1. 234 111. 294. 2. 263 111. 122.
3. Chicago v. Schmidinger, 243 111. 167. In 1909, an act was passed
granting to city and village authorities the power "--to require
all grains, flour, meal, hay, feed, seed, fruits, nuts, vegetables,
and non-liquid vegetable products, meats, and non-liquid animal
products, fish, butter, cheese, end other similar dairy products,
dry groceries and all other articles of merchandise, or any partic-
ular class or classes of such merchandise, in the absence of a con-
tract or agreement in writing to the contrary, to be sold by stan-
dard, avoirdupois weight or by numerical count." Laws of 111.
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The General Assembly considered such regulation unreason-
able and appointed a committee of ten to investigate into the neces-
sity of adopting the tuberculin test in the State of Illinois.^" In
the following session a law was passed making it unlawful for any
city, village, or other incorporated authority in the State to de-
mand or require the tuberculin test to be applied to dairy animals
2
as a means of regulating and purifying milk or other dairy products.
Laws of this character effecting industries outside of
their corporate limits have been passed by cities in other States
and have been held valid.
With the increase in the number and size of cities in the
State, the demand for laws, carefully regulating the manufacture
and sale of the cities' food supplies, becomes more imparative. It
would therefore seem that the Cities' jurisdiction in this field
of police regulation ought to be extended. In many cases the only
effective way to regulate the character of food supplied is to reg-
ulate the conditions under which and the manner in which it is pro-
duced. Such demands, made by the city on the producer outside of
Laws of Illinois, 1909, pp. 139 ff.
1. Ibid., 1909, pp. 492 ff.
2. Ibid., 1911, p. 6.
3. In State v. Nelson it was held: "It is competent for the city
council, by ordinance, to require that an applicant for a license
to sell milk within the city shall consent that the dairy herd
from which he obtained his milk may be inspected by the commission-
er of health of the city, although such dairy herd is kept outside
the city limits.
"The requirement that he shall consent, as a condition prece-
dent to obtaining such license, that the animals from which he ob-
tains the milk shall be subjected to the 'tuberculin test*, is not
unreasonable." 66 Minn. 166. (1896).
A product which has frequently been the subject of regulation
by both the legislature and city councils is mineral oil used for
illnminating purposes. The State legislature in 1869 passed an act
providing for the inspection and sale of mineral oils used for il-
luminating purposes. Under this act both cities and villages were
authorized, on the petition of five or more inhabitants, to appoint
suitable persons, not interested in the manufacture or sale of
mineral oils, as inspectors. Such inspectors, when called upon by
!
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its corporate limits prerequisite to such producer furnishing the
city with its products, might work an initial hardship, but it
does not appear that such requirements would work a permanent eco-
nomic hardship on the producer.
The additional expense incurred by the dairymen, for ex-
ample, in maintaining a herd meeting the requirements under the
tuberculin test, will in the end be born by the consumer of the
dairy products. If the demands are too onerous or if the extra ex-
pense incurred is not compensated immediately by a higher price for
the products, production will be decreased and a higher price must
consequently result.
The dairymen have no vested interest in the business of
furnishing the city consumer with dairy products of a character
that are not considered wholesome or are considered dangerous to
life, and the consumer in the city is in the majority of cases un-
able to examine and analyze these products for himself , but must
rely upon the municipal regulation to protect him.
The above reasoning would apply to the production of
meats, fish, vegetables and fruits.
any manufacturer, refiner, producer or dealer of such oils, to test
such oils, were obligated to make the necessary test.
All such oils igniting at a temperature less than 110 degrees
P« were to be marked "Condemned for illnminating purposes . " If
such oils did not ignite or explode at less than 110 degrees F.
temperature it was to be marked "approved . M Laws of Illinois,
1869, pp. 259 ff.
The above act was revised in 1871. Coal, naphtha, gasoline,
benzine and other mineral oils sold for illuminating purposes are
made subject to inspection. I bid., 1871, pp. 566 ff.
In 1874 the standard for mineral oils was raised. The ignit-
ing point was placed at 150 degrees P. temperature. Ibid. pp. 731ff.
Other changes of minor importance were made by amendments
and revisions in 1887, Ibid., 1887, p. 242; 1911, Ibid., 1911,
p. 432; 1913, Ibid., 1913, p. 442; and in 1915, Ibid., 1915,
pp. 531 ff.
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8. Sale of Game and Fish and Traffic in Diseased Plants and
Animals
.
Laws dealing with the sale of game and fish and with the
traffic in diseased plants and animals are ordinarily of a prohib-
itory rather than of a regulatory character and, therefore, in the
strict sense of the term, they may not "be considered as regulations
of mercantile business. The prime object of the laws relative to
the sale of game and fish is to conserve these resources of the
State. Traffic in diseased plants and animals is prohibited for
the purpose of preventing the spread of contagious diseases.
An early act, regulating the traffic in game, prohibited
the dealing in certain kinds of animals and birds during a given
period of the year. The act applies to less than one-half of the
counties of the State.
Every legislature from 1861 to 1871 inclusive made changes
in either or both the fish and game laws. None of the acts passed
during this period, with the exception of the fish law of 1871,
applied to the State as a whole; the territory covered was, however,
gradually extended.*
An act of 1873 revised and consolidated the previous acts
and made the entire State subject to its provisions. All acts
passed thereafter were general in their application.^
In 1899, it was provided that all packages containing
1. Part of the act applies to only fifteen counties and part of it
applies to forty-four counties. No fish laws are found in the
statutes of 1860. Transportation and storage companies are not made
liable for having in their possession such game. Statutes of
Illinois, 1860, pp. 545 ff.
2. In 1869, it was made unlawful for any common carrier to trans-
port game taken in violation of the law. Ibid., 1869, pp. 188 ff.
3. Laws of Illinois, 1873, pp. 96 ff.
4. An act passed in 1889 again prohibited express companies and
common carriers from receiving for shipment any game taken in viola-
tion of the game laws. Ibid., 1889, pp. 162 ff.
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fish should bear a label disclosing in plain letters the fact
that such package contains fish.* The nature of the same must also
be indicated. Numerous laws have been passed specifying the size
and weight of fish that may be sold.
According to a recent enactment, it is made unlawful for
any person to ship any fish caught in any of the waters under the
jurisdiction of the State, or to conduct a fish market for the pur-
pose of buying and selling and shipping such fish, or as a wholesale
dealer to buy and sell any such fish without first procuring a lic-
en3e so to do.
The State undertakes to regulate the possession, use,
and sale of fish and game on the grounds that the ownership of and
title to all fish in any waters within its jurisdiction and all
wild game within its boundaries are in the State.
^
Traffic in diseased animals and plants has given rise to
a number of legislative enactments in this State; the primary ob-
ject of such legislation being not to prevent the sale of unwhole-
some foodstuffs, but rather to check the spread of disease among
animals and plants within the State or the introduction of the con-
tagion from without the State.
The importation of sheep affected with contagious dis-
4
eases was prohibited as early as 1865. The following legislature
passed an act making it unlawful for any one to bring into the
State Texas or Cherokee cattle at any time during the year. This
act was later so amended as to permit the shipment of such cattle
into the State between the first of October and the first of March
5following.
1. Laws of Illinois, 1S99, pp. 233 ff. 2. Ibid., 1911, pp. 348 ff.
3. Ibid. 1911, pp. 348 ff. 4. Ibid., 1865, p. 126.
5. Ibid. 1867, pp. 402 ff. In 1867, it was prohibited to bring
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The constitutionality of this act was early questioned
on the grounds that it interfered with interstate commerce. In
Yeazel v. Alexander, the State Supreme Court held the statute to "be
a proper and legitimate exercise of the police power of the State
and not in violation of the Constitution of the United States.''" In
1872, the State of Missouri passed an act, similar to the Illinois
law, prohibiting unconditionally the importation of Texas or Cher-
okee cattle into that State during a certain period of the year.
A case, arising under this act, was carried to the Supreme Court
of the United States. 6" The Supreme Court held that the statute
was more than a quarantine measure and not a legitimate exercise of
the police power of the State. The Court 3aid: "While we unhesi-
tatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary lews, and laws for
the protection of life, liberty, health or property within its
borders; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under
contagious or infectious diseases, from entering the State;
while for purposes of self-protection ----it may establish quaran-
tine, and reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with
transportation into or through the State, beyond what is absolute-
ly necessary . The Statute of Missouri is a plain intrusion
upon the exclusive domain of Congress. It is not a quarantine law.
It is not an inspection law----.*' The Court also made special
reference to the Illinois law and to the decision in Yeazel v.
Alexander as being unconstitutional. In 1879, two cases which
arose under the Illinois law were carried to the Supreme Court of
the State.' The State Court at this time, basing its decision on
Railroad v. Husen, the Missouri case, declared the Illinois law
into the State Canada Thistles. Ibid., 1867, p. 79.
1. 58 111. 254. 2. Railroad v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, (1877).
3. Salzenstein v. Mavis, 91 111. 391; C. and A. Railroad Co. v.
Erickson
,
91 111. 613; 94 111. 164, Jarvis v. Riggins.
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unconstitutional; thus reversing the decision made in Yeazel v.
Alexander.
The rule established by the United States Supreme Court
in Railroad v. Husen and in later cases is that a measure interfer-
ing with interstate commerce must be primarily a. quarantine measure.
In Kimmish v. Ball, the United States Supreme Court upheld an Iowa
law prohibiting any person from bringing into the State any Texas
cattle unless such cattle had been wintered at least one winter
north of the southern boundary of the State of Missouri or Kansas.^
In Reid v. Colorado, the Supreme Court held: "It is quite true,
that the transportation of live stock from State to State is a
branch of interstate commerce and that any specified rule or regu-
lation in respect to such transportation, which Congress may law-
fully prescribe and which may properly be deemed a regulation
of such commerce, is paramount throughout the Union. So that
when the entire subject of the transportation of live stock from
one State to another is taken under direct national supervision
and a system devised by which diseased stock may be excluded from
interstate commerce, all local or State regulations ---covering
the same ground will cease to have any force, ;and such rules
or regulations as Congress may lawfully prescribe or authorize
will alone control*---*. The power which the States might thus ex-
ercise may in this way be suspended until national control is aban-
doned and the subject be thereby left under the police power of the
States.
"
2
As a result of the prevalence of mieuro-pneumonia among
cattle in this and other States, a law was passed in 1881 for the
purpose of preventing the spread of the disease. The governor up-
1. 129 U.S. 217,(1888). Section 4058, Code of Iowa.
2. 187 U.S. 137.
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on sufficient evidence that the disease was epidemic in certain
localities in other States was authorized to stop by proclamation
the shipment of cattle from such localities into this State unless
accompanied "by a certificate of health.^"
A "bureau of Animal Industry, to prevent the exportation
of diseased cattle, and to provide means for the suppression and
extirpation of pleuro-pneumonia and other contagious diseases among
2
domestic animals, was provided for by Congress in 1884. Interstate
traffic and foreign commerce in animals infected with contagious
disease is prohibited.
The Illinois legislature, three years later, passed an
act, revising the former acts, by authorizing the governor of the
State to co-operate with the National Bureau of Animal Industry in
3
the prevention of traffic in diseased animals. A law preventing
the transportation of cattle suffering with splenic or Texas fever
was re-enacted in 1889. This law is strictly a quarantine measure
and is in force at the present time.^
The plant disease most vigorously fought is the San Jose
scale. The first act having for its object the prevention of the
spread of the disease was passed in 1899. This act provides that
all trees, shrubs, plants or vines shipped into the State, from
other States, country or province shall be properly labeled with
the name of the consignor and shall be accompanied by a certificate
showing that the contents have been inspected by a State or
National government officer and that such plants are free from all
5dangerous insects or diseases.
1. Laws of Illinois, 1881, pp. 5 ff . This act was revised in 1885.
2. United States Statutes, 188.7-85, Congress 48, pp. 31 ff
.
3. Laws of Illinois, 1887, pp. 8 ff. Vide, 1915, p. 3. 203 111.148.
4. Ibid., 1889, pp. 5 ff. Revised Statutes, 1911, p. 62.
5. Ibid., 1899, pp. 49 ff. This act was revised in 1907; Ibid.,
1907, p. 538.
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9. Litigation and Principle s Established. 1 Certain rules laid
down and principles established by superior courts in recent cases
involving the validity and construction of pure food laws are of
basic importance in the enactment and enforcement of pure food leg-
islation. The effectiveness of such legislation does not depend up-
on the cere with which the laws are drawn up, but upon the decisions
of the courts holding them consistent with the organic law of the
State, established principles of justice, and the valid exercise of
the police power.
Although the above reasoning may be applied to legislation
within any field, it is particularly true in the field of pure food
regulation. In a new field of regulation, neither the legislatures
nor the courts are able to find precedents to guide them; thus the
first rules laid down and principles established by the courts are
of the greatest importance.
As has been stated in a previous section, the validity of
pure food and drug legislation, as a proper exercise of the police
power of the State, is not questioned by the courts provided such
legislation is reasonable, having for its object the suppression of
a nuisance or the furthering of public health and morals.
One of the rules early laid down by the Federal Courts
and of greatest importance in food legislation is the rule relative
1. The above subject has been so thoroughly treated by a number
of writers, notably by Thornton in his work "Pure Foods and Drugs",
that it seems almost superfluous to add this section to the chapter
on pure food and drug legislation. But because of the newness of
regulation in this field, the principles recently established and
the rules laid down by Federal Courts and superior courts of States
other than the State of Illinois are of paramount importance in the
enactment, interpretation, end enforcement of Illinois laws, and
therefore it seemed that it might not be inappropriate to add this
brief section*
2. Vide Supra p. 66.
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to the "Original or Unbroken Package." It was early established
by the Supreme Court of the United States the t goods received by
interstate commerce remain under the shelter of the interstate
commerce clause of the constitution, until by a sale in the orig-
inal package they have been commingled with the general mass of pro-
perty in the Stated If the original package is broken or if it is
sold by the importer it ceases to be an "Original Package."
A more difficult problem is, what constitutes the "Orig-
inal Package." In Austin v. Tenn., and in Cook v. Marshall County,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that the package must
2be such as represents a bone fide transaction.
In a number of cases it has been held that a State may
prohibit the sale, in the original package, of an adulterated or im-
pure food or drug. In Vance v. Vandercook Co., the Supreme Court
held that "the power to ship merchandise from one State to another
carries with it, as an incident, the right in the receiver of the
goods to sell them in the original packages, and State regula-
3ticns to the contrary not withstanding ." Eut in this case
the Court was dealing with a recognized article of commerce.
1. Brown v, Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Leisy v. Harden, 135 U.S. 100.
2. The legislature of Tenn. in 1897, passed an act to prohibit
the sale of any cigarettes or introduction of them into the State
for that purpose. Austin, a merchant in Tenn., purchased from a
factory in Worth Carolina a number of packages of cigarettes, put
up in smell poxes, containing ten cigarettes each; then he secure-
ly pasted over the top of each box a U.S. revenue stamp. The fac-
tory placed the boxes on the floor in its warehouse and an egent of
an express company took them away in a la,rge besket without a cover.
They were sent in this way to Tenn. end delivered to Austin, the
express agent carrying the basket away with him. The State Court
and the United States Supreme Court both held that the basket was
the original package and Austin was found guilty. 179 U.S. 343.
Cigarettes were shovelled into a car in Mo. and delivered to
Cook in Iowa. Cook sold them as original packages. Cook was found
guilty in both the State and the Federal courts. It was held that
the individual boxes did not represent bona fide transactions.
196 U.S. 261.
3. 170 U.S. 438.
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In Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, the court held that
the State of Pennsylvania h8d no power to prevent the importation
of oleomargarine within its limits and the sale cf it in the origi-
nal package "by the importer. Put this right of sale was not held
to extend "beyond the first sale "by the importer after its arrival
within the State. Oleomargarine was recognized as a wholesome food
and therefore could not be excluded from the State by the State
legislature. It was considered a proper article of interstate com-
merce.^" Put adulterated articles are not so considered and there-
fore a State statute which prohibits the sale of adulterated foods
and drugs has been held as not repugnant to the commerce clause of
2the Federal Constitution. "The State may prohibit, the sale of such
foods or drugs, although they be offered for sale in the original
3package." In People v. Price, the Illinois Supreme Court held:
"If a dealer sells an injurious preservative in Illinois in viola-
tion of the pure food law, he is not protected by the fact that the
preservative was manufactured in another State and sold in Illinois
in the original package."^
In decisions made under the National Food and Drug Act of
1906, the Supreme Court has held that the packages in interstate
commerce in violation of the Act may be seized while in the hands
of the importer. According to Section 2 of the Act, however, the
importer is not liable until he shall have delivered, in original
packages, an adulterated article to another person.
1. 171 U.S. 1. For cases reaffirming the rule tha.t a State may
not under the guise of police regulations interfere with interstate
commerce, see: "Minn. v. Barber" 136 U.S. 313; end "Primmer v. Reb-
man" 138 U.S. 78. In "McDermott v. State of Wis." 228 U.S. 115,
a Wisconsin law repugnant to the National Pure Food and Drug Act
was held unconstitutional.
2. Vide Supra, p. 104. 3. "Plumley v. Mass." 155 U.S. 461; "Cross-
man v. Lurman" 192 U.S. 189.
4. 257 111. 587, (1913).
5. The Hipolite Egg Company shipped 130 separate cans of eggs
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The rule as to what foods may "be prohibited from "being
manufactured or sold is fairly well established. The general prin-
ciple although not consistently followed "by the courts, is that
"articles of food universally conceded to be so wholesome and in-
nocuous that the court may take judicial notice of it", may not be
absolutely prohibited from being sold within the State or imported
from another State. "But if there is a dispute ps to the fact of
its unwholesomeness for food or drink, then the legislature can
2
either regulate or prohibit it.""
The power of the Stpte to prevent the manufacture and
sale of food products in imitation of other products, even though
such imitations contain no ingredients injurious to health, but are
conducive to fraud, may be prohibited. Oleoma ragarine cases have
definitely established this principle. "Not only may the legisla-
ture protect the health of the people o** the State, but it may pre-
vent deception in the sale of food products." The cases on this
point are numerous. On the other hand, lews suppressing the man-
ufacture and sale of food products not conducive to fraud, may not
be passed.
In State v. Hanson, the Supreme Court of the State Minn*
declared e law unconstitutional which provided that no one should
manufacture or sell oleomaragerine which should be in imitation of
from St. Louis, Mo. tc itself at Peoria , and placed them in their
storeroom in their backery factory for the purpose cf using them
in their bakery products. The government seized them because they
were adulterated and entered judgement for costs against the com-
pany. The court held in part as follows: "adulterated articles
ere, while in interstate commerce, made culpable as wel? as their
shipper; while original packages they can be seized and they carry
their own identification as contraband of law;
"In a procedir.g in rem under section ten of the pure food and
drug act the court has jurisdiction tc enter personal judgment for
costs against the claimant.
"The object of the law is to keep impure and adulterated artic
les out of the channels of commerce." 220 U.S. 45. (1910).
1. 114 Pa. 265; 127 U.S. 678. 2. 190 Mo. 464; 99 N.Y. 386. 3. Ibid.
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"butter of any shade cr tint of yellow. The court held that the
manufacture and sale of food products produced by natural and essen-
tial ingredients, even though such products resemble butter, could
not be prohibited.^
A statute of New Hampshire provided that all substitutes
for butter must be colored pink before being sold. In a case aris-
ing under this act, the court held that the act necessitated and
provided for adulteration, end if this provision for coloring the
article v/ere a legal condition, a legislature could not be limited
to pink in its choice of colcrs, but might chocse red, black, blue
i
or any other color. It might also provide that the articles be so
mixed as to have an offensive odor. This act was also declared un-
2
constitutional.
In the same year a similar law in the State of Minnesota
was held constitutional by a lower Federal court. 1
The power of the State legislature or of a municipal coun-
cil to f ix a standard of quality end purity for milk is guaranteed.
The sale of milk from diseased cows or from cows fed on still pro-
4ducts may be prohibited. Milk containing preservatives, even
though such preservatives are not detrimental to health when used
5in proper amounts, may also be prohibited.
The sale of patented foods may be regulated. The sale
of food, other than milk, containing preservatives, provided such
preservatives are not injurious to health, may not be prohibited
according to many decisions.
1. State v. Hanson, 118 Minn. 85, (1912).
2. Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S.' 30, (1897).
3. Armour Packing Co. v. Snyder, 84 Fed. 136, (1897).
4. 80 Alt. 30, (New York Case).
5. 46 La. 147; 66 Minn. 166; 182 R.I. 368; 144 Wis. 371.
6. 113 Fed. 616.
An ordinance prohibiting the sale of fresh pork between June 1,
and Oct. 1, has been held unreasonable. Vide 39 L.R.A. 266. (Ark.)
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It is held that the preservation of foods and the arrest
of their tendency to decay is a proner and lawful object."*" The sale
of foods containing injurious preservatives may however he prohibit-
2
ed under all conditions.
A decision which will undoubtedly have far reaching effects
was handed down by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lexington
3
Bill and Elevator Company, 1914. This case arose under the Nation-
el Food and Drug Act of 1906. A number of sacks of flour had been
shipped from Lexington, Febr. to Castle Wo. While still in the
original packages, the United States District Court rendered judg-
ment directing the seizure of the flour on the ground that the flour
had been treated by the Alscp Process and hence was adulterated.
The case was carried to the Circuit Court of Appeals where the de-
cision of the lower court was reversed. From the Circuit Court it
was carried tc the United States Supreme Court for review.
The Supreme Court held in substance as follows: "The pri-
mary purpose of Congress in enacting the Food and Drug Act of 1906
was to prevent injury to the public health by the sale and trans-
portation in interstate commerce of misbranded and adulterated food.
"As against e.dul terat ion the statute was intended to pro-
tect the public health from possible injury by adding to articles
of food consumption poisonous and deleterious substances which
might render such articles injurious to health.
"In subdivision five, Section 7, of the Food and Drug
Act of 1906, the word 'may' is used in its ordinary and usual sig-
nification; and if an article of food may not by the addition of a
small amount of poisonous substances by any possibility injure
the health of any consumer, it may not be condemned under this sub-
division of the act."

The principle established "by the above decision is to the
effect that poisonous materials may be added to foods as long es it
cannot be proven that the addition of such poisons is injurious to
health. Hence it will hereafter he necessary, not only to prove
that poisonous materials hsve been added, tut that the addition of
such substances has rendered the food injurious to health."*"
Implied Warranty. The principle of "Implied Warranty,"
a rule at common law, if affected by pure food legislation, has
been strengthened by such legislation.
There is an implied warranty in the case of a sale of food
2that it is sound and wholesome and fit for consumption. In Wieder-
man v. Keller, the Illinois Supreme Court restated the old rule as
follows: "A retail dealer impliedly warrants the wholesomeness of
articles of food sold for domestic use----and is liable in damages
if they prove unwholesome, whether he was aware of their condition
or not." But it seems that a new problem has arisen under modern
conditions of manufacture and sale of foodstuffs. It is no longer
possible for the retailer to inspect the majority of food articles
which he sells. The problem arises es to the liability of the man-
ufacturer to the consumer of foodstuffs when there are no contract-
ual relations between the two parties. The old rule was that a
manufacturer or seller is not liable to those with whom he has no
contractual relations even though the latter sustain injuries as
a result of negligence on the part of the former. In McCaffrey v.
Mossberg, a leading case, the court divided into three classes
1. The decision in the Bleached Flour case was hailed es a great
victory by the manufacturers of foods. It was considered a sane
and consistent interpretation of the Pure Food Act. "American Food
Journal" 1914, pp. 110 ff. For an opposite view see Folin, "Pre-
servatives and Other Chemicals in Foods" rip. 53 ff
.
2. Sheffer v. Willoughby.. 163 111. 518; 193 111. App. 620; Chap-
man v. Roggenkamp, 182 111. App. 117.
3. 171 111. 93, (1898).
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those cases involving the liability of a manufacturer to consumers
of his products when there are no contractual relations "between
such manufacturer and consumer ; "First, The manufacturer is liable
if he is a manufacturer of poisonous and other dangerous substances;
Secondly, If the manufacturer is guilty of fraud and deceit in sell-
ing the article; Thirdly, When the thing is net itself dangerous,
though the manufacturer has been guilty of negligence, there is no
liability. 1,1
The manufacturer of foodstuffs comes apparently under the
third class and hence no liability would attach to him according to
the reasoning of the court. But the dealer can no longer inspect
the foods which he sells, and the courts have taken cognizance of this
fact and have held the manufacturer liable for negligence. The
legislatures, both State and National, have recognized this fact in
their enactments of criminal laws relative to the sale of adulterat-
ed foods. The serial number system and the guarantee clause pro-
visions, either incorporated into the law or established by rulings
by the proper commissions, evidence this fact.
In many recent cases the liability of the manufacturer
2has been definitely stated. In Tomlinson v. Armour and Company,
the court held that "--irrespective of the presence or absence of
contractual obligations arising out of the dealings between manu-
facturer and retailer, and between retailer and consumer, the manu-
facturer of canned goods is under a duty to him who, in the ordinary
course of trade, becomes the ultimate consumer, to exercise cere
that the goods which he puts into cans and sells to retail dealers,
are wholesome and fit for food and not tainted with -poison."
1. 23 R.I. 381.
2. 219 111. 421; 75 N.J.L. 748; 107 Minn. 104; 163 N.Y.S. 396.
3. 75 N..J.L. 748, (1908).
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In Freeman v. Schultz Bread Company, the court held that
"--one injured by biting into a nail embedded in bread which he
bought from a grocer establishes his right to recover against the
baker by proof that the nail was in the bread when it left the bak-
ery, without any -oroof of negligence in the baking. In the above
and in many other cases, courts have definitely established the lia-
bility of the manufacturer, but nothing was said relative to "Im-
plied Warranty" or contractual relations. All were cases in tort.
In a few cases, however, the courts have gone farther in
their declarations. In Park v. Yost, the court declared: "A manu-
facturer or dealer who puts human food upon the market for sale or
for immediate use does so upon an implied representation that it is
wholesome for human consumption. Practically he must know it is
fit for food or take the consequences if it proves destructive."
In Mazetti v. Armour and Company, "Implied Warranty" on
the part of the manufacturer of foodstuffs was definitely expressed.
The court held: "We would be disposed to hold on this question
that, where sealed packages are put out and it is made to appear
that the fault, if any, is that of the manufacturer, the product
was intended for the use of ell those who handle it in trade as well
as those who consume it.
"Our holding is that, in the absence of an express warran-
ty of quality, a manufacturer of food products under modern condi-
tions impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed in original pack-
ages, and that such warren ty_ is available _to_ all_ who_ m_ay_ be _dame_ged
by reason of their use in the legitimate channels of trade.
1. 163 N.Y.S. 396, (1916). 2. 93 Kan. 334, (1914).
3. 75 Wash. 622,(1913). A restaurant keeper in Seattle sold to a
customer some prepared tongue. The customer on discovering that
the product was unwholesome publicly denounced the matter. The
restaurant keeper sued Armour and Company for damages because of
loss of trade. He had purchased the tongue from a local grocery.
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"We regard this case, in so far as the dealer is permit-
ted to sue the manufacturer, as one of first impression. We think
the complaint states a cause of action. If there is no authority
for the remedy, 'it is high time for such an authority.'"
In its effects upon the relation of the manufacturer to
the consumer, with whom the manufacturer has no privity of contract,
it matters little whether the -niaintiff can "bring his case in tort
or assumpsit. The important fact is that the courts have recognized
such a relation where the dealing is not in things poisonous or
dangerous per se and where no fraud or deceit are involved.
The criminal laws relative to the manufacture and sale
of foods and drugs have strengthened the consumers' claims to damag-
es since the establishment of violation of pure food laws is prima
facia evidence that the manufacturer has "been guilty of negligence
if not outright fraud. Frequent claims for damages may in turn
be more effective in securing pure foods and drugs than penalities
imposed under the criminal law.
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CHAPTER III
Monopolies end Unfair Methods of Competition
1. Monopolies and Restra int of Trade at Common Law in The State
of Illinois prior to 1891*
Introduction * Monopoly in the economic sense signifies such con-
trol of the supply or the demand of one or more kinds of goods as
will enable the monopolizer to fix the price of such goods at a
point higher or lower than competitive forces would fix it. The
term monopoly is as old es the practice."1"
The phrase "Unfair Competition" or "Unfair Methods of
Competition" is of more recent origin. It is supposed "by some writ-
ers that the term was first used "by Lord Eldon in Hogg v. Kirby, a
2
case decided in 1803. The phrase has not been clearly defined and
hence its meaning as used by different writers varies. One condi-
tion, however, that is common to all methods of competition called
"Unfair" is the presence of fraud. It is at the present time a
recognized legal term found in many court decisions and also in
the Federal and many State statutes.
The phrase, similar in meaning, used in England is "Pass-
ing Off" and the phrase used in Prance is "Concurrence DeLoyale."
The terms monopoly and "unfair competition" are not mu-
tually exclusive in their connotation. Both designate practices
which tend to restrain trade; one directly and the other at least
indirectly.
Monopolies existed in ancient times and increased during
the middle ages. Tyre and Sidon maintained exclusive trade
1. In 21 James I, Chapter 3, Monopoly is defined es "The privilege
of the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using anything
within this realm." English Ruling Cases, Vol. XX, p. 37.
2. Nims on "Unfair Methods of Competition" p. 12.

120
privileges, and corners on grain were common in Greece and Rome.^"
Mediaeval towns end national governments often passed laws against
2
forestalling, regrating, and engrossing of commodities of all kinds.
The Elizabethan period in England is notorious "because
of the existing monopolies; most of these were grants "by the crown
to her favorites. These monopolies were very obnoxious to the peo-
ple and were held illegal at common law. No terms too severe could
3be used in their condemnation.
Another practice in England which tended toward monopoly
end was therefore contrary to the common law was the making of con-
tracts in restraint of trade. A contract in restraint of trade was
a contract, voluntarily entered into, which placed a restraint upon
a person's natural right to engage in his trade or profession. Such
a contract was void as against public policy. In those days a man
could not lawfully carry on a trade until he had served a. long
period as an apprentice, and when once admitted to a trade he was
by the law compelled to follow such a trade. Therefore if a party
made a contract not to carry on the trade in which he was skilled
he became a burden to the State and also indirectly furthered monop-
oly by reducing competition. Both were considered as tending to
the prejudice of the public.
At the present time the term "restraint of trade" has a
much broader meaning. Chief Justice White in the opinion of the
Supreme Court in the Standard Oil Case said: "It is also true that
while the principles concerning contracts in restraint of trade,
that is, voluntary restraint put by a person on his right to pursue
his calling, hence only operating subjectively, came generally to be
1. LeRossignal, "Monopolies Past and Present" pp. 25 ff.
2. Ibid., p. 30. 3. H. DeE Gibbins, "Industry in England" p. 242.
Vide Darcy v. Allen, 11 Coke 84. 4*_ Ruling Case Law, Vol. 6, Con-
tracts 190; 24 L.R. A. N.S. 913, Note.
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recognized in accordance with the English rule, it came moreover to
pass that contracts or acts which it was considered had a monopolis-
tic tendency, especially those which v/ere thought to unduly diminish
competition and hence to enhance prices---in other words, to monop-
olize---came also in a generic sense to he spoken of and treated
as they had been in England, as restricting the due course of trade,
and therefore as being in restraint of trade. ""*"
Legislation and Litigation "prior to 1891
.
Prior to the enactment
of the anti-trust law of 1891 there were few statutory provisions
regulating monopolies and other forms of restraint of trade in
either commerce or manufacturing in the State of Illinois. Actions
against the various forms and methods of restraint of trade were
common law actions.
The constitution of 1848 contained no provisions directly
on the subject. The clause of the constitution providing that cor-
porations, not possessing banking powers or privileges might be
formed under general laws, but should not be created by special acts
except for municipal purposes, and in cases where, in the judgment
of the General Assembly, the object of the corporation could not be
attained under the general laws was wholly disregarded, and many
corporations possessing exclusive privileges were created by special
legislation.
*
In Johnson v. Joliet and Chicago Railroad Company, the
Supreme Court of the State held in answer to objection made on the
ground of Article 10, Section 1, of the constitution of 1848: "It
is too late now to make this objection, since, by the action of the
General Assembly under this clause, special acts have been so long
the order of the day, and the ruling passion with every legislature
1. 221 U.S. 1, per Lavies "Trust Laws and Unfair Competition" p. 6.
2. Constitution of 1848, Article 10, Sec. 1.
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which has convened under the constitution, until their acts of this
description fill a huge and misshapen volume, and important end
valuable rights claimed under them. The clause has "been wholly
disregarded, and it would now produce far-spread ruin, to declare
such acts unconstitutional and void. It is now safer, and more
just to all parties, to declare , ---that its object could not be
attained under the general law, .
"
In the constitutional convention of 1870, resolutions
were made declaring monopolies odious and contrary to the spirit
of a. free government and that they ought not to be suffered.*- In
connection with the discussion on warehousing monopolies in the
3grain business were severely condemned.
Under the subject of "Special Legislation Prohibited,"
the present constitution contains the following clause: "Granting
to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclu-
sive privilege, immunity or fra.nchise whatever is prohibited."^
The second General Assembly meeting under the new consti-
stution passed a general conspiracy act which among other things
declares practices in restraint of trade and competition criminal.
The act is in part as follows: "Section 46. If any two or more per-
sons conspire and agree together, with the fraudulent or malicious
intent to injure the --- business or property of another, or
to obtain money or other property by false pretenses, or to do any
illegal act, injurious to the public trade, ----- or to prevent
competition in the letting of any contract by the State or the au-
thorities of any county, city, town or village, or to induce any
person not to enter such competition, --they shall be deemed
1. 23 111. 124, (1859). 2*_ Debates of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, 1870, p. 321. 3^ Vide Supra p. 9.
4. Constitution of 1870, Article 3, Section 22.
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guilty of conspiracy; — " This act did not set e.side the com-
2
mon lew with respect to criminal conspiracy.
The more common practices in restraint of trade which
were found objectionable during the period preceeding 1891 were
monopolizing and cornering the market. Exclusive dealing contracts
existed to some degree, tut the various forms of unfair competition
as they exist today were not considered objectionable or had not
yet made their appearance.
Monopolizing the market has 8lways been considered crimi-
nal in this country. One of the earlier leading cases in which
such monopolization was declared criminal at common law was Graft
v. McConoughy, decided in 1874. The litigants in this case were
the grain dealers, four in number, of Rochelle, Ogle County, 111.
These dealers had agreed to enter the grain trade in Rochelle upon
the following terms: "Our several grain houses shall be put into
the business upon the basis of 27 shares as the aggregate,
Each separate firm shall conduct their own houses as heretofore,
as though there was no Dartnership in appearance, keep their own
accounts, pay their own expenses, ship their own grain, and at
the end of every month, each individuals account to be balanced,
showing the profit or loss, which amount is to be divided pro rata,
according to the number of shares held by each party. It is further
agreed, that there shall be no grain held for advance in price, or
1. Revised Statutes of Illinois 1874, Section on Conspiracy No.
46, p. 358. 2^ Sanford v. People, 121 111. App. 619, (1905).
The same legislature which passed the general conspiracy act
passed an act making it a criminal offense to counterfeit brands
and trade marks which belonged to others because of long usage.
Any peculiar name, letters, marks, device or figures, cut, stamped
or engraved upon or in any way connected with any manufactured
article v/ere protected under this act. Any one using such marks,
without the consent of the owner, for the purpose of falsely repre-
senting any article was subject to fine. Revised Statutes of
Illinois 1874, p. 369.
This act is found in the criminal code of the Revised Statutes
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for any other cause,---.
"Prices and grades to be fixed from time to time, as con-
venient, and each one to abide by them. All grain taken in store
shall be charged one and one-half cents per bushel monthly .
No grain to be shipped by any party at less then two cents per
bushel.
"
A bill in equity was brought by J. 0. McConoughy against
the other members of the partnership for a distribution of the pro-
fits. The court held: "The four firms, by a shrewd, deep laid,
secret combination, attempted to control and monopolize the entire
grain trade of the town and surrounding country. That the effect
of this contract was to restrain the trade and commerce of the
county, is a proposition that cannot be successfully denied. We
understand that it is a well settled rule of law, that en agree-
ment in general restraint of trade, is contrary to public policy,
illegal and void -. But an agreement in partial or particular
restraint of trade has been held good, where the restraint was
only partial, consideration adequate, and the restriction reason-
able." 1
Combinations having for their object the raising of the
prices of prime necessities of life have been held criminal at
2
common law in this State at various times.
at the present time. Revised Statutes, Chapter 38, Sections 115
and 116. An act of 1891 relative to labels and trade marks pro-
vides for the protection of the same through registration. Laws
of Illinois 1891, pp. 202 ff., Vide White v. Wagar, 185 111. 195.
The general conspiracy act was amended in 1887, making the
practice called "boycott" conspiracy. Laws of 111. 1887, p. 167.
1. 79 111. 346, (1875). As to courts of equity and divisions
of profits of an illegal transaction between associates the court
cited : 58 111. 172; 54 111. 309; 66 111. 452.
2. In Samuels v. Oliver, the court held: "The enhancement of the
price of an article of prime necessity, such as wheat, or other
article, for purposes of extortion, is against public policy. And
a combination or agreement to make a 'corner' on stock or grain
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One of the first cases in which a holding corporation,
formed for the purpose of monopoly, was declared illegal in this
State was People v. Chicago Gas Trust. ^ In this case the Supreme
Court very forcibly stated its opinion relative to monopolies of
public service utilities by private corporations. The charter of
the Chicago Gas Trust Company, originally granted in 1849, conferred
upon the corporation the power to manufacture gas and to purchase
and hold stock in other gas and electric companies in Chicago and
elsewhere in the State of Illinois. The court in this case said in
part: "What ever tends to prevent competition between those engaged
in a public employment , or business impressed with a public charac-
ter, is opposed to public policy and, therefore, unlawful. What-
ever tends to create a monopoly is unlawful as being contrary to
public policy.
"If contracts and grants, whose tendency is to create
monopolies are void at common law, then where a corporation is or-
ganized under a general statute, a provision in the declaration of
its corporate purposes, the necessary effect of which is the crea-
tion of a monopoly, will also be void.
"By Chapter 28 of our Revised Statutes it is provided
that 'the common law of England so far as the same is applicable
and of a general nature shall be the rule of decision and shall
be considered of full force until repealed by legislative authority.
Public policy is that principle of the law which holds, that no
subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public, or against the public good. This principle
by buying it up, so as to control the market, and then purchasing
for future delivery, is illegal ." 130 111. 73, (1889).
In Cummings v. Foss it was held: "Combinations having for their
object the enhancement of the price of articles of prime necessity,
as food, for purposes of extortion, are against public policy and
void." 40 111. App. 523. 1. 130 111. 268, (1889).
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owes its existence to the very sources from which the common law
is supplied." 1 The court held that the granting of a charter for
the purpose of purchasing and holding stock in competing companies
was contrary to the public policy of the State and in contravention
of the spirit if not the letter of the constitution.
Contracts having for their object "exclusive dealings"
have been held vslid at common law unless such contracts tended to
unreasonably restrain trade. A certain Hanson end others entered
into an agreement with a certain Rounsavell according to which the
latter granted to the former the right to purchase from him the
AEtna sewing machine for the purpose of selling them in Cook county.
It was further agreed that Hanson and his partners were to deal
exclusively in the AEtna sewing machines. In a suit brought by
Rounsavell a gainst Hanson, who had failed to pay for the machines,
it was objected that the contract was void for being in restraint
of trade* The Supreme Court of the State said that it saw nothing
in such a contract so in restraint of trade as to make it against
p
public policy and hence void.
Contracts not to engage in a business or to practice a
profession within certain limits of time and place (the original
contract in restraint of trade) have been held valid at common law
unless the restricted territory or period of time was greater than
was necessary to protect the purchaser of the good will. The re-
stricting part of the contract in order to be valid at common law
must also be ancillary to a main consideration.
1. In the brief for appellants the following appears: "Trusts of
this character, to hold a controlling interewt in the shares of
stock in other competing corporations, constitute one of the most
insidious and dangerous schemes to secure and perpetuate monopolies
ever invented." Cook on Trusts, pp. 28 ff.
2. Erown v. Rounsavell, 78 111. 589, (1875). The contract was en-
tered into in 1871. 3. In Stewart v. Challacombe it was held

127
An interesting case involving an "Unfair Method of Corn-
petition" was decided by the Appellate Court in 1884. The case in-
volved defamation or misrepresentation of competitor. The plain-
tiff and defendant in this case had formed a partnership as com-
mission merchants and located et 118 S. Water St. Chicago. Six
months after such formation the plaintiff purchased defendant's in-
terest in the business, property, and the good will of the firm.
The defendant again started in the business as commission merchant
and sent cards to consignors and shippers who had dealt or might
deal with plaintiff which read as follows:
"Dear Sir: I drop you a line to let you know A.M. Hays, my succes-
sor in business, is not legally responsible for his contracts, as
he is yet a minor, under twenty-one years of age. A word to the
wise is sufficient. Store, No. 118 South ?/ater St., I shall occupy
and do business. Would be pleased to hear from you."
The court held that the above was defamatory or reason-
ably susceptible of a defamatory meaning even though the plaintiff
was a minor.
The above are some of the more important cases in which
the common law rules relative to monopolies and other forms of re-
straint of trade are set forth.
that a contract not to engage in business in a certain place is en-
forceable in law and equity. 11 111. App. 379, (1882).
In Linn v. Sigsbee it was held that "where one practicing phy-
sician sold to another a house and lot and in the same contract,
included in the sale his practice and obligated himself not to at-
tempt to establish a medical practice in the township where the pro-
perty sold was located, ----that such partial restraint of trade
was reasonable." 67 111. 75, (1873). Vide Frazer v. Frazer
Lubricator Company, 18 111. App. 450, (1886). Talcott v. Erackett,
5 111. App. 60, (1879).
1. Hays v. Mather, 15 111. App. 30, (1884).
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2. Anti-trust Legislation of 1891* The increase in the number of
large-scale "business units, trusts, and combinations of various
kinds, together v/ith the investigations made in this field under
the direction of Congress during the late eighties and early ninties
made the demand for statutory regulation of monopolies end conspir-
acies in restraint of trade more imperative. 1
Although such monopolies and conspiracies were held crim-
inal and against public policy at common law, the common law reme-
dies were no longer considered adequate in dealing with them for
the reason that in many cases it could not be definitely proved
that the alleged monopolies were such in fact and hence against pub-
lic policy. Clea-rly stated rules were necessary. As expressed by
Professor Jenks: "The statutes, by defining in specific terms
what is the act objected to, put people and prosecuting officers
more on the alert regarding their rights and duties. It is proba-
ble, too, that through the statutes the principles of the common
law are fitted more rapidly into modern conditions and that they
have been somewhat extended."
Three well defined waves of anti-trust agitation and leg-
islation are said to have passed over the United States: the first
period including the years 1889 to 1893 inclusive; the second those
from 1895 to 1898; and the third those from 19C7 to 1913. 3 Illinois
was among the States passing anti-trust legislation during the first
period.
In 1889, two bills were introduced into the State Senate
having for their object the prohibition of restrictions on trade by
1. Report of the United States Industrial Commission, Vol. 2, p. 3.
2. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 3^ During this period six States placed anti-
trust provisions in their constitutions and twenty passed anti-
trust statutes. Unpublished Manuscript by Professor Maurice Henry
Robinson
,
University of Illinois.
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the formation of trusts and trust companies. Both "bills passed only
the first reading. 1 During the same session the "Merritt Trust Bill 1
was pessed "by the House by a vote of 113 to 19. Motion in the Sen-
ate to take up this bill for consideration failed to secure the nec-
2
essary two-thirds vote.
During the following legislative session, 1891, two anti-
trust bills were introduced into the House and two into the Senate.
Neither of the Senate bills came to a vote, both being unfavorably
reported back by the committee. One of the House bills was like-
wise reported back unfavorably, but the other House bill was a-
mended by the committe on Judiciary and reported bach with the rec-
ommendations that the amendments be adopted and the bill passed.
The bill was passed in the House by a vote of 131 to 4, and in the
Senate by a vote of 44 to 1. This bill as passed became the first
act in the State of Illinois declaring trusts and combines in re-
straint of trade illegal and void. The almost unanimous vote by
which the bill was passed in both Houses would indicate the attitude
of the people of the State toward such combinations and trusts as
the act was designed to prohibit.
The act applies to all industries alike; extractive, man-
ufacturing, and mercantile. Under it any agreement, trust or com-
bination either of individuals, firms or corporations existing for
the purpose of regulating or fixing the price of any article of mer-
chandise or for fixing or limiting the quantity of any article pro-
duced is declared a conspiracy to defraud and made punishable. It
is likewise declared unlawful for any corporation to issue or own
trust certificates or for any corporation or its representatives to
enter into any combination with any other corporation or its
1. Senate Journal, 1889, pp. 264, 265. 2^ House Journal, 1889,
p. 93; Chicago Tribune, May 24, 1889. 3_j_ Senate Journal 1891,
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representatives with the object of centralizing the management
and fixing the price or limiting the production of any article of
commerce. All contracts made in violation of the act are declared
void, end any purchaser of any commodity from any such illegal
combination may plead the act as a defense to any suit for the re-
covery of the price of the article purchased.
^
The purpose of the act is not to repeal the general con-
spiracy act of the State or set aside the common law, but to make
it easier to prosecute all parties guilty of practices which tend
to materially lessen competition.
The first important case to arise under the act was Ford
v. Chicago Milk Shippers Association. In February 1891, four months
previous to the enactment of the anti-trust law, shippers of milk
had formed a corporation for the purpose of regulating the quantity
and fixing the price of milk to be shipped and sold within the cor-
porate limits of the city of Chicago to the city dealers. A one
Ford, a retail milk dealer, purchased large quantities of milk from
the organization and later refused to pay for the milk on the
grounds that the Chicago Milk Shippers Association was a combination
in violation of the act of 1891. The Milk Shippers Association
brought action against Ford for the recovery of the price of the
milk. The Appellate Court declared the act of 1891 unconstitution-
al on the grounds that it was in violation of the constitutional
clause "that no law impairing the obligations of contracts shall
be passed." The case was thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court
of the State. This court held the Act constitutional and declared
it to apply to corporations formed previous to its passage. The
pp. 11, 310, 726, 992, 993. House Journal 1891, pp. 49, 604, 943-
4, 860. A Mr. Ferns introduced the bill which became the law.
1. "Where there is a conviction under this act the informer shall
be entitled to one-fifth of the fine recovered." Laws of 111.,
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Appellate Court's decision web thus reversed and the constitutional-
ity of the act has not been seriously questioned since.
*
The legislature of 1893 made an amendment to the act of
p1891 end also passed a new anti-trust set. The new act, in addition
to the general -provisions of the act of 1891, contained a section
providing that the act should not extend to agricultural products
or live stock while in the hands of the producer or raiser. The
constitutionality of this act was not construed until 1902 in Con-
4
nolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Company. This case was carried from the
Federal Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois to the
United States Supreme Court.
The Union Sewer Pipe Company of Ohio "brought its action
against Thos. Connolly, a citizen of Illinois, to recover on two
promissory notes. The notes were given on account of the purchase
of sewer pipe "by Connolly from the pipe company. Connolly made
the defense that the pipe company was a combination in restraint of
trade contrary to the common law, contrary to the Federal Act of
1890, and also contrary to the Illinois statute of 1893. The Feder-
al Circuit Court declared the Illinois Anti-trust Law of 1893 in
violation of the constitution of the United States because of the
provision of section 9, exempting agricultural products and live
stock, while in the hands of the producer, from the provisions of
the act. The court held that the principle of classification used
1891, pp. 206 ff
.
1. 155 111. 166, (1895). Vide Constitution of Illinois, 1870, Sec-
tion 14, Article 2. 2^ The amendment made it the duty of the Sec-
retary of State to require an annual report from all corporations
in the State. Laws of Illinois 1893, pp. 89 ff. The act in force
at the present time requiring corporations to make annual reports
to the Secretary of State is the act of 1901, amended in 1903. The
act of 1901 repealed en act of 1899. Ibid., 1899, pp. Ill ff.,
Ibid., 1901, pp. 124 ff,, Ibid., 1903, pp. 123 ff. 3^ Ibid., 1893,
Section 9, pp. 182 ff . 4^ Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Company,
184 U.S. 540, (1902).
i
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in distinguishing between agriculturalists and others was not obvi-
ous and hence the "equal protection of the law" clause of the Con-
stitution of the United States was violated. The United States
Supreme Court reviewed the case and sustained the decision of the
lower Federal court.
The legislature in 1897 again amended the anti-trust act
of 1891 by adding to section one the proviso "That in the mining,
manufacture, or production of articles of merchandise, the cost of
which is mainly made up of wages, it shall not be unlawful for per-
sons, firms, or corporations doing business in this State to enter
into joint arrangement of any sort, the principle object or effect
of which is to maintain or increase wages. "^ In a case arising
under the act, as amended, the Supreme Court of the State, follow-
ing the decision in the Connolly case, declared the amendment un-
constitutional and void, as being an unlawful discrimination in
favor of certain persons or corporations sought to be exempted from
2the operations of the law of 1891.
The anti- trust law of 1691 is thus, with a few unimportant
amendments, the anti-trust law of the State of Illinois at the
present time. Since its enactment trusts and combines in restraint
of trade have been consistently declared illegal either under the
statute or the common law or under both.
One of the first important cases to arise under the act
was decided in 1895. In 1887, a. number of Illinois, Missouri, and
Ohio corporations, engaged in the distillery business, entered into
a trust agreement, vesting the management of the corporations in
the hands of nine trustees. These trustees completely controlled
1. Laws of Illinois, 1897, p. 298. This amendment of 1897 was
made before the new trust act of 1893 had been declared unconstitu-
tional in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.
2. People v. Eutler St, Foundry, 201 111. 236, (1903). The court
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all the constituent companies. In the information filed against
the company it was shown that within a year after the formation of
the trust eighty-one companies located in different parts of the
United States had been absorbed. The Supreme Court of the State
held that a trust agreement entered into for the purpose of secur-
ing control of a manufactured product, so as to limit its production
and fix its prices was void as against public policy. The court
further declared that no corporation could legally acquire the
plants of other competing companies, by purchase or otherwise, if
the purpose of such acquisition was the establishment of a monopoly.
It was considered such an abuse of corporate powers as to warrant
forfeiture of its corporate franchise. It was held that the corpor-
ation was limited in its holdings of property to that necessary for
carrying out the particular business to conduct which the corpora-
tion v/as organized. The above was a Q,uo Y/arranto proceeding and
the corporation was released of its corporate franchise. 1
In Bishop v. American Preservers' Company, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that "an agreement is against public policy and
void where all the interests of a business ere thereby combined and
placed absolutely under a single management to monopolize and con-
trol trade." 2 (157 111. 284).
In 1897 one New Jersey end three Illinois corporations,
manufacturers of glucose products, endeavored to effect a consoli-
dation. Before the combination was completed, suit was brought by
one Harding, a stockholder in one of the constituent companies
on behalf of himself and some of the other stockholders to enjoin
the directors of the American Glucose Company from entering into
in this case clearly stated that the act of 1891 was not repealed
by the anti-trust act of 1693 and that its validity was not affect-
ed TBy the fact that the whole act of 1893 was declared void.
1. Distilling and Cattle feeding Co. v. People, 156 111. 448, 1895.
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and becoming a part of the consolidation or trust about to be form-
ed. The decision of the court was very similar to that in the
Distilling and Cattle Feeding Co. v. People. Although the combina-
tion was effected v/hile the litigation was pending, the Illinois
Supreme Court annulled the agreement. The court held that a minori-
ty stockholder might restrain a corporation from becoming a part of
an illegal combination where the formation of such combination
would be cause for forfeiture of its charter and would pecuniarily
injure the minority stockholder. 1
In Chicago, Wilmington and Vermillion Coal Co. v. People,
the court held that a. combination of producers of coal to prevent
competition in its sale was detrimental to the public, unlawful and
amounted to a common law conspiracy.
In Purington v. Hinchliff, the court held: "No person or
combination of persons can legally, by direct or indirect means,
obstruct or interfere with another in the conduct of his lawful
business, and any loss wilfully caused by such interference will
give the party injured a right of action for all damages sustained."
A case involving a combination of workmen for the purpose
of monopolizing the market and raising the wages of the members of
the association was decided in 1892. The members of the Stenograph-
ic Association of Chicago entered into an agreement by which the
1* Harding v. American Glucose Company, 182 111. 551, (1899).
2. 214 111. 421.
3. 219 111. 159, (1905). It was agreed among the Ericklayers 1
Association at the instigation of the Erick Manufacturers' Union
that their members should not purchase any brick to be used by
them from any person or corporation except such as had subscribed
to the rules and regulations of their association.
In Dunbar v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., part of the
decision of the court as summed up in the syllabus is as follows:
"There is no provision of the general incorporation act authoriz-
ing one corporation to purchase and hold stock in another corpora-
tion, and there is no implied power to do so except where it is
necessary to carry into effect the object for which such corporation
was formed.
f
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prices of reporting legal proceedings by shorthand were to be kept
up through the prevention of competition. Action was brought by a
certain More and other members of the association against a one
Eennett and others to recover damages resulting from an alleged
breach of the rules of the association. The court held that the
agreement among the stenographers was not a valid contract for the
reason that it tended to prevent a free and unrestricted competition
in the business.^"
"Where a controlling interest in a corporation has been purchased
by another corporation for the purpose of stifling competition,
the minority stockholders in the former corporation may have the
sale set aside in equity and may compel the stock to be returned
to the rightful owners upon equitable terms, and their right to
relief is not limited to enjoining the purchasing corporation from
voting the stock and from exercising or enjoying the other rights
of a stockholder." 236 111. 456, (1909).
1. More v. Bennett, 140 111. 69,(1892). Professor W. Z. Ripley
in commenting on this case states: "It is interesting to note that
the court refused to countenance the attempt to regulete the price
of labor as well as to refuse to permit the regulation of prices
of commodities." "Trusts, Pools, and Corporations" p. 234.
Vide, People v. Aaehen and Munich Fire Ins. Co., 126 111. App. 636.
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3» Unfair Methods of Compet ition Introduction* The growth of
unfair methods of competition has "been commensurate with the in-
crease in lerge-scale business nuits, the ingenuity of the unfair
competitor, and interstate commerce* and hence the suppression or
regulation of these methods depends as much upon the action of the
National Government as upon the action of the State Governments.
In the State of Illinois very little legislation has been
passed having for its object the suppression of these methods ,and
the phrase "Unfair Competition" is not found in the statutes of
the State.
In 1891, an act was passed for the protection of associ-
ations and labor unions in the use of trade marks adopted by them.
The counterfeiting or imitation of such labels or trade-marks was
made a punishable offense.* Pout years later an amendment was made
to the act providing for the registration with the Secretary of
p
State of such marks.
Sensational, false and misleading advertising of any kind
in newspapers or otherwise was made a criminal offense by an act
3
of 1897. This act was supplemented by an act passed in 1915.
Fraud end misrepresentation in the sale of articles made
in whole or in part of silver or gold is also declared a criminal
offense. All articles marked "Sterling" or"Sterling Silver" must
1. Laws of Illinois, 1891, pp. 202 ff. 2_j_ Ibid., 1895, pp. 319 ff.
For a classification of Methods of Competition in business called
"Unfair" see Davies "Trust Laws and Unfair Competition," p. 311.
3. Laws of Illinois, 1897, pp. 204 ff. The General Incorporation
Act of the State provides thet "no license shall be issued to two
companies having the same or a similar name, nor shall any foreign
corporation having the same or a similar name as any domestic cor-
poration be admitted to this State under any foreign corporation
law and no domestic corporation shall hereafter be organized with
the same or a similar name as any foreign corporation previously
admitted to do business in this State." Ibid., 1905, p. 130.
Revised Statutes of Illinois, 1916, p. 637, Section 2.
In 1901, an act was passed for the purpose of preventing the
unlawful buying and selling of cans, tubs, firkins, bottles and
,1
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be 925/1000 fine. All articles marked "Coin" or "Coin Silver" must
be not less than 9/10 fine. 1
Outside of the above acts and the laws on pure foods,
which indirectly prohibit and prevent unfair methods of competition,
no statutory regulations on the subject exist in the State.
Many methods of unfair competition have, however, been
declared illegal at common law or in contravention of the anti-trust
act of 1891 because tending toward monopoly or undue restraint of
trade.
Exclusive Dealing Contracts . Contracts calling for exclusive
dealing or so-called tying contracts have been held invalid, if not
criminal, in Illinois if entered into by public service corporations
but have been considered valid if entered into by private individu-
als or corporations provided the agreement is reasonable and not un-
duly in restraint of trade.
In Inter Ocean Company v. Associated Press, the Supreme
Court of the State declared a tying contract illegal end contrary
to public policy because of the quasi-public character of the Asso-
2
ciated Press. This company, a corporation organized under the
laws of the State of Illinois in 1892, was created to "buy, gather,
and accumulate information and news; to vend, supply, distribute
and publish the same; to purchase, erect, lease, operate and sell
telegraph and telephone lines and other means of transmitting news."
The stockholders of the association were proprietors of news papers.
Article 11, Section 8, of the by-laws of the corporation provided:
"No member shall furnish, or permit any one to furnish, its special
others containers and to provide for the registration of the names,
brands, designs, and marks of ownership in connection with such
articles. This act was declared unconstitutional on the grounds
of being discriminatory. Laws of Illinois, 1901, pp. 316 ff
.
Horwich v. Walker, 205 111. 497. 1^ Laws of 111., 1899, pp. 138 ff.
2. 184 111. 438, (1900).
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or other news to, or shall receive news from, any person, firm or
corporation which shall have teen declared by the Board of Directors
or the stockholders to be antagonistic to the association; and no
member shall furnish to any other person, firm or corporation engag-
ed in the business of collecting or transmitting news, except with
the written consent of the Board of Directors."
The Associated Press entered into an agreement with the
Inter-Ocean Publishing Company to furnish it news. The latter
violated its agreement with the ftssociated Press by purchasing news
from other sources , whereupon the Associated Press threatened to
cease furnishing the Publishing Company with news. The Publishing
Company then filed a bill for an injunction against the Associated
Press. The Circuit Court of Cook County and the Appellate Court
both dismissed the bill* The State Supreme Court, however, held
that the lower courts had erred in so doing and said in part as fol-
lows: "The clause of the contract in this case which sought to re-
strict appellant from obtaining news from other sources than from
appellee is an attempt at restriction upon the trade and business
among the citizens of a common country. Competition can never be
held hostile to public interest, and efforts to prevent competition
by contract or otherwise can never be looked upon with favor by the
court . "
In Wieboldt v. Standard Fashion Company, the Appellate
Court held that a contract entered into between the parties in
which it was agreed that the Fashion Company grant to Wieboldt the
In 1901, a contract was entered into whereby the owner of a bed
of fire clay agreed to erect a plant, experienced fire clay miners
agreed to run it and several corporations agreed to take a specified
amount of the product daily at a fixed price; the first party agreec
not to operate a fire clay plant on any other land owned or control-
led by him in the State, the second party agreed not to sell fire
clay to any other parties than the corporations specified, and the
latter agreed not to buy any fire clay in the State except that
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exclusive agency for the sale of its patterns within a certain dis-
trict of Chicago was not invalid as "being in restraint of trade.
In Heimbuecher v. Goff , Horner and Company, the court
said relative to a contract by which one corporation bound itself to
buy all its raw materials from and sell all its manufactured pro-
ducts to another corporation: "We do not regard this contract as one
in restraint of trade and, therefore, illegal and void. Nor do we
think it is forbidden by the anti-trust law of this State, or by
the Sherman Act. " 2
Cases involving exclusive dealing contracts , decided by
the Federal courts, are usually complicated by patent rights and
copyrights. Such contracts nave been held not to contravene the
produced by the second parties and not to enter into any combina-
tion or trust to limit the output of the plant. The contract was
for a term of eight years. In a case involving this contract the
court held that the contract was not invalid as being in restraint
of trade. Southern Brick Co. v. Sand Co., 223 111. 616, (1906).
A contract was entered into between the Superior Coal Company
and the Darlington Lumber Company, whereby it was agreed that if
the Lumber Company, a retail dealer, would buy coal of the raining
company, the latter would not sell coal at wholesale prices to any
other dealer in that town. The Superior Soal Company sued for the
price of a quantity of coal which the defendant refused to pay on
the grounds that the contract was void as being in restraint of
trade.
The court held that the contract was not invalid as contrary
to public policy or in restraint of trade even though it might in-
cidentally resttict competition in the sale of coal in the town.
Superior Coal Company v. Lumber Company, 236 111. 83, (1908).
The Local Telephone Company of Vandalia entered into a contract
with the Kinloch Long Distance Telephone Company whereby it was
agreed that the local company should not connect or make connections
with any other telephone conroany for long distance service.
The court held that "the ordinary rule that contracts in parti-
al restraint of trade are not invalid does not apply to public ser-
vice corporations." The court further stated: "The rule that at
common law contracts in general restraint of trade are illegal
and void is well settled, but agreements in paitial restraint of
trade, only, may be good under certain circumstances if reasonable
in their nature and made upon a sufficient consideration." Union
Trust and Savings Bank v. Telephone Company, 258 111. 202, 1913.
1. 80 111. App. 67, (1898).
2. 119 111. App. 373, (1905).
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Sherman Act. The two leading cases setting forth this view are the
well known "Button Fastener" case, decided in 1896, and the "Mime-
ograph" case, decided in 1912. It was held in both of these cases
that, although a contract involving the use of a patent interfered
with interstate commerce and restrained interstate trade, if it in-
volved only the reasonable and legal consitions imposed under the
patent law, it was not within the prohibition of the Sherman Act."^
Since the passage of the Clayton Act, however, a number
of decisions have been made by the Federal courts declaring "tying
contracts" in restraint of trade illegal even though valuable -patent
rights were involved.*"
1. In Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Company v. Eureka Special-
ty Company it was held that the owner of a patent for a machine for
fastening buttons to shoes with metallic fasteners had the right to
sell such machines subject to the conditions that they should be
used only with the particular fasteners made by the manufacturer of
the machine. The fact that the fasteners were not patented was
held not to prevent the manufacturer from selling the machines under
such conditions. 77 Federal Reporter 288, 1896.
The A. B. Dick Company, manufacturers of the "Roatry Mimeograph'
sold their machines, we'll protected by patents, on the condition
that the purchaser use only the supplies with the machines made by
the A. B. Dick Company.
In a case involving alleged contributory infringement of the
Dick patents the court held that the sale of ink not manufactured
by the Dick Company to a user of a rotary mimeograph with a know-
ledge that it would be used with the mimeograph was contributory
infringement and that the use of such ink was also as infringement*
The court further stated that the owner of a patented article had
the exclusive tight to aake, use, and sell the article. He might
refuse to sell it or sell it conditionally. 224 U.S. 1, (1912).
2. Clayton Act. Section 3. "That it shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to
lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, whether
patented or not, for use or resale within the United States,
or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon,
such price, on the condition, -that the lessee or purchaser
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, supplies or other
coi imodities of a competitor of the lessor or buyer, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly ." United States Statutes, 1913-14, Pt.l, p. 731.
,1

141
One of the first important cases involving both a "tying
contract" scheme and patent rights decided after the passage of the
Clayton Act was United States v. Keystone Watch Case Company. 1 The
Keystone Watch Case Company which had acquired the plants of a num-
ber of manufacturers of filled watch cases and watch movements is-
sued to a large number of jobbers a circular stating that thereafter
it would sell its products only to those dealers who voluntarily
conformed to its plans. The circular among other things stated:
"First. Our goods bearing the following trade-marks, to wit,
will be sold by us to our jobbers at fixed prices, and we
desire that sales of these goods by jobbers, whether to retailers
or jobbers, shall be without deviation at the prices fixed by us
for sales to retailers,
"Fourth. And, further, we desire that the jobbers to whom we sell
our goods bearing the following trade-marks, to wit, shall not
deal in any other watch cases other than those manufactured by us."
The Watch Case Company then proceeded to strictly enforce
its scheme. Half of the jobbers disregarded the rules of the
company and failed to receive any more watch cases. In a case
brought against the Watch Case Company a lower Federal court held
that its proposed policy was a direct and unlawful restraint of
trade; that when the company sold the watch to the jobber it had
fully exercised its right to vend, and had no right to control sub-
o
sequent purchasers.*"
In Victor Talking Machine Company v. Strauss the court
held that the manufacturer of a patented article might give the
right to use such article to whom it pleased and upon what condi-
tions it pleased. But in this case no sale was involved . The
1. 218 Fed. 502, (1915). 2_j_ By a mere notice on the box the com-
pany attempted to controU. the retail price of the watches.
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Victor Talking Machine Company leases its machines under a royalty
scheme. The lessee upon the payment of the royalty has the use of
the machine only until the patent which has the longest time to
run has expired. Thereafter the lessee automatically becomes the
owner of the instrument. The license states that the machine shall
remain unchanged and be used only with the needles, records and
other supplies furnished by the company.^
Two very recent cases in which "tying contracts" have
been held illegal are United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Company and Motion Picture Patent Company v. Universal Film Manu-
2facturing Company. The United Shoe Machinery Company is probably
one of the best known corporations in the United States which sells
its goods under exclusive dealing contracts. One of the most objec-
tionable clauses in its contracts is that the user of a machine
from the company is prohibited from using any shoe manufacturing
machine from any other company.
The lower Federal court shows clearly that the company's
contracts are in violation of Section 3, of the Clayton Act, and
every objection made by the defendant was overruled.
The Motion Picture Patent Company, manufacturers of pic-
ture projecting machines, sold its machines on the conditions that
they should be used only with films of its own manufacture, although
its patents on the films had long ago expired. The court held the
company's contracts invalid as tending to create a monopoly.
This case differs from the Victor Talking Machine case in
two points. The Victor Talking Machine Company controlled one of
many makes of talking machines and leased them under a royalty plan.
The Motion Picture Patent Company held e monopoly of picture pro-
1. 230 Fed. 449, (1916). 2^234 Fed. 127; 235 Fed. 398, (1916).
3. The case is at present pending in the U.S. Supreme Court.
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jecting machines end sold thera conditionally. According to the
court the conditions in the former case did not tend to substantial-
ly lessen competition or trade whereas the conditions in the latter
case tended clearly to restrain trade and establish a monopoly,
hence the Clayton Act was held violated.
Inducing Breach of Contract. Inducing breach of contract is
held to be an unfair method of competition and hence an actionable
offense. A leading case in the State of Illinois is Poremus v.
Hennessy, decided in 1898. Appellee in this case had for a number
of yeers conducted a laundry office in the city of Chicago. She
received clothes, sent them to laundry plants where they were laun-
dered and then returned to her to be distributed by her to her pa-
trons. She alleged that for the reason that she would not increase
her price so as to conform to the laundrymen's union scale the
Chicago Laundrymen's Association had injured her business by compel-
ling those who did her work to break their contracts with her. The
court held: "An action will lie for damages resulting from induc-
ing one to break a contract, if done without justifiable cause and
with the intention of injuring the plaintiff.
"The common law seeks to protect every person against the wrong-
ful acts of others, whether committed alone or by combination, and
an action may be had for injuries done which cause another loss in
the enjoyment of any right or privilege or property. »- . "^
A more recent decision declaring the inducing of a breach
of contract an actionable offense was made in London Guarantee
Company v. Horn. The court held that "Where a third party induces
en employer to discharge his employee who is working under a con-
tract terminable at will but under which the employment would have
continued indefinitely except for such interference and where the
"l. 176~IllI"606"~189eI""2""206"lll^
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only motive moving the third party is malice a cause of action lies
against the third party."
Contracts in Restraint of Trade* Contracts in restraint of trade,
using that term in its original meaning, have teen held valid unless
unreasonable as to time and area restricted to one or "both of the
parties to the contract. The restraint must also be subordinate or
ancillary to a main important consideration.
In 1901, a one Reimers purchased all the property and
machinery used in connection with a bottling works. The purchase
also included the trade, good-will, and business of the former
bottling works. The property was delivered and the name over the
door was changed. Shortly afterwards the seller established a bus-
iness of the same kind and adopted the old name, "A Rauft Bottling
Works." She also directed the telephone company to install on her
new premises the former telephone number and directed all mail ad-
dressed to "A Rauft Bottling Works" to be delivered to her. Reimers
filed a bill praying for an injunction against Rauft to enjoin her
from using the trade name, the telephone number, and from receiving
the mail addressed to "A Rauft Bottling Works." The Circuit Court
granted all the points asked for .whereupon the case was appealed to
the Supreme Court of the State. The Supreme Court ruled that the
decree was too broa.d. Among other things the court held: "It has
been held that the right of a man to use his own name in connection
with his own business is so fundamental that the intention to en-
tirely divest himself of such right and transfer it to another will
not readily be presumed but must be clearly shown. Where it is so
shown the transaction will be upheld, but it will not be sustained
upon doubtful or uncertain proof.
J'_I_n J^nj^l_a_nd_ jit J3je ems_ jto _b_e_ set tied that the vendor of a
67 Law Journal, (Q.B.), 119. Lumley v. Gye, 22L.J. (Q..E.) 463.
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good-will is not entitled to canvass customers and solicit them not
to deal with the purchaser but to deal with the vendor. The vendor
will be restrained from such conduct by injunction. In this country
the authorities are not agreed. In some States the seller may
set up the same business in the same vicinity and canvass the cus-
tomers of the house, with the effect of destroying the good-will.
The English view, which we are inclined to regard as the more just
end equitable, is adopted by other authorities. 1,1
In Telford v. Smith the court held: "A contract not to
engage in a business, as an inducement to buy a business, is en-
forceable where the limitations as to place and time are specific-
2
ally mentioned."
The decisions of the Federal courts do not differ from
those of the State courts. Reasonable restraint is held valid even
though it has a tendency to lessen competition. Any restraint how-
ever which goes beyond what is necessary to protect the vendee in
his purchase is held unreasonable and contrary to the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.
The retail dealers of South Dakota agreed among themselves
not to handle the goods of jobbers or wholesalers who sold their
goods to mail order houses. The retail dealers also kept each other
informed as to the wholesalers and jobbers who sold to mail order
houses. Montgomery Ward and Company brought suit against the Asso-
ciation of South Dakota Retailer and asked for an injunction en-
joining the association to give up their agreement and cease inform-
ing each other as to the jobbers who sold to mail order houses.
1. 200 111. 386, (1902).
2. 186 111. App. 631, (1914). "An agreement not to engage in the
manufacture or sale of a commodity within a certain territory, which
is coextensive with the territory within which the raw material
from which the commodity is me.de is grown, for a term of years, is
in restraint of trade and void." 182 111. 551. 171 111. App. 433.
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The court held: "It appears that the retailers have done nothing
,
nor threatened to do anything that is actionable. Retail dealers
have a lawful right to agree among themselves thet they will not
purchase merchandise from wholesalers and jobbers who sell to mail
order houses. They may also keep each other informed as to those
jobbers and wholeselers who do and who do not sell to mail order
houses.
Betrayal of Trade Secrets. Rules relative to the betrayal of
trade secrets do not seem to be difinitely established. The deci-
sions both by State and Federal courts are made on the bases of the
methods employed by the accused in obtaining the secrets and infor-
mation from the plaintiff.
In Loven v. People, a case decided in this State in 1895,
an injunction was sustained enjoining Loven from advertising in any
manner the medicines of his former employer, Peter Fahrney. He was
also enjoined from imitating the wrappers, using the name Fahrney,
professing to know the ingredients of the Fahrney remedies or from
in any way soliciting the trade of Fahrney's customers. 2
In American Insurance Company v. France, the court held:
"When an agent is under no contractual restraint, and no violation
of business secrets reposed in him by reason of his agency is in-
volved, he has the right, after the termination of his agency, to
influence the policy holders of his former principal, to forfeit or
transfer to other companies, their polices, whether such polices
were the fruits of such agent's efforts while in his former employ-
ment, or otherwise,-------"^
1. Montgomery Ward And Company v. South Dakota Retail Merchants'
and Hardware Dealers' Association, 150 Fed. 413, (1907).
Vide 208 Fed. 733j 227 U.S. 8.
2. 158 111. 159, (1895).
3. Ill 111. App. 382, (1903).
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Anti-Trading Stamp Legislation and Litigation. No ant i- trading
stamp laws have at any time teen enacted in the State of Illinois,
and, therefore, the recent decisions "by the Federal courts involv-
ing the constitutionality of anti- trading stamp laws are of indirect
interest only, in this State. Many such laws have, however, been
passed during the last twenty years "by a number of States with the
object of regulating the trading stamp schemes or abolishing them
altogether. These laws have "been held null and void "by both State
and Federal courts until the year 1916. Some were held contrary to
the "Due Process Clause',' others to the "Equal Protection of The Law I
Clause" and many of these laws h«ve been declared an unreasonable
exercise of the police power of the State."1'
As early as 1875, Congress passed an act prohibiting any
person from engaging in gift enterprises in the District of Colum-
bia, and in 1897, gifts in connection v/ith the sale of tobacco
p
were prohibited throughout the United States. The law provides
in part as follows: " -nor shall there be affixed to, or branded,
stamped, marked, written, or printed upon, said packages, or their
contents, any promise or offer of, or any order or certificate for
any gift, prize, premium, payment, or reward.
"None of the packages of smoking tobacco and five-cent
chewing tobacco and cigarettes prescribed by law shall be permitted
to have packed in, or attached to, or connected with, them, any
article or thing, whatsoever, other than the manufacturers wrappers
and labels, the internal revenue stamp and the tobacco or cigarettes
respectively, put up therein, on which tax is required to be t^aid
under the internal revenue lews."
1. For above decisions see: 109 N .Y. 389, (1888). 74 Md. 565.
76 Vt. 197. 190 Fed. 682. 147 Cal. 763. 2^ 17 Stat. 464, (1873).
Kev. Stat, of the U.S. Sec. 3394. 3^ 30 Stat. 206; 32 Stat. 714;
t
In 1913, the States of Florida and Washington enacted
laws which were designed to abolish the trading stamp schemes in
these States. The law of Florida provides for the payment of a
$500 State license tax and a. $250 county license tax "by every mer-
chant who "offers with merchandise sold in the course of trade
any coupon, profit sharing certificate, or other evidence of indebt-
edness or liability, redeemable in premiums, The Washington
law provides that eny merchant issuing or in any way distributing
gift or profit sharing coupons shall secure a license annually from
the county auditor upon the payment of a f ee of $6,ooo."
It is apparent that the lews of both of these States are
prohibitory. In the State of Florida suit was brought in the Dis-
trict Court of the United States to restrain the enforcement of the
statute. The suit was brought by Florida merchants against a coun-
ty tax collector. The District Court enjoined the enforcement of
the law whereupon the case was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. In the bill of the appellee it was alleged that the Florida
statute was unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the
commerce clause, the due process clause, and the equal protection
of the law clause. Two cases from the State of Washington, which
had arisen under the anti-coupon and trading stamp laws of that
State, v/ere argued in the Supreme Court of the United States at the
same time. One case, Tanner v. Little, was en appeal from the U.S.
District Court and the other, Pitney v. Washington, was an appeal
from the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.^ In Tanner v.
Little, the lower Federal court held the Washington statute
The above act was declared constitutional in Felsenhead v. United
States, 186 U.S. 126.
1. Session Laws of Fla. 1913,
2. Session Lews of Washington, 1913, p. 413.
3. Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis, 240 U.S. 342, (1916).
4. 79 Wash. 608. 240 U.S. 369.
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unconstitutional, whereas in the other case the State court upheld
the Washington law. As the cases were argued together and the prin-
ciples involved were similar, Chief Justice McKenna , after describ-
ing the various coupon schemes, rendered in part the following de-
cision: "All of the schemes have a common character something is
given besides that which is or is supposed to be the immediate in-
centive to the transaction of sale and purchase, something of value
given other than it, ----They are not designed for or executed
through a sale of the 'original package 1 of importation but in the
-packages of retail . This fixes their character as transactions
within the State, and not as transactions in interstate commerce,--.
"Is it an illegal meddling with a lawful calling and a
deprivation of freedom of contract? — Appellees' contentions
have the support of a number of cases. They are opposed by others,
not nearly so numerous as the supporting cases but marking a change
of opinion. Both sets of cases indicate by the statutes passed up-
on a persistent legislative effort against the schemes under review
or some form of them, beginning in 1£80 and repeated from time to
time until the statute in controversy was passed in 1913. In such
differences between the judicial and legislative opinion where
should the choice be? That necessarily depends upon what reason-
ing judicial opindon was based. We appreciate the seriousness of
the situation. Regarding the number of cases only, they constitute
a body of authority from which there might well be hesitation to
dissent except upon clear compulsion.
"The foundation of all of them is that the schemes detail-
ed are based on an inviolable right, that they are but the exercise
of a personal liberty secured by the constitution of the United
States,-------. But there nay be partial or total dispute of the
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propositions. Advertising is merely identification and description,
apprising of quality and place. It has no other object than to draw
attention to the article to "be sold, and the acquisition of the
article to be sold constitutes the only inducement to its purchase.
"The schemes of complainants have no such directness and
effect. They rely upon something else than the article sold. They
tempt by a promise of a value greater than that article and appar-
ently not represented in its price, and it hence may be thought
that thus by an appeal to cupidity lure to improvidence, This may
not te called in an exact sense a 'lottery' may not be called 'gam-
ing,' it may, however, be considered as having the seduction and
evil of such,
The above decision is of interest, not so much for the
fact that hereafter the constitutionality of anti- trading stamp
laws will not be questioned, but for the reason that the court was
sufficiently influenced by the legislation by a number of States,
through a period of time, to render a decision in contravention to
many former decisions. The decision has, however, been severely
criticised for a number of reasons. The courtfe definition of the
object of advertising has been considered faulty as being narrow.
The purpose of modern advertising is regarded to be more than mere-
ly to call attention to the quality and place of sale of the goods.
Advertising has a standardizing effect which involves far more
than recognition of quality. The court's comparison of coupon
schemes to 'lottery' systems has been regarded as unjustifiable.
The anti-trading stamp laws also seem to savor of naternal ism, but
here the criticism belongs to the legislatures rather than to the
court except in so far as the courts are able to protect freedom
of contract against meddlesome and paternalistic laws enacted by
1. 240 U.S. 342. "

legislative bodies.
Price-Cutting versus Price-Maintenance. The term price-cutting
has not "been clearly defined. The term as used in contrast to the
phrase price-maintenance is generally employed to designate the
practice of selling identified or advertised articles at a price
lower than the one set by the manufacturer. Reductions in the
prices of such articles are of various degrees and are made for
various purposes. The reduction may be local or general; it may
be temporary or permanent; and again it may be on identified goods
only or on all goods handled by the dealer.
The reduction in price may be a permanent policy made
possible by the superior efficiency of the individual, firm, or
corporation handling the goods or it may be a temporary scheme for
the purpose of driving out competitors with a view to recouping
the losses after competition has been destroyed. Price cutting on
identified or advertised goods may also be practiced for the purpose
of leading the purchaser to believe that a similar reduction is
being made by the firm or corporation on all the goods sold by it.
The difficulty in solving the problem is increased by the
fact that many of the more objectionable forms of price-cutting are
practiced by the large organizations engaged in interstate business.
At common law the resale price of articles of commerce
cannot be fixed by contract, hence price reduction by the retailer,
unless done for a malicious purpose, is legal. But with the in-
crease in the methods of unfair competition, perfecting of the in-
genuity of the dishonest trader, growth of large-scale industrial
units, and the increase in the number of identified articles, cer-
tain forms of price-cutting have become very objectionable and de-
structive of competition and have therefore given rise to agitation
1. Vide Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 24. np, 921 ff.
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favoring legislation permitting price-maintenance contracts.
The committee on "Maintenance of Retail Prices" in 1916
made the following report to the Qhamber of Commerce of the United
States: "Your committee is convinced that legislation permitting
the maintenance of resale prices under proper restrictions on iden-
tified merchandise, for voluntary purchase, made and sold under com-
petitive conditions, would be to the best interest of the producer,
the distributer and of the purchasing public, or consumer." The
committee also quoted with approval the opinion of Justice Holmes:
"I cannot believe that in the long run the public will profit by
this court pemitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ul-
terior purpose of their own and thus to impair if not to destroy,
the production and sale of articles which it is assumed to be desir-
able that the public should be able to get."
Prior to 1908, it appears that the majority of authorities
were on the side of those advocating price maintenance, but begin-
ning with that year the attitude of the courts changes and it has
been clearly stated in a number of important cases that prices
may not be maintained by contract between manufacturer, wholesaler,
and retailer. Hence price cutting is again legal as at common law.
But this does not dispose of all forms of price-cutting, especially
the so called "predatory price-cutting."
The following cases indicate the attitude of the courts
toward price-maintenance both before and after 1908.
In Edison Phonograph Company v. Kaufman, a case decided
1. Report of Committee on "Maintenance of Resale Prices" to the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1916, pp. 3-4. Vide
Stevens "Unfair Competi t ion',' pp. 10 ff., Davies "Trust Laws and
Unfair Competition" pp.311 ff., 27 Harvard Law Review, pp. 374 ff.,
Ibid., pp. 139 ff. ( Rogers, "Good Will, Trade Marks, and Unfair
Trading" pp. 257 ff
.
2. Both sides of the subject are most thoroughly treated in the
report of the Committee on "Price-Maintenance ,.,
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in 19ol, the court said in part: "I cannot doubt that the complain-
ants have the right to sell their patented phonographs with the re-
strictions and upon the conditions contained in their 'jobbers*
agreement, 1 end that the dealers buying the patented instruments
from the jobbers with notice of those restrictions and conditions
are bound thereby.
In Victor Talking Machine Company v. The Fair, decided in
1903, it was held that the owner of a patent who manufactures and
sells the patented article may reserve to himself, as an ungranted
part of his monopoly, the right to fix and control the prices at
which jobbers or dealers buying from him may sell to the public,
and a dealer who buys from a jobber with knowledge of such reserva-
tion, and resells in violation of it, is an infringer of the patent.
The Bobbs Merrill Publishing Company undertook to fix the
retail price of its copyrighted books by placing a notice in each
book indicating the price at wlkich the book should be sold at re-
tail. Any deviation from such price indicated was declared an in-
fringement of the copyright. The United States Supreme Court held
that the statute in securing to the holder of the copyright the
sole right to vend copies of the book, conferred a privilege which,
when the book was sold was exercised by the holder, and that the
right secured by the statute was thereby exhausted. The court
also held that "---it was not the purpose of the law to grant the
further right to qualify the title of future purchasers by means
of the printed notice affixed to the book, and that to give such
right would extend the statute beyond its fair meaning and secure
1. 105 Fed. 960, (1901).
2. 123 Fed. 424, (1903).
3. 210 U.S. 339, (1908). The same opinion was expressed in Eauer
v. O'Lonnell; The Well known Sanatogen case decided in 1912, 229
U.S. 1. Vide 220 U.S. 373; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park.
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privileges not intended to be covered by the act of Congress."
In Fisher Flouring Mills Company v. Swanson , the plain-
tiff, a Washington corporation, manufacturers of flour, had entered
into a contract with the defendant, a retailer, whereby it was a-
greed that the latter was to sell a special brand of flour, manufac-
tured by the plaintiff, at a fixed advertised price. Defendant
violated the contract by selling the flour at a lower price, where-
upon action was brought by the milling company for damages. It wes
also sought to enjoin the defendant from selling the flour at lesB
than the price agreed upon. The case was tried in the Superior
Court of King County, Washington. Judgment was found for the de-
fendant whereupon the plaintiff appealed the case to the Supreme
Court of Washington. The question was presented: "Has a manufactur-
er, who has given a reputation to particular goods which he creates,
the right to fix in his contract of sale to retailers a reasonable
minimum price at which those goods shall be sold to consumers?"
The court premised that no patent question or question of inter-
state commerce was involved. It was a common law question as there
was no statute on the subject in the State of Washington. The
court held in part as follows: "When the contract fixing the price
is not ancillary to same main lawful contract, the sole object of
the contract is to restrain competition end enhance prices, and its
only tendency is to control the market it is invalid because of
this tendency . Contracts fixing prices as incidental to some
main contract, and involving less than a controlling pert of a giv-
en commodity in a given market, not proceding from, nor tending to
create, or to maintain, a monopoly, will be sustained when the re-
striction is, reasonable in reference to the interest of the
public ; .
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"Finally, it seems to us an economic fallacy to assume
that the competition which, in the essence of monopoly, benefits
the public, is competition between rival retailers. The true com-
petition is between rival articles, a competition in excellence,
which can never be maintained if, through the perfidy of the retail-
er who cuts prices for his own ulterior purposes, the manufacturer
is forced to compete in prices with goods of his own production,
while the retailer recoups his losses on the cut price by the sale
of other articles at, or above, their reasonable price . h1
The above State court decision is clearly, in opposition
to the recent Federal court decisions. The court's definition of
true competition as being between rival articles, "a competition in
excellence" as contrasted with competition between retailers sell-
ing similar articles is of interest.
In 1915, the United States brought suit against the Kellog
Toasted Corn Flake Company on the grounds that the company was
violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by its price fixing policy re-
lative to its breakfast foods. The company printed on each carton
a notice to the effect that the package must be sold at a given
fixed price and that a sale at a lower price was considered an in-
fringement of their patent rights. The court held in part: "The
general rule is well settled that a system of contracts between
manufacturers, jobbers, and retailers, by which the manufacturers
attempt to control the prices for all sales by all dealers, at whole-
sale or retail, whether purchasers or subpurchasers, eliminating
all competition and fixing the amonnt which the consumer shall pay,
amounts to restraint of trade, and is invalid both at common law
and, so far as it effects interstate commerce, under the Sherman
" 2Anti-Trust Act.
1. 137 Pac. 144. (1915). 2. 222 Fed. 725. Vide 223 111. 616.
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The above cases seem to indicate that the problem of
price-cutting versus price-maintenance is no longer complicated in
the opinion of the courts "by patent rights and copyrights. The fact
that the manufacturer puts on the market a patented article will
hereafter not give him a right to fix resale prices "beyond that en-
joyed "by manufacturers of non-patented articles.
The recent decisions by the Federal courts declaring price
maintenance schemes illegal and void are also sufficiently broad to
make legal every method of price-cutting not plainly fraudulent.
Some methods of price-cutting are however palpably "predatory"; for
example, the advertising of an identified article at a price below
its cost of production for the purpose of deceiving prospective pur-
chasers, leading them to believe tha.t all other articles sold by
such price-cutter are equally reduced in price. Such practices are
clearly contrary to every conception of fair dealing, and are plain
fraud.
But the problem remains, can predatory price-cutting be
eliminated from business practices without thereby establishing a
general price-maintenance system? If the eradication of predatory
price-cutting means the legalizing of a. general price-maintenance
system, would not the suppression of a minor evil be attained at
too great a cost? Would such a change not inure to the permanent
detriment of the consumer?
In considering the interests of the manufacturer of iden-
tified goods, the argument in the minority report made to the Cham-
ber of Commerce of the United States in 1916 is to the point: "In
the first place, let us not forget that in entering the production
of branded merchandise he did it with the full knowledge that he
had to face competition without the sheltering wing of legalized
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price-maintenance." In other words, no one has a vested interest
in a legalized price-maintenance system.
Whether e law can he successfully framed that will reach
all predatory price-cutting without legalizing a general price-main-
tenance system or whether predatory price-cutting will "be effective-
ly eliminated by the Federal Trade Commission as an unfair method
of competition remains to "be seen. In the meantime we shall have
to rely upon the courts to mitigate the evil by dealing v/ith the
more flagrant forms of the practice.
1. Report of Committee on "Maintenance of Resale Prices" made to
Chamber of Commerce of the United States 1916, p. 17.
No problem connected with market distribution has probably re-
ceived more attention recently than the subject of Price-Main tenance
One of the possible results of a legalized price-maintenance
system, and the one most to be feared, is the formation of "gentle-
men's agreements" between competing manufacturers of identified
goods. With a legalized price-maintenance system and "gentlemen's
agreements" between competitors there would be left little incentive
for "competition in excellence" by the various manufacturers of
identified commodities.
II
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CHAPTER IV
Weights and Measures
1. Provisions "by The National Government* "Experience in all ages
of the world has shown that the regulation of weights and measures
is a proper and even necessary subject for legislation; that in no
other way can certainty and uniformity be secured. 'Divers weights
and measures' were deprecated "by the wise king and similar griev-
ances led to the declaration in Magna Charta, that there should be
but one weight and measure throughout the kingdom.'" 1
The subject "Weights and Measures" deals with both the
providing of standards and the enforcement of the keeping and proper
use of such stendards by venders of merchandise.
The constitution of the United States grants to Congress
the power to fix the standard of weights and measures.' This pro-
vision, however, remained an unused power for many years, and up to
the present time has been given effect in only a few instances.
The English standard of weights and measures had been adopted by
long custom in all the States, and legislation by the National Gov-
ernment on the subject was unnecessary.
For the purpose of regulating the weight of coinage, a
brass troy-pound weight was procured by the minister of the United
States at London, in the year 1827,. and this was adopted as the
standard troy- pound of the mint of the United States. For reve-
nue purposes Congress has also at various times provided for stand-
5
ards of weights and measures. These provisions, however, were
1. 19 Iowa 388, (1865).
2. Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section, 8.
3. 3 Wall. Jr. 46.
4. 4 Statutes at Large, 277, May 29, 1828.
5. "Collection of duties: What weights and measures to be used.
All invoices shall be made out in the weights and measures of the
country --from which the importation is made, and shall contain
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not for the purjiose of regulating the business transactions of the
people. In Weaver v. Fegely, the highest court of the State of
Pennsylvania held: "It is an error to suppose that the resolutions
of Congress----establish a standard of weights and measures to reg-
ulate the "business transactions of the people. The mere grant in
the Federal Constitution to Congress to regulate weights and measur-
es does not extinguish the right in the States over the same subject,
until Congress shall have exercised the power conferred." 1
In 1836, the following resolution was passed by Congress
providing for the distribution of weights and measures: "No. 7. A
resolution providing for the distribution of weights and measures.
June 14, 1836. Resolved by the Senate --, That the Secretary of
the Treasury be, and is hereby directed to cause a complete set of
all the weights and measures adopted as standards, and now either
made or in the process of manufacture for the use of the several
custom houses, and for other purposes, to be delivered to the
Governor of each State in the Union, --for the use of the States
a true statement of the actual weights or measures of such merchan-
dise, without any respect to the weights or measures of the United
States." Act of June 30, 1864; 13 Stat. 217.
"For the purpose of estimating the duties on importations of
grain, the number of bushels shall be ascertained by weight, in-
stead of by mearuring; and 60 pounds of wheat, corn 56, rye 56,
barley 48, oats 32, pease 60, buckwheat 42, avoirdupois weight,
shall respectively be estimated as a bushel." Revised Statutes of
the United States, 1673-74, Section 2919.
"Standard of Proof Spirits. The commissioner of internal reve-
nue -may prescribe rules and regulations to secure a uniform
and correct system of weighing, inspection, marking, and gauging
of spirits." 15 Stat, of U.S. 125.
Definition of Gallon: "Gallon in internal revenue law shall be
the wine gallon of 231 cu. in." 20 Stat. 351.
"Ton to be, for collection of duties, 20 hundred weight and
each hundred weight to be 112 pounds avoirdupois." 12 Stat. 196.
"The Standard of the London Tower weight, and the English
terms and denominations used to represent the fractions and multi-
ples, were universally adopted in the United States." The
Miantinomi, Case No. 9,521, 3 Wall, Jr. 46, 1855.
1. 29 Pa. St. Reports 27, (1857). In 61 Ky. 121
,
(Metcalfe , Vol. IV.
1862), it was held: "Congress has not passed any law to fix the
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respectively, to the end that en uniform standard of weights and
measures may be established throughout the United States."^
In 1866, the use of the Metric System was authorized.
The law provides that "--no contract or dealing, or pleading in any
court, shall be deemed invalid or liable to objections because the
weights or measures expressed or referred to therein are weights
or measures of the Metric System." A table of the Metric System
2
and its equivalents in the English system is also provided.
For the purpose of securing uniformity in the measure-
ments of sheet and plate iron and steel in the United States, a
standard gauge has been adopted. No other gauge is to be used in
determining duties and taxes levied by the United States on sheet
and plate iron and steel.
A legal unit of electrical measure has also been estab-
lished by Congress.^ An act to this effect was passed in 1894.
The foregoing are the only provisions of standards of
5
weights and measures made by Congress.
In 1901, the "Office of Standard Weights and Measures"
was changed to "National Eureau of Standards" The functions of
the standards of weights and measures as it is authorized to do by
the constitution. The laws of this State, therefore govern the sub-
ject. But Professor Hassler, who was employed for that purpose
by the Secretary of the Treasury, under a resolution of the Senate,
adopted May 29, 1830, prepared standards of weights and measures,
for the use of the custom houses; and by a joint resolution of Con-
gress, adopted June 14, 1836, the Secretary of the Treasury was
directed to furnish a complete set of those weights and measures to
the governor of each State,------. These were adopted by the State
of Kentucky.
"
1. U«S. Stat, at Large, Vol. 15, p. 133. See Senate Resolution
of May 29, 1830 relative preparation of standards.
2. 14 oiat. at Large 339, July 28, 1866. A resolution to furnish
Agricultural Colleges with sets of standard weights and measures
was passed in March, 1881. 21 Stat, at Large 521. See also 20 Stat,
at Large 223; 23 Stat.L. 502; 25 Stat. L. 270-271 and 720.
3. 27 Stat, at Large 746. Act of March 3, 1893, Chapter 221.
4. 28 Stat, at Large 101. Act of July 12, 1894, Chapter 131.
5. The laws passed by Congress regulating the labeling of foodstuff
are passed by authority of the constitutional clause granting to
I
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the Bureau consist in the "custody of the standards; the comparison
of the standards used in scientific investigations, engineering,
manufacturing, commerce, and educational institutions with the
standards adopted and recognized by the Government; the construction
when necessary of standards, their multiples and subdivisions; the
testing and calibration of standard measuring apparatus; the solu-
tion of problems which arise in connection with standards; the
determination of physical constants and the properties of materials,
when such data are of great importance to scientific or manufact-
uring interest and are not to be obtained of sufficient accuracy
elsewhere. H
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce and is no at-
tempt to fix standards. See chapter on Pure Food Legislation.
1. 31 Statutes at Large 1449. Section 8 of this act provides
that reasonable fees shall be charged for all tests except those
performed for the United States and the State Governments.
State institutions may also call upon and receive from the
Bureau, free of charge, such services specified as State Govern-
ments are entitled to. 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 667, (1903).

12. Provisions and Regulations by The State Government * It is
apparent from the foregoing section that Congress has aided the
States in adopting uniform standards of weights and measures, but
has not passed any law fixing such standards for the States as it
is authorized to do by the constitution. This leaves the States
free to adopt their own standards of weights and measures and to reg-
ulate and inspect the standards used and the weighing and measuring
of articles of merchandise by such standards.^*
The Illinois legislature in 1845 passed a law providing
for standards of weights and measures, the sealing of the same, and
penalties for the use of false weights and measures in buying and
2
selling. The act is in part as follows:
"Section 1. There shall be but one standard of measure of length
and surface, one weight and one measure of capacity, throughout
this State, which shall be in conformity with the standard of meas-
ure, length, surface and weight established by Congress.
"Section 2. All commodities sold by heaped measure, shall be duly
heaped up in the form of a cone, .
"Section 3. All measures used for measuring dry commodities, not
1. 61 Ky. 121; 3 Wall. Jr. 46; 109 Cal. 310.
"The other power, 'to fix the standard of weights and measures'
was, doubtless, given from like motives of public policy, for the
sale of uniformity, and the convenience of commerce. a Hitherto,
however, it has remained a dormant power, from the many difficulties
attendant upon the subject, although it has been repeatedly brought
to the attention of Congress in most elaborate reports. Until
Congress shall fix a standard, the understanding seems to be, that
the States possess the power to fix their own weights and measures;
or, at least, the existing standards at the adoption of the con-
stitution remain in full force.- " a. The Federalist No. 42.
b. By Thos. Jefferson and John Adams. Story on The Constitution,
Section 1122.
"But until it ( regulation of weights and measures) shall be ex-
ercised by Congress, each State, it is presumed, retains the right
to fix the standard of weights and measures within its own pre-
cincts." Rawle on the Constitution, Chapter 9, p. 102.
2. Revised Statutes, 1845, Chapter 108, p. 532. An act approved
March 22, 1819, provided that county commissioners should secure
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heaped, shall be stricken with a straight stick or roller, and of
the same diameter from end to end.
"Section 4. Contracts hereafter to he executed, made within this
State, —--shall be taken and construed to be made according to the
standard weight end measure thus ascertained.
"Section 5. The hundred weight shall consist of one hundred pounds,
and twenty such hundreds shall constitute a ton.
"Section 6. The bushel shall consist of 60 pounds of wheat,
54 of rye, 52 of Indian corn, 44 of barley, 40 of buckwheat, and
32 of oats.
"Section 7. The following standards -----a yard, a pound, a liquid,
gallon, and a half bushel, shall be procured by the State sealer of
weights and measures, and deposited in a chest in his office
"Section 8. Copies of the said original standards ----shall be
deposited by the county sealers in the offices of the said county
sealers of the State.------.
"Section 10. The several county sealers shall compare all weights
and measures which shall be brought to him for that purpose, with
the above mentioned copies of such standards in their possession;
and when the same are found or made to conform to the legal standard,
the officers comparing them shall seal and mark such weights and
measures
.
"Section 14. The Secretary of State shall be, ex officio, State
sealer of weights and measures, and the clerks of the county com-
missioners* courts shall be county sealers of weights and measures
for their several counties."*''
The above act, revised and amended in minor points, is
standards of English measures end weights. Revised Laws of 111.
1833, pp. 660 ff.
1. Statutes of Illinois, 1860, pp. 276 ff.
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the present general law of the State of Illinois regulating weights
and measures.^"
It was early made a criminal offense for any one knowing-
ly to sell by false weights or measures or knowingly to use false
measures at any mill in taking toll for grinding corn or other grain.
Such a person was deemed a common cheat and subject to fine and im-
o
prisonment. This law is part of the criminal code at the present
time*
A law regulating platform scales and providing for the in-
spection of the same was passed in 1861 and amended in 1869 so as
to include all scales weighing three tons or over. The act was
repealed in 1871.
Regulation on the weighing of coal at the mines has "been
the subject of much legislation and litigation. The weighing of
coal at the mines, as provided for by law, is not for the purpose of
securing the correct weight for the purposes of sale, but for the
purpose of securing a basis upon which the wages of the miners may
be computed. In 1883, the following act was passed:
"Section 1. -That the owner, ---or operator of each and every
coal mine ---in this State shall furnish, -and place upon the
switch or railroad track adjacent to said coal mine---a 'track scale'
and shall weigh all coal hoisted from said mine ---before or at
1. In 1847, the weight of mineral coal was fixed at 80 pounds per
bushel; Session Laws, 1847, p. 168. In 1851, the weight of a bushel
of Indian corn was fixed at 56 pounds; Ibid., 1851, p. 112. In
1855, the following weights were fixed: Shelled corn 56 pounds,
corn in ear 70 pounds, wheat 60 pounds, rye 56 pounds, oats 32
pounds, barley 48 pounds, Irish potatoes 60 pounds, sweet potatoes
55pounds, Ibid., 1855, p. 176. In 1887, the weights of other
commodities were fixed. Vide Session laws 1887, pp. 309 ff., Ibid.,
1889, p. 362. Weights of sweet potatoes was changed to 50 pounds per
bushel in 1891, Ibid., p. 214. In 1913, slight changew and addi-
tions were made to former laws, Ibid., 1913, pp. 609 ff.
2. Revised Stat. 1845, Chap. 30, Sec. 155. 3^ Public Laws of 111.
1861, p. 186. Ibid., 1869, p. 393. Ibid., 1871, p. 698. 3. The
reasons for the repeal of this law are apparent; cities and~"viiiages

165
the time of being loaded on cars, wagons, -: provided that in
cases where track scales cannot "be used, or the product of such
mine ---will not justify the expense of a track scale, the owner,--
shall be permitted to furnish a platform scale .
"Section 2. All coal produced in this State shall be weighed on
the scales as above provided; and the weight so determined shall
be considered the basis upon which the wages of persons mining said
coal shall be computed.
"Section 3. It shall be lawful for the miners, employed in any
coal mine, to furnish a check weigher at their own mine." (Laws
of Illinois, 1883, p. 113.)
The above act is with slight changes made in revisions
and by amendments the present law relative to the weighing of coal
at the mines. The constitutionality of the act has been attacked
on several grounds, notably that it deprived the operator of the
mine of his property without due process of the law and that it
impaired obligations of contract. The attacks, however, have been
unsuccessful
.
1
An amendment made to this act, in 1885, provided that re-
cords of all coal weighed at the mines be kept and that these records
2be subject to the inspection of all interested. The cons titution-
3
ality of this amendment was tested in Millet t v. People. The
court held that the legislature had no power to require the owners
and operators of coal mines in this State to furnish scales, employ
a person to use them, and keep books of entries of weight for the
benefit or information of the public without first making compensa-
tion to the owners. Such a requirement was held tantamount to an
were given the power to do their own inspecting of weights and
measures of every kind by the "Cities and Villages Act" of 1871.
1. 110 111. 590, (1884). 15 111. App. 241. 2. Laws of 111. 1885,
pp. 221 ff. 3^ 117 111. 294, (1885).
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appropriation to public use of private property.*
By a revision of the act of 1883, made in 1887, all coal
mine operators not shipping by either rail or water were released
from keeping scales and from weighing the coal at their mines. An
amendment to this revision provided that all coal hoisted should be
weighed in fit cars before dumping.^ Both the revision and the
amendment to it were held unconstitutional on the grounds that the
act singled out certain kinds of mine operators and that it inter-
fered with the right of contract. Under it the miners and operators
could not agree upon any method of determining the weight of the
miners' cars except the one pointed out by the act.
The more detailed regulation relative to the weighing and
measuring of articles in commerce and the inspection of the weights
and measures used has always been exercised by the city and village
authorities in this State» the standards of weights and measures
used being, of course, those furnished by the State government. The
cities and villages incorporated prior to 1871 usually exercised
these powers by virtue of the special charters granted them, where-
as those incorporated since that year exercise these powers by
4
virtue of the general grant to municipalities by the act of 1871.
By this act powers are granted as follows: "To regulate the sale of
bread
-; prescribe the weight and quality of the bread in the
loaf. To regulate the inspection, weighing and mearuring of brick,
lumber, fire-wood, coal, hay, and any article of merchandise. ---
To provide for the inspection and sealing of weights and mearures.
To enforce the keeping and use of proper weights and measures by
vendors .
"
1. So much of the amendment was held unconstitutional as placed
the above mentioned burdens upon the operators.
2. Laws of 111., 1887, pp. 235 ff. Ibid., 1891, p. 170. 3. 160
111. 459. 4. Laws of 111., 1871, pp. 281 ff. 5. Rev. Stat. 1874,
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The above act, although revised and amended from time to
time, has not "been materially changed in its important provisions.
A law passed in 1909 specifically delegates to cities the
power to require that all grain, feedstuffs, fruits, vegetables,
dairy products, meats, groceries end all other similar articles of
merchandise, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, shall
be sold by standard avoirdupois weight or by numerical count."'"
As in the case of the powers granted to cities to regulate
the sale of foods and drinks, the courts have in every important
case liberally construed the powers granted cities and villages to
regulate and inspect weights and measures, and have held ordinances
made under them valid provided that they were reasonable and not in
conflict with the Stete laws.
In Spring Valley v. Spring Valley Coal Company, it was
held that "--where a city has been granted power 'to provide for
the inspection and sealing of weights and measures,' and 'to enforce
the keeping and use of proper weights and measures by vendors,' an
ordinance providing for the election of an inspector of weights and
measures, making it his duty to test the accuracy of scales used by
Chapter 24, Article 5, Section 62, Divisions 52-56.
In the revised Municipal Code of the City of Chicago of 1911,
there are found among others the following regulations:
"2817. The mayor shall from time to time appoint so many and such
persons to be city weighers as he may think proper,-
"2819. Each of said v/eighers shall provide his own scales
weights and measures.
"2830. There is hereby created the office of inspector of weights
and measures. He shall be appointed by the mayor
"2832. It shall be the duty of said inspector to inspect and ex-
amine once in each year all weights, measures, , used for
weighing and measuring in the city, ---and deliver to the owner
thereof a certificate of their accuracy.
"2841. The controller, at the expense of the city, shall procure
correct and approved standards -----adopted by the State of Illinois.
"2842. Every person using weights, measures, ----or any instrument,
in weighing or measuring any article intended to be purchased or
sold in the city- -shall cause the same to be inspected and shall
have it sealed by the inspector." Municipal Code, 1911, Sec. 28175*.
1. Laws of Illinois, 1909, p. 139.
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persons or corporations in the 3ale of any article or commodity,
and to condemn scales found not to conform to the standard cf the
State of Illinois, is reasonable, and a proper exercise of the
power granted the city; ----."^
An ordinance passed "by the city of Savanna provided that
all coal sold in the city should he weighed "by the city weighrnaster
and a fee charged. In a case coming up under this ordinance, the
State Appellate Court held that the ordinance imposed a burden on
2
coal dealers not imposed on other merchants and hence was invalid.
The city of Chicago, in 1907, passed an ordinance which
provides in part : "No person or corporation shall, after Oct. 1,
1907, sell---wi thin the city of Chicago any milk or cream in bot-
tles —unless each of said bottles -shall have blown into it,
the capacity thereof; ---the inspector of weights and measures
---shall have the right, at any time, to examine any bottle-- -in
which milk or cream is sold or offered for sale in the city of
Chicago---in order to ascertain whether such bottle ---is of a
capacity less than that which it purports to be; ."^ In a
case arising under this ordinance the State Supreme Court held:
"Imposing a penalty on a milk dealer having in possession, with in-
tent to use them, any bottles or jars of less capacity than is
marked on them, is a valid exercise of the police power, and does
not unconstitutionally deprive him of his property." 4
1. 71 111. App. 432.
2. 81 111. App. 471, (1898). Vide Heath and Milligan Co. v. Lin-
seed Oil Co., 197 111. 632, (1902).
3* Sec. 2479, Revised Municipal Code of Chicago, 1905 as amended
June 11, 1906 and Sept. 3, 1907.
4. City of Chicago v. Bowman Dairy Co., 234 111. 294, (1908).
In Chicago v. Schmidinger, 243 111. 167, the Court held: M --A bread
ordinance, which provides that bread shall not be made for sale in
any way but in one-half, three-fourths, or one pound loaves or in
two, three, four, five, or six pound loaves, is not unconstitutional
as depriving bakers of property without due process of law."
Vide 174 111. App. 64; 159 111. App. 522.
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CHAPTER V
Licenses
.
The police and taxing pcv/ers of the State are held to be
broad enough to subject certain mercantile activities to license
regulations. The grounds on which these activities are thus regu-
lated are various. The purchase and consumption of certain products
has a tendency to result to the detriment of the buyer; the sale of
liquor and opiates is subjected to license regulations for this rea-
son. Such products are further considered luxuries and hence a pro-
per and productive source of revenue. The sale of some products
must necessarily be subject to special inspection and supervision
because of the highly perishable nature of the products and the re-
sulting danger to the unwary consumer; the sale of fish is a famil-
iar example. License fees are in such cases required to cover the
expense of inspection. Certain mercantile businesses, which enjoy
the protection of the law, escape all regular taxation; peddling,
hawking, and itinerant vending are the more common examples. Often
mercantile activities are made subject to license regulations for
two or more of the above reasons, or for the purpose of suppressing
the businesses entirely.
The constitution of 1848 confered upon the State legisla-
ture the power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers,
merchants , commiss ion merchants, innkeepers, and grocery-keepers,
in such manner as they should see fit.^" Similar powers are con-
o
ferred upon the General Assembly by the constitution of 1870.
~
1. Constitution of Illinois 1848, Article IX, Section 2 in part.
2. Ibid., 1870, Article IX, Section 1 in part.
Under the police regulations of the revised statutes of 1845,
there is found an act containing the following provisions:
"Section 1. No merchant, auctioneer, peddler, or other person
shall be permitted to sell, vend or retail, either at private sale
or public auction, any goods, without having first obtained a
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Hawkers and peddlers who desired to hawk or peddle any
goods or wares throughout the State were early granted licenses so
to do upon the payment of a fee of fifty dollars annually.^"
By the "Cities and Villages Act" of 1871, the councils of
cities and the presidents and boards of trustees of towns and vil-
lages are given the following powers:
"To fix the amount, terms and manner of issuing and revoking licens-
es .
"To license, tax, regulate, suppress and prohibit hawkers, peddlers,
and to revoke such licenses at pleasure.
"To license, regulate, and prohibit the selling or giving away of
any intoxicating, malt, vinous, mixed or fermented liquor
Provided, that in granting licenses such corporate authorities
shall comply with whatever general laws of the State may be in
2force relative to the granting of licenses."
This license power, however, does not extend to the licens-
ing of farmers, fruit growers, vine growers, and gardners. These
license for that purpose, as hereinafter provided.
"Section 2. The county commissioners' court of the respective
counties in this State shall have power to grant such license.
"Section 3. Such license shall authorise the person receiving it,
to vend, sell and retail goods -within said county, for the space
of one year .
"Section 7. The preceding section shall not be construed to extend
to the sale of goods, wares and merchandise, by persons who are
not merchants, auctioneers, grocers, --or peddlers, nor to merchants
who pay an annual tax upon merchandise, assessed according to the
revenue laws of this State, nor to persons who sell commodities
manufactured by themselves in this State." Ibid., Chap. 64,
This act also found in the revised statutes of 1860 under the
title "Police Regulations" pages 830 and following, is not found
in the revised statutes of 1874. There is no record of its repeal
in the session laws. The "Cities and Villages Act" of 1871 Try
granting ot cities and villages the authority tc grant licenses for
all purposes named in the above general act made the general act
of practically no effect. Hence probably repealed by implication.
1. Illinois StPtutes 1860, p. 989. Public Laws of 111. 1847, p. 79.
2. Revised Statutes 1874, Chap. 14, Article 5, Section 62, Div. 4
to 46. Illinois Session Laws 1871-2, p. 218. Eefore the passage
of the act of 1871, providing for the incorporation of cities and
villages, the legislatures granted cities and villages extensive
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producers, by a special act, have the undisputed right to sell in
any place or market where such products are usually sold and in
any quantities that they may see fit, the produce from their farms,
orchards, vineyards, and gardens."'"
The power to regulate itinerant merchants and transient
2
venders of goods was granted city and village authorities in 1887.
The "business which haB been the subject of much legisla-
tion and of more license regulation than any other in the State is
the liquor or dram shop business. It was early made a criminal
offense to sell liquor in the State without a license, and cities
and villages were granted in their charters the exclusive authority
to issue or v/ith-hold licenses for that purpose within their limits.
The general "Cities and Villages" act of 1871 grants
cities and villages the same powers.
An act of 1874, in force at the present time in all ter-
ritory not anti-saloon territory, provides that "the county boards
of each county may grant licenses to keep so many dram shops in
their county as they may think the public good requires, upon the
application, by petition, of a majority of the legal voters of the
town, if the county is under township organization, and if not---
then of a majority of the legal voters of the election precinct
where the same is proposed to be located---"
This act has been amended and revised a number of times.
powers in their charters to license merchants not specifically
exempted from license regulation by the constitution and by State
law
.
All corporations in this State must be licensed before open-
ing books for subscriptions for the capital stock of the same.
Laws of Illinois, 1872, pp. 296 ff.
1. Ibid., 1871, p. 416. 2. Ibid., 1887, p. 117.
3. Statutes of Illinois, I860, Vol. 1, Criminal Code, Tivision XI,
Section 132. Revised Statutes 1874, Chap. 43, pp. 438 ff
.
For law relative to anti-saloon territory see Laws of 111. 1907-8,
p. 297.
4. Ibid., 1877, p. 99; Selling to minors or drunkards is prohibited
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In 1885, a lew was passed which provides that ell manu-
facturers, importers, and agents of any artificial fertilizer ex-
ceeding five dollars per ton in price, must obtain a license.^
The following legislature passed an act which required
every itinerant vendor of drugs, nostrums, ointments or appliances
of any kind to secure a State license from the State Board of
p
Health. The fee was fixed at one-hundred dollars. This act was
held unconstitutional on the grounds that the only effect of such
an act was to give the druggists of the State a monopoly of the
sale of all proprietary medicines. The fee was further considered
not only unreasonably high but prohibitory.
An act passed in 1911 and in force at the present time,
requires all itinerant venders to make a deposit of five-hundred
dollars with the Secretary of the State in addition to paying a
State license fee of twenty-five dollars. The proper municipal
officer is further empowered to exact a local license fee for the
privilege of vending within the limits of the corporation.
This act defines an itinerant vender as "any person con-
ducting in the State either in one locality or in travelling from
Ibid., 1883, p. 92; License fee raised to not less than 500 dol-
lars. Ibid., 1887, p. 194, ^his act prohibits the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors outside of cities and villages in less quentities
than five gallons and in the original package as put up by the
manufacturer. This act does not repeal the act of 1874 as amend-
ed. Ibid., 1891, p. 105; Sale of liquor to minors is prohibited.
Ibid., 1903, p. 164; City boards are authorized to grant licenses,
upon petition of majority voters, to persons to sell liquor for
future delivery. Licenses to be not less than 500 dollars annually.
This act applies only to those soliciting for future delivery in
quantities less than five gallons. Ibid., 1907-8, p. 302; No
license may be granted in anti-saloon territory.
1. Ibid., 1885, amended 1903, p. 5.
2. Ibid., 1887, p. 227.
3. Wilson v. People, 249 111. 195, (1911). For an act confering
upon the Board of Pharmacy discretionary power to issue permits
to persons to sell patent or proprietary medicines, see supra p. 9G.
4. Laws of Illinois, 1911, p. 291. In 1901, an act was passed
granting ex-union soldiers and sailors the right to vend, hawk,
end peddle goods without license. This act does not extend to the
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place to place, a temporary or transient "business of selling goods,
remaining in any one place not more than 120 days."
Commercial travellers ere exempted from license regulation
by this act as are such salesmen by all the other acts of the State
dealing with license regulations.
It is apparent from the foregoing acts and regulations
that the dram shop business and itinerant vending are the two main
mercantile activities that have been restricted by license regula-
tions during the last fifty years in this State. The tendency has
been to increase the restrictions in the case of both activities
by raising the license fees charged.
The well known increasing opposition on the part of many
people to the consumption of liquor is responsible for the increased
restrictions in the case of the former activity.
The increased restrictions placed upon itinerant and
transient venders are due to several causes. The regular retail
merchants consider that their sales are decreased to the extent that
these venders sell lines of goods similar to theirs. Consequently
they are using their influence to secure the enactment of laws in-
tended to suppress such vending. The law confering upon the State
Board of Pharmacy discretionary power in the granting of permits
to sell patent and proprietary medicines, and the act requiring a
prohibitory license from the itinerant vender of such medicines
illustrates this fact. The sale of inferior and worthless articles
of merchandise e.nd the fraudulent schemes often resorted to by
these salesmen have also been conducive in arousing public senti-
ment against them.
The sale of commercial fertilizers is subjected to license
vending or peddling of liquors. Laws of Illinois, 1901, p. 236.
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regulations for the purpose of protecting the purchaser against
fraud. This act requires that each lot of such fertilizer sold
he accompanied by a written statement setting forth the chemical
constituents of the contents.
The hawking of fruits and vegetables by persons not the
producers of these commodities is not usually subjected to burden-
some license regulations. The hawking of these products frequent-
ly takes the glut from the market and means an economic saving to
the consumers.
The enactment and execution of license regulations are
left almost entirely to city and village authorities, and the State
courts have been liberal in construing the powers granted for this
purpose provided they are reasonably exercised and not in conflict
with the laws of the State.
1. "A city organized under the general law has no power to re-
quire merchants to take out licenses." City of Cairo v. Bross,
101 111. 475.
"Canvassing or taking orders for future delivery is not subject
to license regulations." Rawlings v. Village of Cerro Gordo,
135 111. 36.
"Ordinances requiring unreasonable fees are invalid." 61 111.
App. 374. 67 111. App. 435.
"Municipal authority to exact license fees may not be delegat-
ed." 81 111. App. 334.
For act requiring persons or corporations, conducting whole-
sale fish markets, to secure license, see Supra p. 105.

175
CHAPTER VI
Miscellaneous Regulations
The following regulations, either directly or indirectly
effecting the mercantile business in the State, do not classify un-
der the subjects treated in the preceding chapters. Some of these
regulations are of historic interest only; for example, the restric-
tions on trading with the Indians and on the sale of playing cards
and dice. Some of these regulations ere, however, of vital impor-
tance at the present time. The regulation of commission merchants,
and the "bulk Sales act" are the more significant.
Restrictions on JThe __sale_ of J)b_scene _Books and _Pic tur_es_.
Laws have at various times been passed in this State regulating or
prohibiting the sale of obscene books, pamphlets, and pictures. The
present law prohibits the sale and display of such articles and the
employment of minors in the handling of the same. 1 A law found in
the revised statutes of 1845 forbade "the sale of playing cards,
dice, billiard tables or any other device or thing made for the pur-
2pose of being used at any game."
Sale _of_ Lead J£inejajls_. An act of 1861 regulates the sale
and purchase of lead minerals. All dealers in this article are re-
quired to keep books stating the amount purchased and sold, and the
place where such minerals are dug.~ The act is still on the statute
books
.
1. An act passed in 1871, revises Section 128, Division 11, of
Chapter 30 of the revised statutes of 1845. Laws of Illinois 1871,
p. 577.
By an act of 1873, the fine for the sale of obscene literature
was raised from 25-500dollars to 100-1,000 dollars for each offense
Ibid., 1873-4, p. 124.
All common carriers were prohibited from carrying such products.
For present act see Laws of Illinois, 1889, p. 114.
2. Statutes of Illinois, 1860, Div. 11, p. 396.
3. Public Session Laws of Illinois, 1861, pp. 140 ff
.
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•Apt. tPIL Tl1®- Protection _of_ Cons ignors __of_ Produce_. An act
having for its object the protection of consignors of fruit, grain,
flour, and other commodit ies to commission merchants was passed in
1869, and is in force at the present time. The act makes it a crim-
inal offense for any commission merchant or his agent to convert to
his own use any proceeds arising from the sale of any such produce
or the failure to deliver to the consignor such proceeds after de-
ducting the usual commissions."''
A more comprehensive act regulating commission merchants
p
was passed in 1899." This act provides "that the commission mer-
chant shall, upon the consumation of the sale of the produce con-
signed to him, immediately render a statement to the consignor giv-
ing the gross amount of the sale, freight charges and all other
charges." The act also provides for a board of inspectors. The
duty of such board is "to receive complaints regarding the disposi-
tion of the articles of country produce shipped on commission to
licensed receivers, and instruct inspectors to investigate the same.
"Every person, firm or corporation in the State of Illinois doing
business in a city of more than 50,000 population receiving on con-
sigment for sale on commission butter, eggs, poultry, game, dressed
calf, green and deciduous fruits, berries, and other commodities
the produce of the farm, with the exceptions grains, live stock
and dressed meats, shall first procure from the board a license to
carry on said business, -"
Pjtwjibjrojcers. Acts regulating pawnbrokers in their busi-
ness have been passed from time to time. These acts require such
business men to keep records of articles pawned and to make reports
to sheriffs. Rates of interest are also fixed and buying from
1. Public Laws of Illinois 1869, pp. 95 ff.
2. Laws of Illinois 1899, pp. 364 ff.
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children is prohibited. 1
Res_t£i£tions_on The 8ale of Tobaccc_ _to__M_in_ors_._ The sale
of tobacco, in any of its forms, to minors of sixteen years or under,
unless upon the written order of parent or guardian, was prohibited
p
by an act passed in 1887. An act regulating the manufacture and
sale of cigarettes was passed in 1907. The act is in part as fol-
lows: "That every person who shall manufacture, sell or give away
any cigarette containing any substance deleterious to health, in-
cluding tobacco, shall be punished-----.
"Every person under the age cf eighteen years and over the age of
seven., who shall smoke or use cigarettes, on any public road, street
ally or park or other lands used for public purposes, or in any
public place of business or amusement, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor and punished --.
"That every person who shall furnish any cigarettes in any form to
any such person --shall be punished -r--."
j3a_le_o_f Deadly Weapon s. The sale and manufacture of dead-
ly weapons and explosives has been the Subject of considerable
regu^j^ion. The 3ale of metallic knuckles and other weapons of
that character is prohibited. Deadly weapons can not be sold un-
less the purchaser's name is registered by the retailer at the time
4
of the sale.
1. Lews of Illinois 1879, p. 219; Ibid., 1903, p. 270; Ibid.,
1909, pp. 300 ff.; Ibid., 1911, pp. 294 ff.
2. Ibid., 1387, pp. 298 ff. 3. 1907, pp. 265 ff.
4. Ibid., 1881, pp. 73 ff.; Ibid., 1887, pp. 180 ff
. ; Ibid.,
1889, p. 125; Ibid., 1903, pp. 159 ff.; the laws of 1913, p. 255,
prohibit the sale of gasoline in any but containers marked "Gasoline
in red letters. The law of 1913, p. 257, prohibits the sale of
toy pistols for shooting blank cartridges. See also Laws of 1915,
pp. 37 ff.
An early act forbade the trading with Indians. It is in
part as follows: "Wo person of this State, or other person or
persons, shall purchase of, or otherwise trade or barter with any
Indian or Indians in this State, for any firearms, knives, toma-
hawks, blankets or horses, ." Rev. Stat. 1845, Chap. 54, Sec. 8.
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Jhe Julk_Sales_Act_. The so-called "Eulk Sales Act" or
an act to prevent the sale of merchandise in fraud to creditors
was passed in 1913 This act provides in part as follows:
"Section 1. That the sale, transfer, or assignment in "bulk of the
major part or the whole of a stock of merchandise, otherwise
than in the ordinary course of trade and in the regualar and
usual prosecution of the vendor's business shall "be fraudulent and
void as against the creditors of the said vendor, unless the said
vendee shall, in good faith, at least five days "before the con-
summation of such sale, transfer or assignment demand and receive
from the vendor a written statement under oath of the vendor
containing a full, accurate and complete list of the creditors of.
the vendor, and the amounts owing to each , and if there
he no creditors, e written statement to that effect; and unless
the said vendee shall at least five days "before taking passession
of said goods and chattels and at least five days "before the pay-
ment or delivery of the purchase price, in good faith, deliver
1. In 1905, an act was also passed which had for its object
the prohibition of sales of merchandise in fraud to creditors.
This act was declared unconstitutional in Opp v. Morehead, 235
111. 40. For the act see Laws of Illinois 1905, p. 284.
In 1899, an set was passed which had for its object the pro-
hibition of the use of the national flay or emblem for any com-
mercial purposes or as an advertising medium. It was made unlaw-
ful for any person to use or display the national flag or emblem,
or any drawing, lithograph, engraving, daguerreotype of the srme,
for commercial purposes. Laws of Illinois 1899, p. 234.
This act was declared unconstitutional in the following year.
The court held: "The exercise of police power by the legislature
is limited to enactments tending to promote the public health,
morals, safety and general welfare.
"The use of the flag trademark or label is not harmful in it-
self.
"The use of the likeness of the national flag for a trademark
and label has been sanctioned by the Federal authorities in charge
of the enforcement of trade mark laws .
"The flag law is unconstitutional, not only as infringing up-
on the personal liberty guaranteed by the constitution, but as
depriving citizens of the United States of a privilege, in contra-
vention of section 1, of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal
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a notice in writing to each of the creditors of the vendor
named in the said statement , of the proposed purchase by him
of the said goods : Provided, however, that it shall he law-
ful for the vendee to pay to the vendor so much of the purchase
price as shall be in excess of the total amount of the indebted-
ness of the vendor, before the expiration of the five days herein-
above referred to." ^
The uniform sales act was passed by the Illinois legis-
lature in 1915. 2
constitution." A. Ruhstrat v. People, 185 111. 133, (1900).
1. Laws of Illinois 1913, pp. 258 ff.
2. Ibid., 1915, pp. 604 ff. The uniform sa.les act is a general
act
.
In 1915 an act was passed for the purpose of regula.ting the
making, remaking and renovation of mattresses or bed comforters
and the sale of the same. This act forbade the use of second hand
material in mattresses and prohibited the sale of the same. Laws
of Illinois 1915, p. 375.
The act was declared unconstitutional.
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CHAPTER VII
Summary and Conclusions
The history of legislation regulating mercantile "business
in the State of Illinois proves no exception to the principle known
as the "unity" or "continuity in history." It shows that there
have been no sudden changes in nolicies or standards in this field
of regulation, the legislation having consisted for the most part
of enactments supplementing the common law and making it easier to
enforce its principles. Many acts and practices, illegal at com-
mon law, have also "been specifically declared to be so in statutes.^"
As in other fields of legislation there has been a con-
stant attempt to meet the shortcomings of the common law and thus
bring about a more perfect adjustment between law and economic con-
ditions on the one hand and between economic conditions and the
changing standards of business ethics on the other.
Undoubtedly the standards of business ethics have risen
somewhat during the last fifty years, but this rise has not been
commensurate with the increase in the volume of legislation passed
in this field during the same period. Changes in economic condi-
tions, such as concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, per-
fected ingenuity of the unfair trader, progress in science, greater
publicity, territorial distribution of labor, growth of centers of
population, and increase of interstate commerce are some of the
factors responsible for the mass of these new regualtions. If more
property has become "affected by a public use" it is primarily due
1. Professor Freund in discussing the shortcomings of the common
lav; as it stood at the beginning of the 19th. century says: "First,
its standards had failed to keep pace with advancing or changing
ideals; it developed no principles of reasonableness regarding
economic standards or equivalents (oppressive practices of employ-
ment, --- reasonableness of price)
; "Thirdly , the law of
fraud was too lax to insure commercial fair dealing, ."
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to a greater interdependence in our economic life and relations and
not so much to changes in our conceptions of standards of business
ethics.
Legislation regulating mercantile distribution enacted
prior to 1890 came for the most -oart in response to the demands of
the agricultural classes, the predominant producing interests of
the State, seeking protection against alleged fraudulent marketing
conditions and competition. These demands early found expression
in the so-called "Granger Movement". The railroads of the West and
the Northwest and the warehousemen and grain dealers of the city of
Chicago were the principal objects of attack. As a result of this
movement, provisions regulating public warehouses in all cities
with a population of 100,000 or more were placed in the constitution
of 1870 followed by the enactments of 1871, which among other things
provided for the Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners charged with
the enforcement of the railroad and warehouse laws.
These early laws are, with amendments on minor points,
the laws regulating public grain warehouses at the present time.
In the early seventies, the dairying interests of the
State began to demand protection against the manufacture and sale
of imitation butter and skimmed cheese. These products were alleg-
ed to be destructive of both the local and distant markets for the
genuine products.
The State passed a law for their protection in 1879 and
again in 1881. The National Government also passed an act in 1886
for their protection by placing a tax uoon the manufacture and sale
of oleaginous products made in imitation of butter. The agricultur-
al interests received further protection during this period by the
enactment of laws prohibiting traffic in diseased plants and animals
iTreund, "Standards of American Legislation" p. 70-71.
I
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A general law prohibiting the manufacture and se.le of
adulterated foods was passed in 1881, and en act regulating the
manufacture and sale of canned and preserved foods wes -passed in
1885, but as no special provision was made for their enforcement,
they remained generally inoperative.
No other important laws regulating mercantile business
were passed prior to 1890. The agricultural classes as producers
were thus the only classes receiving special protection, all effect
ive legislation having been passed in response to their demands.
The consumer, although indirectly protected end benefited, wes left
to rely upon the common lew remedies, the principle of ceveat emp-
tor prevailing.*1
By 1889 the first anti-trust wave began to pass over the
country as a result of the increase of pools, trusts, and other
combinetions in restraint of trade. Investigations by the National
and State governments were also conducive towerd increasing the
agitation e.gainst monopolization in the fields of manufacture and
market distribution.
Illinois, following the lead of a number of other States,
passed its first anti-trust l8w in 1891. This act anplies to all
industries alike, extractive, manufacturing, and mercantile. This
may be said to be the first important law seeking to protect the
consumer or buyer. Its main purpose is to protect him against
monopoly prices.
The pure food agitation, commenced by the dairying inter-
ests of the State in the eerly seventies, end resulting in the leg-
islation egainst the sele of imitation butter and cheese, was now
i« Throughout this entire period, however, as well as at the pres-
ent time, the villege end city authorities were reguaating many
phases of the mercnatile business within their jurisdictions for
the protection of the consumer.
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taken up "by the consumers who demanded protection against the in-
creasing adulterations of, end substitutions for, pure food products
of all kinds.
A comprehensive act was finally passed in 1899. This not
only restricts the manufacture and sale of adulterated and poison-
ous foods, but also provides for a special agency charged with its
enforcement. The National Pure Pood Act of 1906 greatly assists
the State authorities by keeping the impure and adulterated products
out of the channels of interstate commerce.
The legislation since 1899 has been mostly in the nature
of amendments to and revisions of former acts rather than exten-
sions of regulations into new fields.
New problems in the regulation of mercantile business have,
however, arisen during the last twenty years which threaten to be
difficult of solution. Various practices which are considered un-
fair methods of competition have been making their appearance.
These problems are difficult of solution for several reasons: both
manufacturers and merchants whose immediate interests are not served
by similar laws are involved; both State and interstate commerce is
concerned; patent rights, copyrights, brands and trade-marks compli-
cate the situation; and many of the practices ere not inconsistent
with established common law principles. These problems are further
difficult to deal with for the reason that the suppression of these
methods usually means interference with the right of contract. The
suppression of the unfair methods of competition may also directly
further monopolization.
The term "unfair competition" ha.s not been definitely de-
fined for the reason that no criterion or underlying unity has been
discovered which serves as a mark of identification or earmark

whereby e method of doing "business may be distinguished as unfair.
This feet makes it doubly difficult to so frame laws that they will
reach these alleged unfair practices without at the seme time inter-
fering with fair methods of dealing. The problem is, how fa.r may
the interference with the right of contract be profitably carried
for the purpose of preserving freedom of competition and trade.
Legislative action relative to these practices should
not be taken simply with a view to immediate relief, but rather with
a view to the ultimate results. By a c&reful study and investiga-
tion of the reasons why certain interests seek the suppression of
these so-called unfair methods more judicious action may be taken.
Although there nas been no concentration of the mercantile
business in the hands of the few as there has been concentration in
other fields of economic activity, there is a tendency for merchants
to become more and more limited in activity by policies and schemes
imposed upon them by the manufacturers and jobbers whose goods these
merche.nts handle.^ To the degree that the merchants become mere
instruments in the hafids of the manufacturers, competition between
them becomes more apparent than real, and the problem of regulating
the mercantile business becomes the problem of regulating the man-
ufacturers. The problem, for example, of the maintenance of resale
prices becomes important in view of these conditions.
A further condition necessary in order to settle many of
the problems connected with the regulation of mercantile business
in the permanent interest of all is a keener recognition of the im-
portant place which this business holds in our economic system.
Legislation passed with a view to benefiting and protecting only
the producers of the articles and commodities of commerce, or of
1. Chain stores and certain mail order houses, although not monop-
olistic in their businesses, repres^i^t concentration of consider-
able capital under centralized management.
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protecting only the producers and consumers of the commodities in
disregard of the welfare of the mercantile class must necessarily,
in the long run, result to the detriment of all.
It must be recognized that barriers placed in the way of
mercantile distribution are as truly interferences with production
as barriers placed in the way of manufacturing, and that the extra
expense thereby incurred will ultimately become a part of the price
of the goods.
The production of form utilities in contra-dis tinction to
the production of piece utilities, end particularly in contrast to
the production of time and possession utilities has always been con-
sidered the more commendable type or form of economic activity. The
man who produces grain and vegetables and the corporation that pro-
duces machinery and construction materials are considered the bul-
warks of our economic system, whereas the man or comoany that buys
these products at a certain figure, stores them for a time, and
then sells them in small quantities for a somewhat higher price to
the consumer as he needs them, is considered at best an unfortunate
necessity if not a parasite on the system.
The mercantile business may be considered as that activ-
ity which brings into vital relation the process of production and
that of distribution. It produces time and possession utilities,
the last step in the productive process. It is that activity or
process in which the shares received in distribution, that is, the
wages of laborers, the rent received by the landlords, profits made
by the enterpriser, end the interest received by the capitalist
are exchanged for the real income or consumable goods.
^
1. The creation of time utilities by the merchant is becoming con-
stantly less important as a result of the improvement of the means
of transportation and communica.tion. The merchant, unless he does
speculative buying, may order in small quantities but more often,
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The lack of appreciation of the production of time and
possession utilities together with another erroneous notion that
our money, the nominal share received in distribution, is more val-
uable than the goods for which it can "be exchanged, -places the mer-
cantile business in an unfortunate position and ex7>oses it to med-
dlesome and oppressive legislation.^ The importance of this busi-
ness as a necessary step in the production process must be accepted
in better faith in the future than it has been accepted in the past
if present problems are to be solved.
In the State of Illinois the legislatures have on the
whole been conservative in passing laws regulating the mercantile
business. Practically no legislation has been passed in the State
dealing with infair methods of competition and the term is not
found in the statutes. The legislatures cannot be said to have en-
acted laws in this field unduly interfering with the freedom of con-
tract or unduly savoring of paternalism. They have not seen fit
to substitute the principle of the civil law caveat venditor, let
the seller beware, for the common law principle caveat emptor, let
the purchaser beware. The courts, on the other hand, have been
libera.1 in construing the laws enacted in this field and have de-
clared only such laws mnconstitutional as were clearly contrary to
the principles and polices set forth in the organic law of the
State.
If our legislatures deserve to be criticised it is rather
because of the too frequent revisions of the laws. Too frequent
revisions of the laws, especially in new fields of regulation, in-
thus securing a more rapid turnover of his capital. Readings in The
Economic history of The United States, by Eogart and Thompson
,
p
. 247
.
1. 1'raud in the mercantile business ha a undoubtedly been instru-
mental in bringing unfavorable criticism upon it, but the more
basic reason is found in the lack of appreciation of the production
of time and possession utilities.
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crease the problems of the courts end produce an uncertainty among
the economic interests concerned.
Frequent revisions may "be due to one or more of several
conditions. Among others the following are probably the more com-
mon: Conditions under which the laws apply may be rapidly changing,
carelessness in the framing of the laws may make revisions neces-
sary, changes may be due to political reasons purely, or it may
have become a fad to enact sufficient laws during a legislative
session to fill a handsome volume.
Progress in legislation would rather consist in the en-
actment of a few laws, carefully framed, and correctly setting
forth policies and principles sought to be put into practice. This
would necessarily require continuity in legislative policy extend-
ing over long periods of time. For this lack of continuity in pol-
icy the criticism justly belongs to our system of State government
and not to the legislatures whose personnel and party complexion
is constantly changing.
Considering these defects in the system of our State gov-
ernment together with the rapidly changing conditions in our econom'
ic life, the surprising fact is that law and economic conditions
have not been more incongruous.
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